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This study analyses the impact of M&As on acquiring company shareholder wealth and 
market risk through empirical evidence based on event study methods and cross-sectional 
regressions. The hypotheses investigated relate to the relevance of target status, method of 
payment, acquirers‘ bidding experience, and diversification motives. The evidence is based 
on a comprehensive sample of M&A transactions comprising 46,758 initial bids announced 
in 180 countries over the period 1977-2012, covering 88 industries. The study also 
investigates the relevance of deal and firm-specific factors affecting the likelihood of the 
success or failure of a deal once announced.  
The results of the event study indicate that acquirers‘ abnormal returns are not influenced by 
uncertainty about whether the announced deals will succeed or fail, which is consistent with 
the efficient market hypothesis. The event study evidence also confirms that acquirers‘ gains 
are most significant in cross-border M&As with acquirers located in developed countries and 
targets in developing countries. Further evidence from cross-sectional regressions confirms 
that cross-border and cross-industry diversification yields significant announcement gains for 
acquirers, although in comparison with domestic and focussed deals, such deals carry a 
greater risk of failure. Diversification has no significant impact on acquirers‘ market or 
systematic risk. 
In addition, the evidence with regard to the impact of target status and method of payment 
suggests that acquirers‘ gains are most significant in stock payment deals involving private or 
subsidiary targets, while stock payment deals involving publicly-listed targets yield lower 
returns. In general, cash payment for acquisitions serves to reduce the negative impact of 
acquiring public targets, while stock payment enhances the positive impact of acquiring 
private or subsidiary targets. Correspondingly, acquirers‘ market increases with the 
acquisition of non-public targets, while using cash payment reduces this risk. The overall 
findings in this regard are robust across various samples and are generally associated with the 
existence of information asymmetry between acquirers and targets. Finally, the findings 
reveal that acquirers‘ prior experience of bidding in M&A deals is associated with 
significantly lower shareholder returns for acquirers, and this also increases their risk. This 
finding, however, is specific to serial acquirers and generally supports the hubris motive. 
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 Introduction Chapter 1:
1.1. Background 
In the corporate world, businesses know they must either grow or ultimately fail. A growth 
path allows a company to remain competitive, create profits, and increase the wealth of its 
shareholders. Companies that fail to grow, however, tend to stagnate; they lose their 
customers and market share, and their shareholders lose their investments. Mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) play an important role in this cycle by catalysing the growth of strong 
companies, preventing the survival of weaker ones, and rewarding entrepreneurs for their 
efforts. M&A transactions thus play a vital role in any healthy economy and comprise one of 
the primary ways in which companies are able to provide returns to their shareholders. 
Furthermore, such transactions have the potential to lead to exceptionally large returns, and 
this makes M&As especially attractive to both entrepreneurs and investors hoping to 
capitalise on a company‘s value. 
Sherman and Hart (2010), for example, in their textbook ‗Mergers and Acquisitions from A 
to Z‘ (3
rd
 edition), have reported M&A deals that have created massive shareholder value. 
One such case involved a two-year-old technology company with only $150,000 of invested 
capital and no revenue which was nevertheless able to obtain a return of $13 million. Another 
deal involving a 30-year-old, family-run business achieved a return of almost $30 million for 
its shareholders. For many entrepreneurs, a merger or an acquisition provides the ultimate 
‗happy ending‘ they seek (Sherman and Hart 2010: 2).  
Over the course of corporate history, M&As have played a number of different roles, from 
the infamous ‗greed is good‘ mentality prevalent in the 1980s, which often involved hostile 
takeovers in which the acquired company was then broken apart and sold piecemeal, to the 
1990s practice focussing on using M&As for purposes of industry consolidation and external 
growth. Nearly half of all companies in the United States were restructured during the 1980s, 
80,000 were acquired/merged, and more than 700,000 were forced to seek bankruptcy 
protection in order to continue operating. In the 1990s, the focus switched to an emphasis on 
operational synergy and efficiency, the formation of strategic alliances, and obtaining access 
to new technologies, and this period was thus characterised by M&A transactions promoting 
growth and consolidation. When the technology bubble burst in 2002, however, and the 
ensuing global recession began, this period of corporate prosperity came to an abrupt end. 
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Since mid-2004, markets have seen a new surge in M&A activity, driven by certain key 
trends along with general economic recovery. Many businesses have found themselves no 
longer able to continue increasing their profitability through operational efficiency or cost-
cutting and have thus begun to re-examine growth and expansion as a means to increasing 
shareholder returns. In addition, the return of corporate profits has provided support for the 
M&A market and, correspondingly, stock valuations have improved. This, in turn, has 
allowed public companies to acquire illiquid private target firms in exchange for stock. 
Finally, interest rates have continued to remain at historical lows, making even the use of 
debt a cost-effective way to finance M&A-based growth (Sherman and Hart 2010, Martynova 
and Renneboog 2009). 
In general, M&As involve complex deals, and their precise impact on shareholder wealth is 
an area that has been debated from various perspectives in the mainstream literature. A 
common empirical finding is that target firm shareholders tend to achieve positive abnormal 
returns in connection with M&A announcements. Evidence on the average returns to 
acquiring companies, on the other hand, has not allowed clear conclusions to be drawn, 
though many researchers seem to agree that poor performance may be more commonly 
associated with M&A activity from this perspective (e.g. Walker 2000, Doukas, Holmen, and 
Travlos 2002, Martynova and Renneboog 2011, Jaffe et al. 2015). In other words, the 
evidence on acquirer returns following deal announcements is conflicting, particularly with 
regard to the impact of the method of payment for public vs. non-public targets, 
diversification, and acquirers‘ previous M&A experience. This study provides empirical 
evidence on announcement-period acquirer returns based on an extensive sample
1
 of global 
M&A data, examining issues related to the impact of target status (i.e. public, private, 
subsidiary), method of payment (cash vs. stock), diversification, and acquirer bidding 
experience. The study also investigates the importance of these factors for acquirers‘ market 
(or systematic) risk. Additionally, the study evaluates the importance of these issues in 
assessing the likelihood that an M&A transaction, once announced, will be successful or not, 
drawing insights from the literature on why M&As ultimately succeed or fail. 
  
                                                          
1
 Compared to prior studies in the literature, as discussed further below, this study uses a much larger, global 
sample of M&A deals obtained from Thomson One Banker. 
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1.2. Research Problem and Motivation 
Academic research has already devoted a good deal of attention to M&A activity. One line of 
research focusses on whether M&As tend to improve or destroy shareholder wealth, and 
many such studies have examined market reactions to the announcement of M&As using the 
event study methodology (e.g. Mullherin and Boone 2000, Kohers and Kohers 2000, 
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001, Beitel, Schiereck, and Wahrenburg 2004, Choi and 
Russell 2004, Martynova and Renneboog 2011, Jaffe et al. 2015). The picture provided by 
the existing literature regarding the overall effects of M&As on shareholder wealth, however, 
is far from clear. While there is a general trend indicating that target companies tend to earn 
positive announcement returns, evidence on acquiring company (or bidder) returns has been 
quite mixed and inconclusive (Tang 2015). 
Toyne and Tripp (2008) assert that empirical findings in this regard may be sensitive to the 
time-period selected for the event study and the corresponding market conditions. Other 
market-specific factors may also play a role. For example, theoretical and empirical studies 
on shareholder wealth have examined various deal and firm-specific characteristics 
associated with M&As. Most notably, the literature has related shareholder returns to (i) the 
method of payment used to finance the deal, distinguishing between cash or stock payment 
(or a combination of both), (ii) the role and nature of information asymmetry surrounding the 
status of target firms (whether publicly-listed or private), (iii) industry or cross-border 
diversification, and (iv) acquirer characteristics such as size and experience. Investigation of 
such relationships is typically determined by combining the event study and regression-based 
methods. The extant evidence relates mostly to M&A activity in the U.S. (e.g. Mulherin and 
Boone 2000, Walker 2000, DeLong 2001, Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller 2002, Moller, 
Schinglemann, and Stulz 2004, 2007, Ismail 2008, Martinez-Jerez 2008, Santos, Errunza, and 
Miller 2008, Officer, Poulsen, and Stegemoller 2009, Akbulut and Matsisaka 2010, Boone, 
Lie, and Liu 2014, Jaffe et al. 2015), Europe (e.g. Doukas, Holmen, and Travlos 2002, 
Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin 2006, Kuipers, Miller, and Patel 2009, Raj and Uddin 2013), 
and other international markets combining developed and developing countries (e.g. Burns 
and Liebenberg 2011, Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar 2010).  
Acquiring firms have often experienced negative abnormal returns associated with M&A 
announcements in the U.S. and slightly positive returns in Europe (DeYoung, Evanoff, and 
Molyneux 2009). Most of the research has focussed on the U.S. and Europe, with fewer 
 
4 
studies examining a combined sample of announcement return data (Beitel, Schiereck, and 
Wahrenburg 2004), and the wealth effects of M&As involving a variety of developed and 
developing markets is an area which remains underexplored. Studies involving a large, 
international sample covering a number of different regions are particularly lacking, and this 
study attempts to address the question of whether M&As improve or destroy acquiring 
company shareholder wealth using a global sample of M&A data. More specifically, it takes 
into account issues such as method of payment, target status, diversification, and acquirer 
bidding experience.  
While most empirical studies on M&As have analysed shareholder wealth effects, a limited 
number of studies have examined their impact on acquirers‘ market or systematic risk (e.g. 
Lev and Mandelker 1972, Joebnk and Nielsen 1974, Chatterjee et al. 1992, Amihud, DeLong, 
and Saunders 2002, Mei and Sun 2007, Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Salleo 2008, Evripidou 2012, 
Bozosa, Koutmos, and Song 2013, Casu et al. 2015). This line of research, which combines 
the use of capital asset pricing models (CAPM) and risk regressions, has developed from 
portfolio theory, suggesting that the risk-return trade-off can be exploited via M&As owing to 
the tendency of both financial and non-financial firms to expand across industries and 
countries. However, most previous studies have investigated the impact of diversification on 
acquirers‘ risk while focussing on specific industries or country, and there is thus insufficient 
evidence at a global level on the implications of M&As for acquirers‘ market risk. This study 
also aims to contribute to the literature by taking advantage of a global sample of M&As and 
presenting new evidence on acquirers‘ market risk, investigating not only the impact of 
diversification but also other aspects of M&As, including method of payment, target status, 
and acquirer bidding experience.  
Another dimension of M&A research relates to the pre-merger characteristics of targets and 
acquirers that affect their likelihood of being involved in M&As. The literature in this regard 
is well-established, offering evidence related to both financial and non-financial firms and 
focussing on specific regions, such as the USA, Europe, and Asian countries (e.g. Powell 
1997, Gonzalez et al. 1997, Ali-Yrkko, Hyytinen, and Pajarinen 2005, Wheelock and Wilson 
2004, Rossi and Volpin 2004, Focarelli and Pozollo 2001, Buch and DeLong 2004, Hannan 
and Pilloff 2009, Pasiouras, Tanna, and Gaganis 2011). Studies in this area have largely 
employed probit/logit regressions using combined samples of firms which are both involved 
and not involved in M&A transactions. Owing to the nature of the investigation, most of the 
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studies in this area have used data for completed M&A transactions only, thereby ignoring 
deals that ultimately did not succeed.  
An interesting extension to this area of research, not explored in previous studies, is to assess 
the specific characteristics affecting the likelihood that M&A transactions, once announced, 
will ultimately succeed or fail. In this regard, it seems natural to ask whether the market 
reaction at the time of deal announcement reflects an expectation regarding deal completion 
which could be associated with specific deal or firm-level characteristics influencing 
shareholder returns or risk. According to the informational efficiency of markets, the market 
reaction at the time of a deal announcement should reflect all (publicly) available information 
regarding a deal, including both deal and firm-level characteristics. Conversely, if the market 
reflects uncertainty regarding deal completion or failure, this would be inconsistent with the 
efficient market hypothesis, which entails the implicit assumption that the market reaction at 
the time of a deal announcement is indifferent to the possibility of the deal being ultimately 
successful or not. Addressing this kind of enquiry requires (i) a sample of both successful (i.e. 
completed) and unsuccessful (i.e. terminated or cancelled) deals to avoid any sample 
selection bias and (ii) a combination of methods including the event study method and 
probit/logit regression. This represents a unique contribution to this thesis over and above the 
use of a global sample of M&A data, although it should be noted that this analysis is merely 
exploratory and purports to offer only limited evidence regarding specific deal-, firm-, and 
market-level characteristics. 
In a broad sense, then, the problem this thesis attempts to address is whether specific 
characteristics of M&As (payment method, target status, diversification, and acquirer bidding 
experience) affect acquiring company shareholder wealth and risk. Additionally, the analysis 
attempts to identify which of these characteristics and other acquiring company attributes 
play a significant role in the probability of deal failure after announcement. The empirical 
analysis investigates these issues using an extensive, global sample of 46,758 M&A 





1.3. Research Aims and Significance 
The overall aim of this thesis is to provide new empirical evidence relating to the impact of 
M&As on (i) acquiring company shareholder wealth, (ii) acquiring company risk, and (iii) the 
probability of deal failure. The evidence draws on a global sample of 46,758 M&A 
transactions and reflects specific deal-, firm-, and country/industry-level characteristics.  
Although the field of M&A is diverse and contains many unresolved issues, the empirical 
evidence normally relates to either industrial or financial entities, but not both at the same 
time, owing to their distinguishing characteristics. This distinction, however, is less important 
when controlling for specific industry or country-level characteristics in a global sample of 
M&A transactions, particularly in light of the fact that the specific hypotheses this research 
seeks to investigate relate to four main interrelated deal or firm-specific M&A characteristics. 
As stated above, these are: (a) method of payment, (b) target status, (c) diversification, and 
(iv) previous acquiring/bidding experience. 
In principle, the specific aims of this thesis involve investigating these four main aspects of 
M&A transactions. While the literature has proposed a variety of motives for M&As which 
can have an impact on shareholder wealth, there is strong evidence based on both U.S. and 
European data which confirms that the method of payment used to finance a deal influences 
shareholder returns. Typically, three methods of payment are used by acquirers to finance 
M&As: stock, cash, or a combination of both. The choice between these is further motivated 
by the presence of information asymmetry between the two parties involved in M&As: 
acquirers (or bidders
2
) and targets. Theoretical research (discussed in Chapter 2) 
demonstrates than when the bidder and target have private information about their own 
intrinsic values, the presence of information asymmetry can influence the bidder‘s choice of 
payment method (i.e. cash vs. stock). The status of the target conveys a further degree of 
information asymmetry given that shareholders or investors generally have access to more 
information about publicly-listed targets (hereafter public) than non-public (i.e. private or 
subsidiary) targets. In this sense, bidders may be influenced by potential market reactions to 
the status of the target in determining their choice of payment method, which in turn may 
influence shareholder returns. 
                                                          
2
 The terms ‗acquirers‘ and ‗bidders‘ are used interchangeably when drawing upon relevant prior studies.   
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Diversification is another issue facilitated by the nature of this study‘s global M&A sample 
which cuts across both industries and countries, although the distinction drawn here is rather 
generic instead of sector-specific, drawing on the debate between focussed (i.e. domestic and 
within-industry) and diversified (i.e. cross-industry or cross-country) deals. Potential 
synergies from diversification include economies of scale/scope and increased market power, 
as well as tax or activity-based advantages, all of which can impact profitability. However, 
diversification guarantees neither an increase nor a decrease in shareholder wealth, and 
various theoretical arguments attempt to account for these uncertain effects (discussed in 
Chapter 2). However, diversification tends to be the main motivating factor for multinational 
firms seeking to achieve expansion through M&As rather than setting up subsidiaries, which 
influences both their shareholder returns and risk. It therefore seems appropriate to inform the 
academic debate with new empirical evidence highlighting the risk-return trade-offs 
associated with portfolio theory.  
Empirical studies on M&As have also demonstrated increased interest in investigating the 
motives of serial acquirers by relating their previous experience of bidding to shareholder 
wealth. As discussed in Chapter 2, several hypotheses relate acquirers‘ bidding experience to 
performance, ranging from ‗learning by doing‘ to ‗hubris‘, although the number of empirical 
studies largely based on U.S. data tend to analyse the ‗frequent bidder effect‘ by comparing 
shareholder returns associated with multiple versus single bidders. The global sample of 
M&As permits investigation of this issue at a broader level and also allows for investigation 
of the impact of acquirer bidding experience on risk. 
Taking into account the above four interrelated considerations, namely (a) method of 
payment, (b) target status, (c) diversification, and (d) acquirer bidding experience, the 
empirical analysis seeks to investigate a number of hypotheses relating to the three main 
issues of (i) acquiring company shareholder returns, (ii) acquirers‘ market or systematic risk, 
and (iii) the probability of deal failure. As it will be discussed in Chapter 3, the existing 
empirical evidence regarding the aforementioned four M&A aspects relates primarily to their 
impact on shareholder wealth. There is also an existing body of literature relating 
diversification to risk, but there appears to be little or no research relating the impact of other 
deal characteristics, such as target status or method of payment on, for example, acquirers‘ 
risk or the probability of deal failure. This thesis therefore contributes to the literature by 
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presenting new evidence based on a global sample of M&A transactions combined with 
relevant firm-, industry-, and country-specific data to investigate the issues mentioned above. 
To summarise, this thesis aims to investigate three sets of hypotheses associated with (1) 
acquirers‘ shareholder returns, (2) acquirers‘ market/systematic risk, and (3) the probability 
of deal failure. For each of these, specific sub-hypotheses will be explored in the empirical 
analysis which relate to the four main aspects of M&A transactions, i.e. (a) method of 
payment, (b) target status, (c) diversification, and (d) acquirer bidding experience. 
1.4. Research Questions and Contributions 
In view of the broad set of hypotheses to be investigated using a global, cross-country, and 
cross-industry M&A dataset, it is important to highlight the usefulness of this research. The 
research therefore seeks to answer the following three questions:  
1. Does the cross-border and cross-industry nature of M&A data permit relevant 
investigation of the impact of payment method, target status, diversification, and acquirer 
bidding experience on acquirer shareholder wealth, acquirer market risk, and the 
probability of deal failure?  
Given the global nature of the sample, the scope of this research is somewhat broad in terms 
of pursuing the same set of four hypotheses for each of the three main areas of investigation. 
However, the emphasis is more on the empirical analysis to provide new and robust evidence 
that is comparable with prior empirical literature. For example, the existing empirical 
literature on shareholder wealth has examined the effects of cash vs. stock as a method of 
payment as well as target status (public vs. private), but it has focussed mainly on the U.S. 
and Europe. The data collected here will therefore permit a more systematic investigation on 
a global scale, covering both developed and developing regions. Furthermore, investigation 
of the impact of cross-border M&As between developed and developing economies has been 
previously undertaken by only a limited number of studies, and this research will permit a 
broader investigation of the impact of activity and geographical diversification on both 
shareholder wealth and risk.  
Additionally, while literature relating to shareholder wealth is abundant, the evidence 
pertaining to acquirers‘ market/systematic risk is relatively scarce. Hence, this research will 
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provide unique evidence relating to the impact of, for example, method of payment and/or 
target status on acquirers‘ risk, and the findings will be interpreted according to the 
theoretical analysis discussed in Chapter 2. 
2. Does the sample of data on M&A transactions provide sufficient flexibility (in terms of 
scope and variability) to ensure that the evidence from the empirical analysis is robust 
across different sub-categories/regions? 
A unique contribution of this thesis in terms of its data is the utilisation of a worldwide 
sample of 46,758 M&A initial bid announcements along with relevant deal-, firm-, and 
country-level data covering 180 countries over the period 1977-2012. While the dataset 
covers transactions across various industries (both financial and non-financial), more 
importantly for the purposes of this research, it facilitates investigation of the relevant 
hypotheses to establish new evidence for both developed and developing regions of the 
world. The majority of prior M&A research has involved small or medium sized samples.
3
 
Furthermore, the majority of the existing evidence on M&A transactions relates to developed 
countries, especially the USA. Therefore, this research is the first of its kind to include 
evidence for an extensive global sample of M&A data. To ensure robustness, the empirical 
analysis includes evidence for a variety of subsamples and event windows in order to 
investigate effects on shareholder wealth. In further regressions associated with all three of 
the main areas of investigation, robustness is pursued through a sensitivity analysis 
considering a set of variables which relate to specific hypotheses, as well for all variables 
included together, with relevant control factors. Furthermore, evidence is provided for the 
global sample as a whole as well as for subsamples comprising U.S. and non-U.S. acquirers. 
3. Does the inclusion of unsuccessful deals in the sample represent any significant advances 
in terms of contributions or evidence? 
Prior empirical studies on the impact of M&As have generally used only completed deals 
while ignoring unsuccessful deals (Mangold and Lippok 2008, Officer, Poulsen, and 
                                                          
3
 A majority of studies have used small samples, typically less than 1000 deals. For example, Raj and Uddin 
(2013) used a sample of 340 deals, Rani, Yadav, and Jain (2014) used 268 deals, and Bhabra and Huang (2013) 
used 136 deals. Studies involving relatively large samples include Ahern (2007) with 12,942 deals, and Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) who used 12,023 deals. In the middle of the spectrum, Andrade, Mitchell, and 
Stafford (2001) used 3,688 deals, Martynova and Renneboog (2011) used 2,149 deals, Fuller, Netter, and 
Stegemoller (2002) used 3,135 deals, Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin (2006) used 4,429 deals, and Jaffe et al. 




Stegemoller 2009, Rani, Yadav, and Jain 2014, Jaffe et al. 2015)
4
. Recently, however, some 
studies have focussed on the analysis of failed deals from various perspectives. Tang (2015), 
for example, analysed acquirers‘ termination returns in failed deals and found that acquirer 
gains vary significantly depending on target type. Becher, Cohn, and Juergens (2015) 
analysed the impact of analyst recommendations on the probability of completed deals and 
found that it increases (decreases) along with the favourability of acquirer (target) 
recommendations. Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi (2016) analysed unsuccessful takeover bids 
and found that the targets of cash offers are revalued on average by +15% after deal failure, 
whereas stock-funded targets returned to their pre-announcement levels. No prior studies, 
however, have analysed the impact of these attributes on the probability of deal failure. In a 
sense, this aspect of research is still in its infancy, and this study will add new evidence to the 
literature by using a combined sample of both successful and unsuccessful deals. 
Given the uncertainty about whether a deal, once announced, will be successful or not, it is 
useful to ask whether the market reaction at the time of deal announcements reflects an 
expectation regarding deal failure. This may itself be associated with the specific deal in 
question or other characteristics influencing acquirer returns or risk. Using probit regressions, 
the results will show that certain deal characteristics which improve shareholder returns (such 
as non-public targets) will also improve the chances of completed deals. 
1.5. Organisation of Study  
The rest of this thesis is organised into the following chapters. Chapter two discusses a broad 
list of rationales which have been proposed as motives for M&A transactions, along with the 
relevant underlying theories. In addition, the chapter presents theoretical arguments regarding 
the relevance of method of payment, target status, bidder experience, and diversification to 
shareholder wealth. Finally, the typical underlying causes of M&A failure are briefly 
outlined. 
Chapter 3 complements the previous chapter by focussing on the empirical evidence related 
to the theoretical issues already discussed. More specifically, the purpose of Chapter 3 is to 
review the existing evidence on the relevance of target status, payment method, acquirer 
                                                          
4
 Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004: 205) indicated that ―to estimate the shareholder gains from 
acquisitions, we consider successful and unsuccessful acquisition announcements to investigate whether this 
focus introduces a bias in our analysis and find that it does not‖.  
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experience, and diversification to shareholder wealth. Finally, the chapter discusses the 
evidence regarding the impact of M&A transactions on acquirers‘ risk. 
Chapter 4 describes the methodology used in the empirical analysis. The first of these is the 
use of the event study methodology to analyse the impact of M&As on acquiring company 
shareholder returns, taking into account the primary assumptions used to calculate cumulative 
abnormal returns. Then, the chapter outlines the empirical strategy regarding the three sets of 
hypotheses related to (1) acquiring company shareholder returns, (2) acquirer risk, and (3) the 
probability of deal failure. Each of these hypotheses includes a number of sub-hypotheses 
based on the four main aspects of M&A deals: method of payment, target status, 
diversification, and acquirer bidding experience. 
The research methodology used to test these various hypotheses draws a distinction between 
univariate and multivariate analysis. Univariate analysis deals with the relationship between 
two groups of variables (i.e. dependent and independent variables) and uses both parametric 
and non-parametric tests to account for the continuous and discrete sets of variables included 
in the analysis. Multivariate analysis involves more than two variables and uses regression 
analysis along with a parametric approach to hypothesis testing. Chapter four also includes a 
discussion of the sampling procedure used for data collection and a preliminary empirical 
analysis to highlight the global trends in the field of M&A. Finally, the chapter undertakes 
some pre-regression testing of the cross-sectional data to examine the validity of the 
underlying assumptions. 
Chapter 5 begin with the first empirical analysis relating to the impact of M&As on acquirer 
shareholder returns, presenting evidence from both the event study and CAR regressions. The 
analysis focusses on investigating the four main hypotheses relating to target status, method 
of payment, diversification, and acquirer bidding experience. The evidence is supplemented 
with appropriate robustness checks to ensure the consistency of the results. 
Chapter 6 conducts further empirical analysis presenting evidence relating to the impact of 
M&As on acquirers‘ market risk as well as on the probability of deal failure following 
announcement. The first part of this chapter investigates the relative importance of the factors 
that can influence the change in acquirers‘ risk, and the second part investigates whether the 
probability of unsuccessful deals is influenced by the range of factors that influence 
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acquirers‘ characteristics as well as by the relevant deal categories relating to the 
aforementioned four hypotheses. 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes by summarising the empirical findings, discussing the 








 Theories and Motives for M&As and Implications for Shareholder Wealth Chapter 2:
and Risk 
2.1. Introduction 
Although organisations may have different reasons for partaking in M&As, their intention is 
usually to generate higher shareholder value as a combined entity than they were previously 
able as two separate entities (Sudarsanam 2003, Chakravorty 2012, Dhir and Mital 2012). 
Sudarsanam (2003) posits that M&As serve to improve shareholder value, create or enhance 
competitive advantage (e.g. economies of scale, scope, or increased market power) and grow 
the acquiring party‘s asset base, revenues, and market share. Basically, this entails benefitting 
from a synergistic situation where ‗one plus one equals three‘. Although the specifics may 
vary according to the type of merger and the underlying characteristics of the merging 
parties, gaining such an advantage through the financing means available remains the key 
motivation for bidders to engage with a target in an M&A transaction. 
In this chapter, a broad list of different rationales which have been proposed as motives for 
M&As will be analysed, and their underlying theories and motives will be discussed. The 
existing literature has proposed a variety of motives which can have an impact on shareholder 
wealth and has also shown that asymmetric information (between bidder and target) is a 
crucial factor determining the method of payment used in M&A transactions. Furthermore, 
the theoretical arguments highlighting the relevance of target status, bidder experience, and 
diversification motives are considered in terms of their relevance in determining shareholder 
value. Hence, in the analysis that follows, the importance of these attributes will be analysed 
along with how they affect bidding-company shareholder value and/or risk. Finally, the 




2.2. Theories and Motives for Mergers and Acquisitions 
2.2.1. Motives  
M&As are an important part of many firms‘ strategies, and the motivation to engage in this 
type of activity usually arises from the acquiring company‘s strategic objectives. Prior studies 
have proposed numerous motives and underlying theories for M&As, but the popularity of 
such transactions has also led researchers to examine the motivating factors which affect 
shareholder value. A review of the literature suggests that different motives or attributes have 
different impacts on shareholder value. This section sheds light on the motivating factors 
affecting shareholder wealth, which can be separated into three categories: 
1. Factors that improve shareholder wealth. 
2. Factors that destroy shareholder wealth. 
3. Factors that have an uncertain effect on shareholder wealth. 
The first group includes factors that improve the shareholder value of the merging firms due 
to the potential for increased profits or market value. The second group includes agency 
motives which emphasise managerial interests rather than the interests of shareholders; the 
rationale for these mergers is to increase the acquiring firm manager‘s wealth and prestige 
even if this may result in undermining the firm‘s value (Cartwright and Cooper 1996, Napier 
1989, Halpern 1983, Firth 1980, Bhalla 2011). This distinction is important because acting in 
the interest of shareholders improves the firm‘s welfare through efficiency gains or the 
exercise of market power according to the neoclassical view. In contrast, agency cost 
considerations emphasise that managerial gains should not reflect any welfare improvement. 
Finally, the third group considers factors that could either improve or reduce shareholder 
wealth and could be associated with a firm‘s expansion or diversification, irrespective of 
whether managerial or shareholder interests are taken into account. 
2.2.2. Factors Which Improve Shareholder Wealth 
The motivating factors that improve shareholder wealth include synergy, economies of scale 





2.2.2.1. The Synergy Motive 
The word ‗synergy‘ comes from an ancient Greek term meaning ‗working together‘ (Bruner 
2004: 325). It occurs when two entities come together to create a whole which is greater than 
the sum of its parts, such as when the reaction between two chemicals releases a great amount 
of energy. In the context of takeovers, this usually refers to firms producing greater combined 
profits after merging than before, so that there is a positive net acquisition value (NAV).  
The synergy motive is the most common motivating factor for engaging in M&As 
(Alexandridis, Petmezas, and Travlos 2010). It refers to combining the assets of two 
companies to create a new, joint entity with a higher value than those of the two separate 
firms (Seth, Song, and Pettit 2000, Dhir and Mital 2012). Gondhalekar and Bhagwat (2003) 
found that in synergy-motivated M&As, the acquiring management seeks to benefit their 
shareholders through increased profitability associated with synergy gains. This may come 
through the transfer of some valuable intangible assets, such as know-how, between targets 
and acquirers (Seth, Song, and Pettit 2000).  
Analysing the synergy effects of an M&A transaction is a key element for management in 
terms of determining success. Empirical studies indicate that the synergy motive is beneficial 
for targets, acquirers, and total gains (Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993, Gondhalekar and 
Bhagwat 2003). Sudarsanam, Holl, and Salami (1996) posit that the synergy motive improves 
shareholder wealth for both the acquirer and the target. Moreover, other empirical findings 
suggest that total gains (target + acquirer) from acquisitions are positive (implying that 
synergies exist) in tender-offers (Bradley, Desai, and Kim 1983, 1988). In addition, Hubbard 
and Palia (1999) find such gains in takeovers of cash-strapped companies by cash-rich 
companies. Maquieira, Megginson, and Nail (1998) also find this to be the case in stock-
financed, non-conglomerate takeovers. 
Chatterjee (1986), Sudarsanam, Holl, and Salami (1996), and Clougherty and Duso (2011) 
identify four different types of synergy creation: operational, financial, collusive, and 





2.2.2.2. Operational Synergy 
Operational synergy calls for a high degree of overlap in the activities, products, and markets 
of the acquiring and target companies (Sudarsanam, Holl, and Salami 1996). Increasing 
monopoly power means that there must be a horizontal or vertical association between the 
parties. When the companies are involved in the same industry, they are better positioned to 
gain from operational synergies. However, when their industries are unrelated and the merger 
or takeover is conglomerate, increasing shareholder wealth is dependent on financial or 
managerial synergies. 
Operational synergy refers to efficiency gains at the production or administration level 
(Chatterjee 1986) and may be divided into revenue-enhancing operating synergy and cost-
reducing operating synergy (Gaughan 2010) based on how the gains are achieved. This type 
of synergy can produce gains in areas including purchasing, training, and manufacturing 
(Bruner 2004). 
2.2.2.3. Financial Synergy 
According to Sudarsanam, Holl, and Salami (1996), there are three possible sources of 
financial synergy: 
1. Tax benefits from unused debt capacity in the firm (directly related to the size of the 
gap in the firms‘ debt levels). 
2. Complementary growth opportunities. 
3. Debt coinsurance.  
Fluck and Lynch (1999) and Chatterjee (1986) define financial synergy as when the capital of 
two firms is combined to reduce their collective capital costs and improve their cash flow. 
This often refers to financing expensive investments. It may, alternatively, refer to buying a 
target at a cheap price with a low Tobin‘s Q ratio (Copeland, Weston, and Shastri 2005). 
However, value creation in terms of financial synergy comes from the advantage of the lower 
cost of internal financing compared to external financing, which generates greater growth of 
investment due to excess cash flow (Copeland, Weston, and Shastri 2005). Sudarsanam 
(2003) further points out cost of savings as another aspect of value creation in M&A. 
Furthermore, according to Chatterjee (1986), financial synergies tend to be associated with 
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more value, on average, than do operational synergies. 
2.2.2.4. Collusive Synergy 
Collusive synergy refers to combining scarce resources to increase market power and reduce 
competition where prices and profits go up for all firms in a market (Clougherty and Duso 
2011). Studies indicate that collusive synergies produce greater shareholder wealth than 
operational or financial synergies (Chatterjee 1986). 
2.2.2.5. Managerial Synergy 
Managerial synergy occurs when a firm with strong management acquires a target with weak 
management. This is referred to as a disciplinary takeover, and overall value gains are 
generally enjoyed as a result (Sudarsanam, Holl, and Salami 1996).  
2.2.2.6. Efficiency Gains 
The theoretical literature has emphasised the significance of the efficiency benefits derived 
from M&As. Jensen and Ruback (1983) discuss the reductions in average costs that can be 
achieved through economies of scale, and Williamson (2007) refers to the savings achieved 
through lower transaction costs. As a result of efficiency gains in whatever form, acquisitions 
should produce gains for both bidder and target shareholders. Where improved efficiency is 
the main motivating factor for a merger, both parties will gain if this is effective, producing a 
positive correlation between their respective benefits and overall improvements in efficiency 
(McCann 2004). 
Efficiency gains include the potential for economies of scale/scope and vertical integration, 
which are each discussed in turn below. 
2.2.2.7. Economies of Scale 
Economies of scale occur when average unit costs fall in conjunction with rising output (Seth 
1990, Brealey, Myers, and Allen 2008), i.e. there is inverse proportionality between output 
and marginal costs. 
Short-term economies of scale arise when the merging of two firms allows the consolidation 
of fixed costs, such as those associated with administration, customer service, billing, 
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manufacturing, distribution, sales, etc. (Christensen et al. 2011). The underlying basis for 
short-term economies of scale is that after the merger, a single team is responsible for 
administration rather than two. Short-term economies of scale can also be achieved through 
the reallocation of output across various units of operation. Long-term economies of scale 
with respect to mergers result from an increase in output which is greater than any increase in 
combined inputs (including physical capital). This occurs, for example, when a larger and 
more financially stable firm invests in new technologies which could substantially improve 
its production process and R&D base (Roller, Stennek, and Verboven 2006). 
2.2.2.8. Economies of Scope 
Economies of scope usually occur after vertical takeovers, with efficiency gains resulting 
from a greater variety of products and the merging companies able to take on production of 
outputs where they have advantages over the other firm (Brealey, Myers, and Allen 2008). 
According to Amel et al. (2004), economies of scope (which may be based on either reducing 
fixed costs or boosting revenues through cross-selling to existing customers) are the second-
most-common motivation for banking takeovers. In the banking sector, mergers may allow 
smaller banks to benefit from access to economic research facilities they had previously 
lacked so that fixed assets and IT resources may be more efficiently applied to a larger 
number of operations; cross-selling opportunities will arise, etc. An often-quoted example is 
that of banking and insurance products offered by a combined entity after the merger of a 
bank and an insurance firm (Pasiouras, Tanna, and Zopounidis 2005, Elyasiani, Staikouras, 
and Dontis-Charitos 2015). 
2.2.2.9. Economies of Vertical Integration 
Economies of vertical integration occur when efficiency gains generally entail one firm 
taking over another firm which has a separate stage of producing an output. These savings 
may come from technical gains or from a better distribution process. For instance, 
acquisitions involving promotion, technical support, training, equipment, and financing are 
often seen as factors generating efficiency gains from vertical integration. Further savings 
may come from the elimination of opportunism that one of the parties may have previously 
been able to benefit from and vertical restraints that may have formerly added to one of the 
firms‘ operating costs (Chemla 2003). For example, when an upstream firm finds it difficult 
to induce downstream retailers‘ behaviour to align with its own interests, vertical integration 
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could be a preferred alternative to vertical restraints (e.g. quantity discounts, exclusivity 
contracts, etc.), and the firm may thus also decrease its operation costs and improve 
efficiency through vertical integration (Chemla 2003). 
2.2.2.10. Improved Market Power and Revenue Growth Motives 
Seth (1990: 101) defines ‗market power‘ as ―the ability of a market participant or group of 
participants to control the price, the quantity or the nature of the products sold, thereby 
generating extra-normal profits‖. Gaughan (2010) posits that market power and higher 
revenue growth are the most common aims of merging parties, and according to Sudarsanam 
(2003), these motivating factors can be pursued through horizontal takeovers. Andrade, 
Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) note that market power gains can be achieved through the 
formation of monopolies and oligopolies. Furthermore, greater revenue may assist firms in 
becoming more competitive and benefitting from low pricing on products with high price 
elasticity of demand (Roller, Stennek, and Verboven 2006). Growth may be pursued through 
introducing new technologies and innovative products or from entering new markets 
(Sudarsanam 2003). The firm‘s improving financial position thanks to the takeover, in turn, 
improves market power and revenue growth, which can have benefits leading to greater profit 
and shareholder wealth (Gaughan 2010). 
2.2.3. Factors Which Destroy Shareholder Value 
Motivating factors which destroy shareholder value from M&As include managerial hubris, 
agency problems, and free cash flow. These are each discussed briefly below. 
2.2.3.1. Managerial Hubris 
The concept of managerial hubris, according to Seth, Song, and Pettit (2000), consists of a 
‗hubris hypothesis‘ and a ‗managerialism hypothesis‘. 
The hubris hypothesis will hold if acquiring managers overestimate target value and gains 
from synergy (Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993, Dhir and Mital 2012). Roll (1986) and 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) argue that takeovers occur because bidding managers are 
infected with over-optimism (hubris) and thus overestimate their ability to manage the target 
firm, which causes them to overpay for it. 
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A study by Roll (1986) found the hubris hypothesis to be a valid explanation for corporate 
M&As due to the fact that managers aim to take over firms for their own benefit rather than 
to benefit their firm as a whole. As such, acquiring firms sometimes pay excessive fees for 
target companies due to the overconfidence of their management (Roll 1986, Seyhun 1990, 
Martin and Davis 2010). Furthermore, Gaughan (2010) argues that senior management hubris 
is positively correlated to the size of the premium paid. Therefore, since target gains are 
merely a transfer of wealth from the acquirer, there can be no correlation between target and 
total gains (Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993). 
According to the managerialism hypothesis, managers tend to engage in M&As in order to 
ensure that they themselves earn the highest possible compensation and to the detriment of 
shareholders (Firth 1980, Copeland, Weston, and Shastri 2005, Sharma and Hsieh 2011). 
Seth, Song, and Pettit (2000) found that due to the connection between managerial 
compensation and financial position, managers tend to prioritise growth over profitability. 
The managerialism explanation of conglomerate takeovers, as theorised by Mueller (1969), is 
that management sees a positive correlation between company size and their own 
compensation and thus aims to grow their organisation through takeovers, even when this 
does nothing to improve shareholder value. Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), however, argue 
against this, using empirical evidence of a stronger correlation between profitability and 
management compensation than between sales and management compensation. 
In conclusion, as Figure 1 below illustrates, managerial factors tend to destroy the acquirer‘s 
performance in mergers (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1990). Furthermore, it has been found 
that in cases where M&As are motivated by managerial hubris, ―(a) the combined value of 
the target and bidder firms should fall slightly, (b) the value of the bidding firm should 




Figure ‎2.1: Model of the Role of CEO Hubris in Large Acquisitions. Source: Hayward and Hambrick 
(1997: 111). 
2.2.3.2. The Agency Motive 
In some situations, the agency problem can motivate M&As (Dhir and Mital 2012). Given the 
separate functions of ownership and control, the agency problem occurs when M&As are 
motivated by managers‘ desire to increase their own wealth rather than prioritise shareholder 
value (Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993, Dhir and Mital 2012). The agency problem may 
stimulate competition between firms; however, it cannot be eliminated by such competition. 
The main beneficiaries of any such competition will be target shareholders (Berkovitch and 
Narayanan 1990, 1993). Although the agency motive can lower the acquiring company‘s 
shareholder value, managers still pursue M&As to maximise their own incomes (Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1989). It may be argued that this motivation is the main source of 
shareholder wealth destruction after an M&A transaction.  
2.2.3.3. Free Cash Flow Theory 
The free cash flows theory assumes that management and shareholder interests are in conflict, 
with managers seeking to optimise their own compensation to the detriment of shareholder 
value by accumulating free cash flow (Jensen 1986, 1988, Amit, Livnat, and Zarowin 1989). 
Such cash is not injected into activities that, from the shareholders‘ point of view, possess 
positive value.  
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can 
be found in the Lancester Library, Coventry University.
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According to this theory, therefore, managers are prone to invest cash surpluses in M&A 
activity rather than paying out dividends or engaging in share repurchase because they see 
M&A investments as a way to increase their own power (Shleifer and Vishny 1991, Brealey, 
Myers, and Allen 2008). Jensen (1986, 1988) posits that free cash flow destroys shareholder 
wealth. 
The argument behind such actions is that the cash injection to the target will create a gain for 
shareholders, but it is questionable whether acquiring shareholders actually do benefit. Amit, 
Livnat, and Zarowin (1989) argue that any gains are generally divided between the firms 
based on leverage, and accordingly, the stronger negotiating position of the target yields 
greater gains. For instance, when the stockholders of a viable target firm have other suitable 
potential bids, they will capture a larger share of the economic gain than when the target is 
facing bankruptcy. Correspondingly, the acquiring firm‘s shareholders tend to gain or lose 
depending on the target‘s alternatives. 
Furthermore, a target‘s liquidity is directly proportional to the level of certainty regarding its 
valuation. For instance, if a target firm has a high proportion of liquid assets, then the bidder 
is less certain of its value. On the other hand, if a target is not considered a going concern, 
then there is much greater uncertainty about the value of its assets. 
Finally, a financially distressed firm is not attractive to most potential bidders as a highly 
liquid target firm, even though such a firm may attract certain bidders who wish to enter new 
markets or who desire the tax benefits associated with acquisition. Thus, highly liquid firms 
are expected to make higher economic gains for stakeholders than highly illiquid firms. In 
turn, they will yield lower gains for bidders than those of financially distressed firms. 
2.2.4. Motives with Uncertain Effects on Shareholder Wealth 
2.2.4.1. The Diversification Motive 
Diversification tends to be the main motivating factor for conglomerate M&As as it decreases 
the management‘s employment risk, i.e. the risk of losing jobs and corresponding loss of 
reputation (Amihud and Lev 1981). Many large firms seek to achieve diversification through 
M&As rather than setting up subsidiaries (Thompson 1984).  
The diversification motive comes from the portfolio theory concept that gains can be made 
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from reducing risk through diversification (Zhang 1995). Zhang (1995) suggested that 
diversification within markets provides little variation in income, whereas out-of-market 
transactions tend to increase shareholder wealth. Efficiency gains usually occur in relatively 
small takeovers, while gains from geographic diversification generally occur in relatively 
large takeovers. However, diversification may be considered in terms of economic, financial, 
or strategic theory, or from a market power perspective (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2005). Gains 
may come from mutual forbearance, cross-subsidising, or reciprocal buying, which may be 
used to put pressure on single-business rivals (Chevalier 2004).  
However, diversification guarantees neither an increase nor a decrease in shareholder wealth, 
and there are theoretical arguments regarding these uncertain effects (Berger and Ofek 1995). 
Potential gains from diversification include operational efficiency, greater likelihood of 
engagement in positive net present value business activities, reduced taxes, and increased 
capacity to take on debt. Furthermore, a bidding firm may gain from economies of 
scale/scope and increased market power. Potential costs, on the other hand, may take the 
form of greater likelihood of loss-making investments, acquisition of poorly-performing units 
that reduce shareholder value, and inefficiencies created by divergent aims of central and 
division management. 
Kuppuswamy, Serafeim, and Villalonga (2012) and Tate and Yang (2015) state that 
takeovers are related or focus-oriented when the parties belong to the same industry as 
represented by the two initial digits of their four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes. All other M&As are not related or are seen as diversification strategies.  
Jensen (1986), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Stulz (1990), DeLong (2001), and 
Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) argue that focussed mergers (whether activity or 
geographical) can improve stockholder value, whereas diversifying mergers may be more 
likely to destroy value due to overinvestment and the necessity of supporting poorly-
performing units. However, it is possible for the gains based on greater debt capacity and 
lower tax burdens to make up for the potential loss of profits. For example, Berger and Ofek 
(1995: 59) state that ―diversification creates a further tax advantage by allowing the losses of 
some segments to be offset contemporaneously against the gains of others, rather than merely 
carried forward to future tax years‖. However, more recent research by Cornett, Mcnutt, and 
Tehranian (2006) finds that activity and geographically-focussed mergers produce greater 
performance gains than activity and geographically-diversified mergers. 
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2.2.5. Neoclassical and Behavioural Theories  
Although there are a wide variety of motivating factors for M&As, as discussed above, the 
underlying theories which encompass these motives may be broken down into neoclassical 
and agency/behavioural theories (Sudarsanam, Holl, and Salami 1996, Bernile and Bauguess 
2011).  
Neoclassical theories posit that mergers take place as a result of the process of capital 
reallocation due to external shocks (e.g. economic, political, technological, financial, or 
regulatory) (Harford 2005). These are motivated by the desire to keep or create a competitive 
advantage (Jensen 1988) with the intention of maximising profits and shareholder wealth 
(Martynova and Renneboog 2008). A competitive advantage means that the combined entity 
is more efficient than were the two parties operating separately. The efficiency and synergy 
motives that improve shareholder wealth, as discussed above, are considered to fall within the 
scope of neoclassical theories. 
In contrast, agency and behavioural theories posit that M&As may destroy shareholder value 
due to conflicts between management and shareholders or biased decision-making by 
management as a motivation for M&As (Jensen 1986, Roll 1986, Shleifer and Vishny 1991, 
Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993, Dhir and Mital 2012). Managers may seek to make 
acquisitions as a means to increase their own scale and power without necessarily fulfilling 
the shareholders‘ desire for value addition. Mueller (1969) argues that elements such as 
management compensation, bonuses, stock options, and promotions tend to be more 
associated with corporate size than a firm‘s profitability. Jensen (1986) assumes that as 
management salaries are linked to revenue growth, managers may push to keep the firm 
growing beyond its optimum size. Roll (1986) argues that managerial hubris makes 
overconfident managers overestimate the creation of synergy value, thereby tempting them to 
overpay and create value-destroying mergers. 
According to the behavioural theory proposed by Shiefler and Vishny (1991), managers may 
take advantage of market timing and temporary market ‗mis-valuations‘ (Rhodes-Kropf, 
Robinson, and Viswanathan 2005, Dong et al. 2006). This behavioural perspective originates 
from a study by Myers and Majluf (1984), who argue that management may use temporarily 
overvalued equity to fund the acquisition of real assets. In this regard, behavioural theories 
may be associated with either positive or negative effects on shareholder value. 
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As previous studies indicate, these theories are not mutually exclusive, and companies often 
have multiple motivations for engaging in M&A activity (Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993). 
Empirical research (discussed in Chapter 3) similarly suggests that no single theory 
encapsulates all the patterns of M&A activity/merger waves that have been observed. Based 
on an in-depth study of corporate takeovers during the 20th century, Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008) indicate that the most common finding about takeover motivation is that it 
varies with the stage of the merger wave. Furthermore, they suggest that wealth effects vary 
depending on whether a takeover occurs in the earlier or later part of a wave. Interestingly, 
their analysis indicates that companies benefitted from synergy gains in mergers that occurred 
in the first half of a takeover wave, whereas the majority of value-destroying acquisitions 
took place in the second half of a wave. 
In terms of impacts on shareholder wealth, Table 2.1 below classifies the respective gains to 
acquirers and targets of combined entities, where the positive, negative, or zero changes refer 
to fluctuations in the market share price of companies as a result of deal announcements. 
Table ‎2.1: Pattern of Gains Related to Takeover Theories. Source: Financial Theory and Corporate 
Policy (Copeland, Weston, and Shastri 2005: 760). 
The overall positive benefits may result from neoclassical motives resulting in more efficient 
production, synergies between the firms, and greater market power. Hubris theory (Roll 
1986) assumes losses for acquirers along with zero net benefits due to overvaluation of target 
companies, who gain from mergers. Agency theory generally postulates negative overall 
benefits and losses to acquirers due to failure to accurately assess target value, potential 
synergies, etc. This could be due to managers acting in their own pecuniary or corporate 
interest rather than that of the company‘s shareholders. On the other hand, Jensen‘s (1986) 
free cash flow theory posits gains to targets but uncertain effects for acquirers, with a 
negative net acquisition value. The second column in the table indicates that target companies 
overwhelmingly tend to benefit from deal announcements.  
Bidders receive net benefits when the market perceives synergies or efficiency savings from 
the takeover, where it is assumed that positive benefits outweigh any excessive premium. 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be found in the 
Lancester Library, Coventry University.
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Hubris theory indicates that the acquiring company‘s managers may overestimate target value 
and potential gains from synergy, and the agency problem occurs when the merger is 
motivated by managers‘ desire to increase their own wealth. Thus, hubris theory and the 
agency problem will lead to destruction of the acquiring company‘s shareholder value. Under 
free cash flow theory, where management seeks to maintain power and control of internal 
funds, the shareholders of bidding companies are assumed to lose out. However, Amit, 
Livnat, and Zarowin (1989) argue that bidder gains are related to target liquidity.  
2.2.6. Information Asymmetry and Abnormal Returns 
Theoretical studies (e.g. Hansen 1987, Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel 1990, Fishman 1989) 
suggest that in a merger transaction, considerable information asymmetry exists with respect 
to bidder or target intrinsic values, and this may provide incentive for merging parties to 
reveal private information in deal announcements. Hietala, Kaplan, and Robinson (2001) 
observe that such announcements often reveal information regarding the bidder‘s payment 
method or the target‘s valuation. Several studies have hypothesised a possible link between 
information asymmetry and the average announcement-time cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) of the bidder and the target.  
Roll (1977) proposed a signalling model through which a firm can reveal its private value by 
announcing an intention to raise debt capital in the market, since investors may assume that a 
firm which declares debt capital is of high quality. This could extend to stock purchases as 
well, since when there is a high level of information asymmetry regarding the value of the 
target, the announcement of a stock purchase by the bidder may be perceived as a sign of 
confidence about the target‘s value. Various theoretical models relate to this. For example, 
Fishman (1989) analyses the bidder‘s use of cash in mergers transactions. In his model, a 
cash offer signals the bidder‘s high valuation of the target and has the advantage of serving to 
pre-empt competition from other bidders. 
Therefore, although a stock offer may in general send a negative signal about the bidder‘s 
value, this could be the other way around in cases of large amounts of target information 
asymmetry. There is ample empirical evidence to support such observations, such as Officer 
(2006), who argues that the return should actually be positive when the target is extremely 
opaque (e.g. a private company). One explanation for this comes from contract theory: the 
stock offer could be thought of as a contingent contract and hence provide safety to the bidder 
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in case the target turns out to be a lemon. This theory can be applied to a private target since 
the degree of information asymmetry in such transactions tends to be very high.  
2.3. Methods of Payment in M&As 
Typically, three methods of payment are used to finance M&As: stock, cash, or a 
combination of both. The impact of the payment method on shareholder wealth is an ongoing 
debate among academics. Using stock to finance M&As became increasingly common during 
the 1990s, but its use declined after 2000. For instance, Heron and Lie (2002) demonstrated 
that 31% of the takeovers between 1985 and 1997 were financed through stock, whereas 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) found that only 26.8% of takeovers were financed through a stock 
swap between 1997 and 2000. 
Moreover, Heron and Lie (2002) found that a predominance of takeovers was financed 
through cash before 1990, reaching a maximum of 74% in 1988. The contrary trend was 
observed over the following decade, with a majority of payment occurring through stocks at a 
maximum of 66% in 1996. Of the 859 takeovers observed by Heron and Lie (2002), 50% 
were acquired through stock payment, 40% through stock swap, and only 10% using a 
combination. 
One of the benefits of the stock swap is the new share capital that is issued during the merger 
process, which alleviates the liquidity problem for the merging firms. Moreover, given that 
the target company is exposed to the same risk as the acquirer after the merger, the risk of a 
high premium is limited. This effect is referred to by Hansen (1987) as ‗the contingent 
pricing effect of stock payment hypothesis‘, and it denies the theory that shareholders sell 
their stocks to generate profit once the target is acquired if they believe that the value of the 
bidder‘s shares are overvalued. 
In contrast to Hansen‘s (1987) hypothesis, researchers have pointed out that purchasing a 
company with stocks may send a negative signal to the market. This argument relies on the 
signalling effect and information asymmetry theories and states that acquirers will choose to 
buy a company with stocks only if their own shares are overvalued (Myers and Majluf 1984, 
Berkovitch and Narayanan 1990). In addition, higher integration costs are incurred with the 
dilution of outstanding shares, and the remuneration of managers can no longer be directly 
related to their investment decision. Synergy is reduced due to these agency problems, and 
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this result in falling share prices at the time of the announcement as the market recognises the 
issues at hand. 
On the other hand, financing the merger through cash generally has a positive impact on the 
share prices of the merging firms. In this case, the acquirer finances the cost of the merger 
directly, generally through long-term debt. This implies a belief that the company will 
generate high enough returns to cover the interest costs of the debt. Furthermore, a 
commitment to repay the long-term debt will also motivate the creation of synergy between 
the two companies in order to improve their financial performance. In order to understand 
how the bidder is influenced regarding choice of payment method, the next section considers 
the relevant underlying theoretical issues. 
2.3.1. Information Asymmetry and Method of Payment 
Given that both bidder and target have private information about their own intrinsic values, 
the presence of information asymmetry can influence the bidder‘s choice of payment between 
cash and stock. Several theoretical papers (e.g. Hansen 1987, Fishman 1989, Eckbo, 
Giammarino and Heinkel, 1990, Finnerty, Jiao, and Yan 2012) have argued that a cash offer 
enables a bidder to avoid potential mispricing arising from the bidder‘s private information 
about its value (bidder information asymmetry) and that a stock offer can help the bidder 
reduce the cost of overpayment which arises from the target‘s private information about its 
value (target information asymmetry). However, it is also acknowledged that all-stock or all-
cash offers cannot simultaneously resolve both bidder and target information asymmetry. 
This dual problem has been referred to as the ‗double-sided asymmetric information problem‘ 
(Finnerty, Jiao, and Yan 2012). 
To further illustrate the issues at hand, consider cash and stock as the only two possible 
methods of payment. In an all-stock merger, the value of the offer made by the bidder is 
dependent on the combined value of the bidder and the target as well as the potential synergy 
resulting from the prospective merger. As argued intuitively by Finnerty, Jiao, and Yan 
(2012), the value of a stock offer is sensitive to both types of information asymmetries (i.e. 
bidder and target), and a high-value bidder may distinguish itself from a low-value bidder by 
offering stock. By doing so, the high-value bidder can share some of the overpayment with 
the target‘s shareholders, which reduces the bidder‘s overpayment cost. On the other hand, 
the value of an all-cash offer, unlike an all-stock offer, is unaffected by bidder information 
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asymmetry. However, in this case, the cash bidder must fully bear the cost of any 
overpayment because it cannot share this cost with the target‘s shareholders.  
According to Finnerty, Jiao, and Yan‘s (2012) line of reasoning above, the choice between an 
all cash or an all-stock offer will be based on the trade-off between the costs associated with 
under-pricing (which arise from bidder information asymmetry) and the costs associated with 
overpayment (associated with target information asymmetry). In other words, a bidding 
company is more likely to offer stock when there is a greater level of target information 
asymmetry than bidder information asymmetry. Conversely, cash will more likely be offered. 
However, all-cash or all-stock offers, as noted above, can only address one type of 
information asymmetry or the other, but not both at the same time (Finnerty, Jiao, and Yan 
2012). 
A mixed offer, on the other hand, consisting of a combination of stock and cash, may be able 
to partially address both bidder and target asymmetries (Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel, 
1990). For a high-value bidder, however, a fixed proportion of stock and cash will only 
resolve one type or the other, but not both. A mixed offer with a fixed combination will be 
more effective for resolving bidder information asymmetry if the cash fraction is higher than 
the stock fraction. Likewise, a fixed combination offer will be more effective for resolving 
target information asymmetry if the cash proportion is lower than the stock proportion. 
Finnerty, Jiao, and Yan (2012) further rationalise this argument by proposing the use of 
convertible bond securities as a more flexible means to address the double-sided asymmetric 
information problem that exists in corporate M&As. As a hybrid comprising debt and stock 
payment, the convertible bond security which allows the issuer to call for ‗forced conversion‘ 
or redemption at a suitable time in the negotiation process can help a high-value bidder 
mitigate the cost of both bidder and target information asymmetries. 
There is now a strong, established theoretical and empirical literature which draws on the role 
of information asymmetry problems and the use of appropriate payment methods to solve 
these problems in merger transactions (e.g. Hansen 1987, Fishman 1989, Eckbo, 
Giammarino, and Heinkel 1990, Finnerty and Yan 2006, Finnerty, Jiao, and Yan 2012). This 
literature developed from the insights of Myers and Majluf (1984), who first highlighted the 
overvaluation problem: under information asymmetry, a public bidder‘s announcement of a 
stock transfer for takeover could cause a perception in the market that the bidder‘s stock is 
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overvalued, leading to an adverse reaction in its share price, which could then generate 
negative abnormal returns. This problem can be mitigated by using cash as the takeover 
mechanism. However, in cases of a cash transfer, a serious problem of overpayment may 
arise, and target shareholders will generally gain at the expense of bidder shareholders. Eckbo 
(2009) provides a cogent synthesis of the literature on the payment methods used in merger 
transactions and observes that under two-sided information asymmetry, convertible securities 
may have a certain value-adding role.  
To summarise, it has been suggested (e.g. Eckbo 2009) that in the presence of bidder 
information asymmetry, the optimal mechanism is a cash offer by the bidder since it allows 
the bidder to mitigate the mispricing/undervaluation of its stock by an uninformed target 
(although the cost of such an offer is the possibility of overpayment by the bidder). 
Moreover, in the presence of target information asymmetry, it is optimal for the bidder to 
offer stock as this will mitigate the overpayment problem by the bidder, since a high-value 
bidder will share some of the overpayment cost with the target‘s shareholders. However, the 
cost of such a mechanism will be that the uninformed target may undervalue the bidder‘s 
stock. 
2.3.2. Other Factors Influencing Choice of Payment Method 
A. Growth Opportunities and Market Timing  
The investment opportunities theory posits that a relationship exists between acquirer 
valuation and the mode of acquisition, as long as firms with more growth opportunities avoid 
the underinvestment problems caused by high levels of debt finance; in response to that, they 
prefer to use stock (Martin 1996, Jung, Kim, and Stulz 1996). Furthermore, according to the 
market overvaluation theory (Shleifer and Vishny 2003, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 
2004), acquirers favour stock acquisitions when their equity is relatively overvalued 
compared to the target firm‘s equity in order to decrease acquisition costs. 
B. Firm Control and Monitoring  
Some studies have shown that managers are willing to realise a takeover through debt or 
internal resources (Stulz 1988, Jung, Kim, and Stulz 1996). This arises because issuing new 
shares will lead to a dilution of their ownership (and thus of their decisional power) in favour 
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of the acquirer. Moreover, if managers have a high stake in the acquiring company, it has 
been shown that they prefer to use cash as payment (Amihud, Lev, and Travlos 1990, Martin 
1996, Ghosh and Ruland 1998, Faccio and Masulis 2005). 
In the same regard, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) 
emphasise that block holders can influence managers‘ actions and may be able to match 
shareholder actions with managerial decisions to increase financial performance. Block 
holders can also recommend action to a potential bidder‘s managers in order to launch a 
takeover process. Thus, they can influence the takeover terms, especially regarding financing 
methods (Travlos 1987, Brown and Ryngaert 1991, Schlingemann 2004). 
C. Pecking Order and Free Cash Flow  
The pecking order hypothesis developed by Myers (1984) suggests that in the presence of 
asymmetric information, agency costs may be mitigated consistent with financing investment 
projects by first using internal financing (reserve cash) as a method of payment, followed by 
debt, and finally by issuing new shares, in that order of preference. Furthermore, Jensen 
(1986) concluded that there is a positive relationship between free cash flow and decreases in 
the bidding company‘s shareholder wealth in cash takeovers. He also pointed out that 
companies with large volumes of cash, large cash flows, and low financial leverage are more 
inclined to use cash payment in takeovers. 
D. Hostility, Competition, Mode of Acquisition, and Intra-Industry Deals  
The terms of an incorporation contract comprise another factor which can influence the 
financing method in M&A transactions. Particularly in hostile acquisitions or when a target is 
coveted by various potential bidders, acquirers want to finalise the transaction as quickly as 
possible in order to prevent their competitors from winning the deal (Fishman 1989, 
Berkovitch and Narayanan 1990). In this kind of deal, cash is often used as a means to deter 
competitors. 
Cash is also commonly used as a medium of payment during tender offers any time the 
management of the acquirer wants to finalise the deal quickly. This arises from the terms of 
the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, which requires an acquirer using stock as payment to wait an 
additional period of time between the offer and completion of the acquisition due to SEC 
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processes (Martin 1996). 
2.3.3. Method of Payment and Implications for Shareholder Wealth 
There is a voluminous literature relating to the valuation effects of takeovers on the bidding 
firm‘s share price and, as a result, it is important to highlight the fundamental factors which 
may influence shareholder wealth following the acquisition announcement. The literature 
suggests some prominent arguments and/or hypotheses relating to the influence of the method 
of payment on the acquirer‘s stock return upon announcement.   
First, the information content theory proposed by Myers and Majluf (1994) is related to 
signalling models of investment developed by Leland and Pyle (1977). These models 
demonstrate that, in the world of asymmetric information characterising adverse selection, 
the method of payment conveys a signalling role for the bidder. Leyland and Pyle (1977) 
developed a simple model of collateral signalling in entrepreneurial finance, where the cost of 
capital can reduce if the entrepreneur is willing to invest his own capital in the project since 
that can work as a collateral, or serve to mitigate the adverse selection problem. Myers and 
Majluf (1984) adopted this setting in their model to argue that stock issuance is always 
perceived by the market as a negative signal, since market agents may think that the acquiring 
firm proposing stock (instead of cash) is overvalued.  Inferring from the theory developed by 
Myers and Majluf (1984) model, if the acquiring firm‘s pre-announcement share price does 
not reflect the true value of the firm, the management will attempt to finance the acquisition 
using either cash or stock to signal its value to the market.  For instance, if the management 
believes that their firm is undervalued they will choose the cash offer and if they believe their 
firms is undervalued they would go for the stock offer to finance the takeover. In particular, if 
the acquiring firm that is overvalued pledges cash, the market perceives it as a positive signal, 
and if it offers stock the market will perceive it as a negative signal. DeAngelo, DeAngelo 
and Rice (1984) confirm that for any corporate acquisition, the market participants would 
perceive cash offer as good news about the bidders‘ valuation. 
Then there is the free cash flow hypothesis, developed by Jensen (1986), which states that the 
firms with excess free cash flows do have the managerial incentive problem to waste free 
cash flow in investing in negative NPV projects. The solution for the typical moral hazard 
problem is to force managers to pay out more dividends or go for stock buybacks. 
Acquisitions paid for in cash use up these excess cash flows, divert funds from other internal 
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investments or increase the indebtedness of the acquiring firm (McCabe and Yook 1997). The 
discretionary cash flow and the power of managers to use such cash flows will be reduced in 
these cases, and thus the alignment between the managers, shareholders and the bondholders 
will be strengthened. The smaller is the amount of cash flow in the hands of the managers, 
the less will be the possibility of misallocating the same. Based on this reasoning then, a cash 
financed acquisition will increase the stock price and return of the acquiring firm around the 
announcement period. 
Another hypothesis is the risk sharing hypothesis put forward by Hansen (1987). This 
hypothesis is also based on the asymmetric information problem as in Myers and Mujluf 
(1984), but here there are adverse implications for the acquiring firms. There is always a 
degree of information asymmetry about the true value of the target firm. Moreover, there is 
information asymmetry around the expected synergy which is to be achieved after the 
takeover, hence information asymmetry problem about post acquisition synergy. Hansen 
(1987) has formulated the model based on the information asymmetry theory regarding the 
true value of the target firm, hence in such a scenario, the bidders would like to pay by stock 
since they would like the target shareholders to share the risk of the post-merger revaluations. 
Martin (1996), along with Hansen (1987), has also argued that if there is high uncertainty in 
the acquisition outcome then there is a high possibility of stock payments. 
The last two hypotheses, namely, investment opportunity and risk sharing hypotheses have 
gained more attention over the years and there are some good reasons for the same. For 
example, there have been an increase in the number of mergers in several industries, for 
example, car industry, car supplier industry, food industry, which may be due to increase in 
competition, deregulation (e.g. telecommunication industry, utilities), surge of rapidly 
expanding new industries (technology sector), and increased globalisation (increase in cross-
border transaction) – all this is evidence of a general increase in investment opportunities and 
appears to fit with the investment opportunity hypothesis. 
There is also the agency conflict implying whether the managers are really concerned with 
the increase in the shareholders‘ value. Hence if there is stock offered then this may also 
mean that the managers of the acquiring companies are involving managers of the target 




To conclude, the information content and free cash flow hypothesis predicts that there should 
be negative abnormal return to the stock announcements or transactions, whereas the cash 
transactions should result in positive abnormal returns. On the other hand, the other two 
alternative hypotheses (investment opportunity hypothesis and the risk sharing hypothesis) 
have observed that the stock payments need not to be looked as the negative signals to 
markets. Such suggestions are at odds with Myers and Majluf (1984) and Jensen (1986). 
2.4. Public vs. Non-Public Targets 
Researchers have found that acquirers of non-public targets tend to achieve higher 
announcement returns than do acquirers of public listed targets, and this differential applies to 
both acquisitions of private targets and subsidiary firms (i.e. unlisted targets). In their brief 
review of previous literature, Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin (2006: 197) state, ―Although 
various hypotheses have been proffered to explain this phenomenon, none have been fully 
successful‖, and they conclude that ―[t]he fundamental factors that give rise to this listing 
effect…remain elusive‖. 
Since about 75% of M&As performed by public companies involve non-public firms, it is 
important to highlight various arguments which have been proposed in the literature. The few 
existing studies which have examined the return differential between public and non-public 
firms focus mainly on the U.S. (Chang 1998, Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller 2002, Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz 2004, Jaffe et al. 2015), though a few others have considered the 
situation in European countries (Faccio, McConnell and Stolin 2006), such as the UK (Draper 
and Paudyal, 2006), and one notable study uses a sample of M&As in the USA, the UK, and 
France (Capron and Shen 2007). Drawing upon these studies, the main explanations (or 
hypotheses) are considered below. 
2.4.1. Managerial Opportunism and Hubris 
When considering M&A activity, managers of acquiring firms may be motivated to either 
focus on value creation for their shareholders or pursue their own interests, which include 
benefits related to the size and prestige of the target company (Aggarwal and Samwick 2003). 
For example, managers may prefer to buy larger, more prestigious companies at higher prices 
if they are pursuing their own interests rather than those of shareholders. Public listed 
companies tend to be both larger and more prestigious than non-public ones, so greater levels 
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of managerial opportunism may be associated with the acquisition of public firms. On the 
other hand, the acquisition of non-public companies may be more likely to create value for 
shareholders, and the payment of an excessive price for such a target is less likely. 
Opportunism may also be associated with excessive ‗hubris‘ on the part of managers, who 
may overestimate their own ability to manage the target company (Roll 1986). This can also 
lead to overpayment for targets. 
Since managerial opportunism and hubris tend to be associated with the payment of higher 
prices, or premiums, for target companies, shareholders may view an M&A transaction 
negatively if they perceive the price to be too high (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 2004, 
Faccio, McConnell and Stolin 2006). On the other hand, if they perceive the M&A 
announcement as likely to create value, shareholders will perceive the deal in a positive light. 
2.4.2. Negotiation Process: The ‘Winner’s Curse’ 
Whether or not a firm is public listed is one of the key aspects that can affect the negotiation 
process in a potential acquisition. The corporate governance mechanisms of public companies 
put pressure on managers to encourage competition among potential bidders in order to 
achieve a higher price for shareholders (Schwert 1996, Goergen and Renneboog 2004). For 
this reason, the sale of public companies often involves an auction process in order to 
increase the number of bidders hoping to gain control (Milgrom 1987). 
However, this competition among bidders can lead to a phenomenon known as the ‗winner‘s 
curse‘ (Roll 1986). The shareholders of acquired companies will, naturally, accept the best 
offer. The bidding prices are increased by the competition, especially when managers are 
guided by hubris, which can cause them to pay excessive amounts, more than the target is 
actually worth. Such an excessive price is known as a ‗premium‘ (Jensen and Ruback 1983). 
Non-public companies, on the other hand, are usually sold in direct negotiations between the 
acquirer and the target based on the free will of both parties (Koeplin, Sarin, and Shapiro 
2000). While non-public firms can also create an auction process, it is uncommon for them to 
do so due to the fact that they tend to have neither the required financial resources nor the 
necessary contacts with investment intermediaries (Capron and Shen 2007). In addition, such 
targets may prefer to carry out negotiations with a specific buyer who can offer greater 
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guarantees regarding continuity of the company‘s activity, employment, or culture, for 
example, rather than merely seeking the highest price possible (Graebner and Eisenhardt 
2004). Greater levels of information asymmetry in these cases increase the costs of 
information for acquirers, which reduces competition. For this reason, such transactions also 
tend to receive little or no publicity. 
2.4.3. Information Asymmetry: Discount in the Acquisition of Non-Public Firms 
Although a premium may be paid for the acquisition of public firms due to the so-called 
‗winner‘s curse‘, which can have a negative impression on shareholders, arguments also exist 
in favour of the positive valuation of non-public firms in the acquisition process. These are 
based on the discount expected in the price paid by the acquiring firm‘s shareholders (Feito-
Ruiz and Requejo 2014). In other words, acquiring shareholders may take a positive view of 
an M&A transaction independent of whether the price paid for a non-public target firm 
benefits the acquirer. Koeplin, Sarin, and Shapiro (2000) estimate the discount for acquisition 
of private firms to be between 18 and 30%. Similarly, Kooli, Koratas, and L‘Her (2003) 
estimate this value to be between 20 and 34%, and Officer (2007) sets it between 15 and 
30%. 
Such discounts in the price of acquiring non-public companies are associated with reduced 
levels of transparency and liquidity, greater information asymmetry, less market visibility, 
and the absence of a share market price, all of which reduce their negotiating power in the 
selling process (Feito-Ruiz and Requejo 2014). 
2.4.3.1. Less Market Liquidity 
Because it is more difficult to buy or sell a non-public firm, the market for acquiring such 
companies is less liquid than for public firms. The negotiating power of acquiring firms in 
such cases is thus increased, and such targets tend to accept lower prices for their shares is 
less liquid markets (Officer 2007). Conversely, public companies tend to have a wider range 
of potential buyers, and individual shareholders can always opt to sell their shares on the 




2.4.3.2. Less Business Liquidity 
If a company is experiencing liquidity problems, its difficulties obtaining funding may cause 
managers to sell up, or, in the case of groups, to sell off a subsidiary (Feito-Ruiz and Requejo 
2014).  
In terms of non-public firms, negotiating power will be lower in proportion to a company‘s 
need for liquidity or the extent of its difficulty obtaining funding. According to Faccio, 
McConnell and Stolin (2006), when the acquired company is not listed, the determinants of 
shareholders‘ valuation are the same whether the company is sold as a firm or as a subsidiary 
in a group. 
2.4.3.3. Information Asymmetry Regarding a Firm’s Value 
When a target company is non-public, information about it is generally more limited. Public 
companies, on the other hand, are exposed to the scrutiny of the entire stock market. Once a 
company becomes publicly listed on the stock exchange, it is subject to regulations regarding 
transparency and the issuance of certain types of information. Public companies also tend to 
be extensively examined by financial analysts. All of this leads to great reductions in any 
uncertainty regarding their value (Capron and Shen 2007, Feito-Ruiz and Requejo 2014), and 
a public company‘s share price becomes a constant reference for potential buyers which can 
help them determine how much to bid. Non-public companies, however, have more control 
over the kind and amount of information they disclose to markets (Reuer and Ragozzino 
2008). 
This means that the managers of bidding firms tend to have less information about potential 
targets if they are non-public. This information asymmetry increases the risk of inaccurately 
valuing the target‘s assets (Reuer and Ragozzino 2008). In order to avoid adverse selection, 
therefore, shareholders of the acquiring company will lower the price offered for non-public 
firms (Akerlof 1970). 
Information asymmetry is reduced when the bidder and target companies have had previous 
trading relations. In such cases, acquired companies have greater incentive to remain more 
transparent to the buyer and provide relevant private information for evaluation by the 
acquiring company‘s managers. This can help to mitigate the negative consequences 
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associated with adverse selection and achieve a higher offering price. 
However, the information asymmetry which characterises non-public targets creates 
advantages for acquirers with access to private information. They may, for example, be able 
to obtain extraordinary gains by demanding and forcing the target to accept a substantial 
discount in the purchase price (Makadok and Barney 2001). Thus, information asymmetry 
can create investment opportunities for companies which hold more information, allowing 
them to make acquisitions which create value. 
2.4.3.4. Less Transparency and Less Complete Accounting Information 
Market regulations require publicly listed firms to disclose more complete accounting and 
financial information than non-public companies, even if regulations for the two types of 
companies are similar (Ball and Shivakumar 2005). Non-public companies, however, may 
not be required to perform any accounting audits at all. 
While public companies must transmit large amounts of financial information to creditors, 
potential investors, and other outside agents, the accounting activities of non-public 
companies are more likely to focus on internal uses such as tax payment, to aid in decision-
making, and to provide information to shareholders. Financial relationships with creditors 
usually remain private for non-public companies, involving financial intermediaries rather 
than debt issuance in the market. In addition, non-public companies tend to have more 
concentrated ownership, reducing the necessity for financial statements to serve as a control 
mechanism in management decisions (Feito-Ruiz and Requejo 2014). 
This reduced transparency of non-public companies‘ financial statements creates greater 
amounts of information asymmetry, which can lower the prices offered by potential acquirers 
in an attempt to avoid the consequences associated with adverse selection.  
The potential for a premium to be paid for public companies and the discount typically 
associated with the acquisition of non-public ones raises the question of why public firms are 
acquired at all, since it would appear more efficient to acquire only non-public companies. 
However, despite the arguments mentioned above, there are cases in which it may be optimal 
for the shareholders of an acquiring firm to purchase a public company. An acquirer may 
wish to avoid purchasing a non-public firm when there is an excessive amount of information 
 
39 
asymmetry, even though it could lead to the payment of a discounted price. For example, if 
the acquirer believes the level of information asymmetry to be excessive, it may be wiser to 
avoid the deal altogether than simply to demand a greater discount. 
In summary, the acquisition of non-public companies tends to lead to discounts in the 
purchase price, depending on the corresponding levels of information asymmetry and market 
liquidity. However, in cases where the level of information asymmetry is excessive, 
managers may prefer to purchase public companies. 
2.4.4. Bargaining Power 
There are several empirical studies which investigate the differential returns observed for 
bidders between the public and non-public (private and subsidiary) targets (Netter, and 
Stegemoller 2002, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2004, Draper and Paudyal 2006, Faccio, 
McConnell, and Stolin 2006, Capron and Shen 2007, Rani, Yadav, and Jain 2014, Jaffe et al. 
2015). One explanation is that the ownership structure of the private target is more 
concentrated, and therefore it is anticipated that the target shareholders can perform better 
monitoring, and also be more active in the negotiation process with the bidder, so that they 
can retain greater bargaining power during the merger. However, there can be situations also 
where the smaller targets may wish to cash out after the merger has happened.  
The differential returns to bidders observed between the public and private targets remains an 
anomaly which researchers have tried to explain by the distinctive shareholder characteristics 
which the private targets have. Why the markets respond differently to these mechanisms for 
private targets relative to the public targets is an issue that has not been satisfactorily resolved 
yet, theoretically, it has been associated with the greater role of the bargaining power which 
private targets could exercise in their negotiations with the bidder.  
For the private firms the ownership structure is often concentrated which avoids the agency 
problems associated with public targets. This is of crucial importance if the payment 
mechanism is based on stock, which confers significant bargaining strength of private firms 
allowing them to negotiate a premium and get better terms relative to the more dispersed 
shareholders of public targets, thus creating a belief in the market that the potential gains 
accrued to bidders are relatively greater in the case of private targets (Gonenc, Hermes and 
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Sinderen 2013).  In addition, the monitoring hypothesis suggests that the concentrated 
shareholders of private targets have greater incentives to monitor the actions of the bidders.  
However, there is also the cash out hypothesis, which predicts that the private targets would 
rather like to have the cash offer and move out of the game, and therefore cash offers yield a 
negative response of the market. Another point can be the higher risk in the cases of private 
target takeovers owing to less information and greater uncertainty about synergy gains, which 
suggests that such mergers are likely to be motivated by stock offers. Overall, there are 
various grounds to suggest differential bidder returns for private and public targets although 
empirical studies have not been successful in explaining such returns differentials. 
2.5. Bidder Experience: Frequent bidders 
Recent empirical studies on M&As have shown a substantial increase in the number of serial 
acquisitions. To support this, it will be shown that the present research found that 57% of the 
sampled bidders were frequent acquirers who made three or more acquisitions over the period 
studied.  
Previous empirical studies relating to frequent-bidder acquisitions have arrived at various 
conclusions. For example, Stegemoller (2002) and Baker and Limmack (2001) argue that 
bidders realising a series of takeovers tend to experience better performance than their single-
bidder counterparts. On the other hand, Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2011), Ismail (2008), 
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), and Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) find a 
significant negative relationship between performance and bidders‘ experience.  
2.5.1. Why Does It Matter? Relevant Hypotheses 
Seven hypotheses exist regarding the effect of an acquirer‘s experience on its performance as 
represented by the number of takeovers in which it has recently engaged. These hypotheses 
are associated with (i) learning by doing, (ii) overvaluation, (iii) hubris, (iv) monopolisation, 
(v) indigestion, (vi) merger programme announcement, and (vii) accounting manipulation.  
The ‗learning by doing‘ hypothesis asserts that both the number and order of acquisitions will 
have a positive effect on the bidding company‘s shareholder wealth. This is underlined by the 
‗acquisition learning curve‘, which implies a positive correlation between experience and an 
acquirer‘s cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). In other words, the more takeovers in which a 
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company engages, the more successful each ensuing acquisition will be in terms of 
performance.  
The ‗overvaluation hypothesis‘ entails the belief that mergers will take place only if the 
acquiring company is in a good financial position, either in terms of recent performance of 
the share price or from a positive market situation where the company operates. It could also 
be due to the agency costs which arise in the acquisition of overvalued firms (Jensen 2004). 
Bidders in this case may be more likely to use a stock swap rather than cash to realise the 
acquisition in order to increase their share performance around the announcement date (short-
run). In the same regard, this could lead to under-performance in the long-run. Recently, 
Dong et al. (2006), Ang and Cheng (2006), Shleifer and Vishny (2003) have demonstrated 
that this theory holds for both a single acquisition and for a series. This arises from the fact 
that while short-term results may be good, on a more long-term basis, their degradation often 
leads to a diminution in shareholder wealth. 
Acquiring a large number of companies, as in the ‗monopolisation hypothesis‘, can improve 
the financial performance of a bidding company, especially if the acquisitions are focussed on 
a single sector or industry. More specifically, it can increase the power of the firm within its 
market. Kamien and Zang (1993) find that bidding on companies within the industry is likely 
to increase the concentration of firms and lead to a monopolised market. However, Nilssen 
and Sorgard (1998) point out that considering the actual context of globalisation and the 
associated forces of competition, true global monopolisation is likely unachievable.  
Nonetheless, other empirical papers have found no correlation between bidder experience and 
CAR. The ‗indigestion hypothesis‘ states that, given the small amount of time between each 
acquisition, acquirers often do not gain the necessary experience to improve their CAR upon 
takeover announcement (Guest et al. 2004). This implies that every short-run takeover will 
lead to lower and lower CAR for bidding company shareholders. 
The ‗accounting manipulation hypothesis‘ states that financial statements can be manipulated 
in order to portray an overly-positive perception of the takeover. This can arise from 
corporate governance issues which lead managers to manipulate the figures in order to 
enhance their own rewards or prestige. One accounting explanation for declining 
performance is the price-earnings ratio game, which aims to increase earnings-per-share 
(EPS) by acquiring targets with lower P/E ratios. As it concerns only the accounting profit 
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and not the shareholders‘ wealth, this entails a short-term vision on the part of managers 
which could be totally offset in the long-run (Guest et al. 2004). 
The ‗merger programme announcement hypothesis‘ states that the first takeover in a 
particular period may be seen as part of a long-term merger strategy. This may be viewed 
positively by the market, leading to improvement in the performance of the firm and the 
shareholders‘ wealth. When the second takeover is announced, however, a short-term gain 
will be observed, but as a first takeover has already taken place, stock prices will already 
exhibit a decrease from this first acquisition. Thus, the merger programme announcement 
hypothesis states that a series of acquisitions will not have an overall positive effect on 
shareholder wealth (Guest et al. 2004). 
2.6. Mergers and Acquisitions and Risk 
In recent years, financial institutions have been exposed to a variety of risks in a volatile and 
uncertain environment, and this has had economy-wide spill over effects, as revealed by the 
recent global financial crisis. It is important to differentiate between uncertainty and risk. The 
former arises in situations where the probability of various effects is unknown, while the 
latter applies when the probability of prospective consequences is known. It is also important 
to bear in mind that risk which affects the financial system as a whole and can have 
economy-wide consequences is ‗systemic‘ and can be attributed to causes other than M&As. 
Focussing on the financial industry, Murphy (2012: 1) defines systemic risk as ―the 
possibility that the financial system as a whole might become unstable, rather than the health 
of individual market participants. Stable financial systems do not transmit or magnify shocks 
to the broader economy‖.  
In more general terms, according to portfolio theory, the total risk of a firm operating within 
an industry, whether financial or non-financial, comprises of two major types of risk: 
systematic risk and unsystematic risk.  
Systematic risk is related to the market or industry as a whole and is also known as ‗un-
diversifiable risk‘. With regard to the financial industry, Hendricks, Kambhu and Mosser 
(2007: 65) define systematic risk as ―the risk that an event will trigger a loss of economic 
value or confidence in, and attendant increases in uncertainty about, a substantial portion of 
the financial system that is serious enough to quite probably have significant adverse effects 
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on the real economy‖. However, several empirical studies emphasise that systematic risk is a 
difficult concept to accurately define. 
In contrast, unsystematic risk is the risk that is idiosyncratic to a given company, such as a 
particular hazard that is inherent to an investment, and this kind of risk is diversifiable. In 
general, then, unsystematic risk is unique to a firm or industry. Factors such as management 
capability, consumer preferences, raw material scarcity, and labour strikes can cause 
unsystematic variability in a firm‘s returns. 
It has been amply demonstrated in previous research that both systematic and unsystematic 
risk can have a strong impact on share prices and, particularly in times of economic distress, 
managers employ particular strategies to mitigate the impact of both kinds of risk through 
M&As. Although systematic risk can be reduced by employing a suitable assets allocation 
strategy or through risk-hedging transactions, unsystematic risk is often mitigated through 
diversification, such as by holding stock in various firms that operate in a variety of 
industries. This may entail that managers engage in M&As to control operating costs and 
increase the company‘s average market share in order to mitigate operating risk by 
diversifying the company‘s operation and producing benefits related to economies of scale. 
However, management decisions can also influence levels of systematic risk exposure, which 
are determined by a set of external factors and may reflect on firm performance (Lee and 
Jang 2007). It is therefore appropriate to consider the risk of management actions in terms of 
their impact on stock returns or divarication. 
2.6.1. The Risk of Stock Returns  
The empirical literature has considered the trade-off between portfolio returns and risk as 
well as demonstrated misperceptions surrounding the available definitions of stock returns 
and risk. Lubatkin and O'Neill (1987) suggest that modern portfolio theory distinguishes 
between risk factors which increase with general economic movements and those that do not.  
For instance, a major customer bankruptcy is considered a source of unsystematic risk (or 
‗stakeholder risk‘ or ‗business-specific risk‘). This kind of risk can be associated with a wide 
variety of sources, such as a fire at a production facility, the death of a high-ranking 
executive, or the unexpected obsolescence of product technology. Miller and Bromiley 
(1990) emphasise that unsystematic risk correlates (r = 0.32) with several measures of income 
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variability, and hence the factors which affect this type of risk may not affect all returns. 
With regard to systematic risk, Helfat and Teece (1987) suggest that the sources of this type 
of risk often involve changes in fiscal or monetary policy, tax laws, the cost of energy, and 
the demographics of the marketplace. A company‘s average systematic risk exposure is 
determined through the level of uncertainty related to responsiveness, general economic 
forces, or the sensitivity of a company‘s returns to those forces. Miller and Bromiley (1990) 
found that systematic risk correlates (r = 0.40) with several measures of income variability. 
2.6.2. Market Risk vs. Diversification  
The above analysis suggests that M&As which diversify a firm‘s activities with returns that 
do not correlate highly with those of the firm‘s existing portfolio will contribute to lowering 
unsystematic risk. However, if the diversification involves activities with higher risk, then 
overall portfolio risk could actually increase, even if the returns on the activities do not 
correlate highly with those of the existing portfolio.  
Drawing on this line of reasoning, Berger et al. (2015) distinguish between a ‗market risk 
hypothesis‘ and a ‗diversification hypothesis‘ in their analysis of the relationship between 
internationalisation and bank risk. The market risk hypothesis implies that banks sustain 
lower levels of risk as they tend to diversify their portfolios internationally, while the 
diversification hypothesis asserts that banks actually face higher risk levels when operating 
abroad owing to market-specific factors which can make their foreign assets comparatively 
risky. In other words, foreign market conditions may cause international banks to face greater 
rather than lower levels of risk on their foreign assets due to a variety of market-specific 
factors. Gulamhussen, Pinheiro and Pozzolo (2014) emphasise the complexity of the 
relationship between internationalisation and bank risk, where potential risk-reducing gains 
from portfolio diversification can be offset by incentives which lead banks to take on 
excessive amounts of risk. 
There is also literature which considers the effect of M&A diversification on the risk of 
nonfinancial firms; similarly, two opposing views are presented. Some studies point to the 
benefits of increased diversification which has been associated with generating cash flow in 
different countries, and this implies lower levels of risk for multinational corporations 
(MNCs) relative to purely domestic corporations (Hughes, Logue, and Sweeney 1975, 
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Amihud and Lev 1981, Michel and Shaked 1986). On the other hand, factors such as greater 
foreign exchange risk, political risk, local market conditions, regulatory barriers, agency 
problems or difficulty monitoring managers abroad, and unfamiliarity with foreign markets 
are common factors which imply greater cash flow volatility and higher risk levels for MNCs 
(Bartov, Bodnar, and Kaul 1996, Reeb, Kwok, and Baek 1998). In addition, there may be 
operational diseconomies associated with distance which can affect MNC performance or 
risk (consistent with the ‗home field advantage hypothesis‘ of Berger et al. [2000]). 
2.7. Factors Influencing M&A Value 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, there are various theories and numerous studies which 
support the view that the method of payment, target status, diversification, acquirer‘s bidding 
experience as well as other factors (such as size of deal and bidder size) play an important 
role in explaining acquiring firms‘ stock returns This section summarises the main arguments 
and hypotheses and by doing so provides a rationale for the inclusion of main determining 
factors in the empirical analysis evaluating their their impact on the bidders‘ returns.   
2.7.1. Method of Payment 
Many studies examining the method of payment in M&As suggest that it has a strong impact 
on bidder firm‘s stock return (e.g. Travlos 1987; Wansley, Lane, and Yang 1987; Amihud, 
Lev, and Travlos 1990; Servaes 1991; Brown and Ryngaert 1991; Draper and Paudyal 1999; 
Eckbo and Thorburn 2000; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2004; Faccio and Masulis 
2005; Ismail 2008; Martynova and Renneboog 2011). There are principally four main 
hypotheses (i.e. information content, free cash flow, investment opportunity, and risk sharing) 
which offer a rationale to investigate why there should be such an impact of the method of 
payment on stock price.  
First, the information content hypothesis, suggested by Travlos (1987) based on the theory 
developed by Myers and Majluf (1984), predicts that if there is stock offered by the bidder to 
finance an acquisition then the market may interpret that the firm is overvalued. Second, the 
free cash flow hypothesis, originally based on Jensen (1986), holds that acquisition paid for 
by cash can reduce the agency cost associated with free cash flows. These two hypotheses 
confirm that there should be negative abnormal returns around the announcement day if the 
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stock payment method is used to finance the acquisition, and positive abnormal returns for 
cash payments. 
The other two hypothesesdo not necessarily suggest a negative reaction with stock payments. 
The investment opportunity hypothesis states that it is inefficient to pay by cash if the bidder 
has excellent investment opportunities. In most cases, it is assumed that cash transactions are 
to be financed by external debt.  Hence, the free cash flows should not be used to pay up debt 
since that reduces the discretionary power of managers to use free cash flow in investments. 
The risk sharing hypothesis holds that for the high risk transactions it is inefficient to pay by 
stock since the target firm will have the incentive to make the takeover success. Hence, the 
implication of both these hypotheses is that the stock payment method may not be always 
have a negative reaction. 
2.7.2. Target Status 
There are several studies which show that acquirers of non-public targets tend to achieve 
higher announcement returns than do acquirers of public listed targets (Chang 1998, Fuller, 
Netter and Stegemoller 2002, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 2004, Jaffe et al. 2015). As 
discussed in section 2.4, there are a number contending theories which seek to explain the 
differences of stock returns from between the private and public acquisitions, the most 
prominent ones relating to (a) managerial motive of bidders, (b) liquidity of targets, and (c) 
bargaining power of parties in the acquisition process. The relevance and predictions of these 
hypotheses which explain the bidder return differential observed in acquisitions of public vs 
non-public targets are summarised below. 
The managerial motive hypothesis: The major motives of the managers of the bidding firms 
can be either maximising the private benefits accruing to them, or increasing the 
shareholders‘ wealth. There some private benefits of the managers which are related to the 
size and brand image of the firms they manage, and also the extent of their research control. 
Here the managers are motivated to increase prestige and maximise their firm size 
(maximising private benefits), so they will be prepared to pay high premiums for the large 
and reputed targets. Such activities may have adverse effect on the share price of their firms. 
Generally, the publicly listed targets are better known than the private firms. While the 
acquisition of less reputed private firms are not very well connected to the private wealth 
creation of the managers, they are more driven by the potential synergies from the acquisition 
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and a desire to maximise shareholders‘ wealth. Hence in such cases the mangers would be 
willing to pay lower premiums which won‘t adversely affect the acquiring firms share price 
(Faccio, McConnell and Stolin 2006). Smaller private firms are easily integrated into the 
business as compared to that of the large public targets. Hence the market may perceive the 
acquisition of a private firm more favourably than the bidding for the listed firms. Hence the 
testable hypothesis: ‗bidders for private targets should gain more than bidders for listed 
targets‘. 
The liquidity hypothesis: Chang (1998) has hypothesised that, in a perfect competitive 
takeover market, any takeover transaction should be a zero NPV transaction, where the 
bidding firm should not earn any extra abnormal return when the bid is paid in cash. 
However, this result is based on the informational efficiency of the market. Compared to the 
listed target, the unlisted target is much more opaque and therefore there is much less 
information availability, which further reduces competition. Moreover, the market for 
privately held firms is very illiquid. Such factors may increase the bargaining power of the 
bidders and is likely to generate underpayment by bidding firms, leading to higher returns for 
bidders for private targets than for public targets.  
The bargaining power hypothesis: For the private firms the ownership structure is often 
concentrated and a small group of partners mainly controls the ownership which may also 
reduce the agency problems which they may face. Such favourable conditions often help the 
firms to choose the time of sale and also the buyers whom to sale their business. This 
bargaining power is of special importance if the payment mechanism is based on shares, 
hence there is more ability to control the sale more closely suggests that closely controlled 
firms may have significant bargaining strength allowing the owners to receive a better price 
for their firm, and for the premium paid by the bidder to exceed the potential gains that may 
result from the merger (Gonenc, Hermes and Sinderen 2013). 
2.7.3. Geographic Diversification  
The location of the target firm is also an important characteristic which has been seen to 
affect the bidder returns (Markides and Ittner 1994, Bhagat, Malhotra, and Zhu 2011, 
Deshpande, Svetina, and Zhu 2012, Danbolt and Maciver 2012). There is, however, 
contradictory evidence of the impact of domestic or foreign acquisitions on bidder returns, 
and there are many factors which are related to the acquirer‘s home country and its cultural 
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and legal environment which may also be relevant. Dutta, Saadi and Zhu (2013) indicate that 
there is generally a higher concentration of larger value based transactions in the merger 
markets, and find that cross-border acquisitions generally seem to be regarded as more 
favourable than domestic acquisitions. On the other hand, Moeller and Schlingemann, (2005) 
find insignificant differences between domestic and cross-border acquisitions of the US 
firms. 
Cross border acquisitions are generally more exotic alternatives available to bidders, and 
there are many reasons why the bidders would find them more attractive relative to domestic 
acquisitions. From the perspective of the portfolio theory, the opportunity of taking over 
firms in a different country would expand the portfolio diversification benefits (Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2005). Such activities will increase the likelihood that the optimal synergy 
effects and efficiency gains of the acquisitions will be realized. From the perspective of 
corporate governance, the acquiring countries legal and regulatory set up can change the 
policies of the target firm and expectation of future dividends among their current 
shareholders. Bris, Brisley and Cabolis (2008) argue that in such cases the shareholder 
protection might be different between the countries. In this scenario if the target firm belongs 
to a country with better shareholder protection then the combined organisation may perform 
better, yielding shareholder benefits.  
There are also other important considerations to account for in cross-border acquisitions, for 
example the integration of the shareholder interests with managerial and regulatory assets 
(Campa and Hernando 2006). There can be loss of synergy due to the lack of integration 
processes in place. One standard explanation as to why the cross-border mergers may 
generate greater returns is that there can be diversification benefits when businesses seek 
synergies arising from information based assets (Morck and Yeung 2003). Hence such 
mergers help to achieve synergies through internalisations which can otherwise be lost due to 
various market failures.  
2.7.4. Industrial Diversification 
An age old question is whether corporate diversification creates or destroys value? There are 
several empirical studies which show that diversifications may destroy bidders‘ shareholder 
wealth, which is reflected in the fact that the shares of the diversified, merged organisations 
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trade at a discount. In such scenarios, the opinions of managers, creditors, and stockholders 
differ greatly regarding the merits of corporate diversification (Martin and Sayrak 2003). 
The standard reason for the firms to go for diversification is that managers would like to 
reduce their firm specific risks which can affect the value of future compensations. Moreover, 
the creditors of firms may also want managers to diversify since uncertainties about cash 
flows can further impact the default probabilities of firms. However, shareholders may not 
want the firms to diversify. Montgomery (1994) has listed some reasons why the managers 
might want to diversify, namely, agency theory, resource based theory, and market power 
theory. Agency theory may predict that diversification is a result of the managerial self-
interest, or hubris. According to the standard agency theory explanation managers may want 
to diversify in order to  (1) increase their compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), power, 
and prestige (Jensen, 1986); (2) make their positions with the firm more secure (i.e., entrench 
themselves) by making investments that require their particular skills via manager-specific 
investments (Shleifer and Vishny 1990); and (3) reduce the risk of their personal investment 
portfolio by reducing firm risk since the managers cannot reduce their own risk by 
diversifying their portfolios (Amihud and Lev 1981). 
From the perspective of the resource based theory, diversification takes place when there is 
excess capacity in resources and capabilities which can be transferred across the industries. 
Here the main driver of such diversifications is the economy of scope as theorised first by 
Penrose (1959). One example is that firms can use the same marketing or distribution channel 
for a variety of products. Again the firm may be able to utilize its corporate legal and 
financial staff to support a variety of different industries.   
Finally, there is the market power theory from which diversification benefits can be viewed. 
Villalogna (2004) provided three different anticompetitive motives for diversifications. The 
first one is using profit in one industry to practise predatory pricing in another. The second 
motive is to collude with the firms which compete with the firm in multiple product markets, 
also known as the mutual forbearance hypothesis which is applicable in multiple markets. 
Third is the reciprocal engagement, i.e. firms might use corporate diversification to engage in 
reciprocal buying with other large firms in order to squeeze out smaller competitors, thus 




2.7.5. Bidder Experience 
According to Roll (1986) the managers who go for frequent acquisitions are either poor 
managers with free cash flows or very good ones at evaluating potential synergies. These 
ideas are formalised in the form of empire building hypothesis or efficient market hypothesis, 
respectively. The theory also holds that these type of firms would increase their abilities of 
better mergers when they move up the learning curves. Hence, such firms should perform 
well and better than the average firms, specifically if the average firms are in the same 
industries. Moreover, such synergy gains should be reflected in the share prices also. A 
positive change in their operating performance will occur as costs decrease from the increase 
in the economies of scale and as the firm increases revenues and profits resulting from a gain 
in market power (Stegemoller 2002). 
However, if there is no fundamental logic for acquisitions but the firms would simply like to 
race with their peers in multiple acquisitions, then there are unlikely to be significant benefits 
in terms of improved performances. Moreover, those firms with hubristic management will 
most likely decrease in value as the market observes shrinking margins and reduced cash 
flows at the expense of increasing size. Frequent acquirers should be the crown jewels of 
firms exhibiting poor use of discretionary cash flows (Roll 1986). 
On the other hand, the market efficiency hypothesis holds that the mergers are nothing but 
zero NPV transactions. There can be some interpretations of takeover according to this 
hypothesis, for example, a takeover may represent any of the following: (1) a simple 
alternative to expanding capacity already impounded in the firm‘s stock price, (2) a vessel 
used by management to build an empire, and (3) an introduction of valued synergies not 
previously recognized by the market. The efficient market would see these hypotheses from a 
neutral, negative and positive light, respectively. 
2.7.6. Other Explanatory factors 
Value of Transaction 
There is a large volume of literature which suggests that large firms which take over smaller 
firms actually destroy value of their shareholders. For example, BusinessWeek (2002) reports 
that 61% of merger deals worth at least $500 million ends up costing the shareholders. 
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Similarly, research by Boston Consulting Group (2007) shows that ―megadeals‖ priced at 
more than $1 billion destroys nearly twice as much value relative to smaller transactions.  
There are many hypotheses developed in the support of such results. Loderer and Martin 
(1990) argue in the line of overpayment, i.e. large firms tend to overpay for the merger, and 
such arguments are based on the managerial hubris hypothesis if the overconfident managers 
overestimate the synergy benefits (Roll 1986; Hayward and Habrick 1997; Malmendier and 
Tate 2008). Moreover, the managers can also overpay for larger targets since there are hidden 
private benefits (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1990; Loderer and Martin 1990; Grinstein and 
Hribar 2004; Harford and Li 2007). 
On the other hand, there are many reasons for which there should be lower premiums for 
larger deals. There is a risk taking hypothesis which suggests that if greater value is at stake 
then there can be more accurate valuations and also make the managers or the boards hesitant 
to offer greater premiums (Alexandridis, et al. 2013). Furthermore, there can be better 
incentives for the managers to hire reputed advisors for negotiating better deals. There can be 
greater uncertainties also from larger deals, which may be the result of too large diversities of 
products and sources of cash flows, which can also lower the premium. From the perspective 
of the competition theory also the large targets have less number of bidders, hence lower 
levels of premium (Gorton, Kahl and Rosen, 2009), which however also mitigates the 
‗winners curse‘ problem up to a certain extent, and can lower premium. There can also be 
lower managerial ownership which can also make the management accept lower price, which 
leads to lower gains for their shareholders (Bauguess, et al. 2009). 
Alexandridis et al. (2013) have provided evidence for the fact that not only that the bidders 
pay lower premium for the larger deals, the effect also persists over time. Their results are 
quite robust when a set of control variables for other known determinants is used. The same 
authors have shown that the uncertainty of return measurements also increases while larger 
acquisitions are considered, which shows that the investors think that larger acquisitions are 
very uncertain investments. Alexandridis et al. (2013) show that returns from the large deals 
tend to be lower in the long run, whereas the abnormal returns from the smaller transactions 
generate positive abnormal returns for the acquiring shareholders. There can be post-merger 




Common Law (Target) 
By reshuffling control over companies, M&As help to reallocate corporate assets to their best 
possible use. Greater investor protection in the target country can affect the shareholder 
wealth because of lower frictions and inefficiencies in the target country (Rossi and Volpin 
2004). The importance of the legal traditions, emanating from the pioneering work of La 
Porta et al (1998), is based on the critical impacts of ownership structures, shareholder 
protections, and capital markets. There are striking differences in ownership structures 
between the common law and civil law countries, in the former the ownership is rather 
dispersed among large number of outsider investors and the concentrated ownership is rather 
limited. Hence the control of the shareholders on the managers is very less which again 
generates various agency conflict issues (Franks and Mayer 2001). Therefore, the principal 
agency conflicts are taken be more pervasive in the common law economies like UK. 
Moreover, since the voting power is dispersed there is a greater incidence of free rider 
problems in case of corporate control which affects their stock markets (Shleifer and Vishny: 
1997). 
These differences in investor protection laws give rise to different market reactions to the 
M&A announcements. Empirically, therefore, in cross-country analysis of shareholder 
returns it appropriate to distinguish between common law and civil law countries (using a 
dummy variable in regressions). La Porta, et al. (1998) argue that legal origin is a broad 
indicator of investor protection and show that countries with common law legal origin protect 
minority shareholders more than do countries with civil law as the legal origin.   
GDP for Target Country 
The literature suggests that cross-border acquisitions are less valuable than domestic 
acquisitions (e.g. Aw and Chatterjee 2004, Soussa and Wheeler 2006, Moeller and 
Schlingemann 2005, Mangold and Lippok 2008) due to the differences in cross border 
cultures and regulations.  Hence, in cross-country analysis, it is important to investigate 
whether the GDP of the target nations have significant impacts on the bidder returns. Gravity 
models hold that the flow of bilateral trades should be inversely proportional to the distances 
between the countries and is proportionate to the size of the economies as measured by GDP 
(Giovanni 2005). There are some oversimplifications in such a model, for example the trade 
and FDI flows between countries depend on relative trade costs rather than absolute trade 
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costs, for example there is strong evidence that neighbouring nations trade more with each 
other since they have fewer alternative trade partners, as in the case of the EU countries 
(Giovanni 2005).  
The fundamental premise behind cross border mergers is that the firms enter the target 
markets to exploit resources and market imperfections in the target country (Buckley and 
Casson 1976; Morck and Yeung 1992). For identifying such opportunities, the size of the 
target countries can be used, proxied by its GDP, as one of the determinants of value in cross-
border mergers.  
Bidder Size 
Bidder size is another determining factor of value in M&As, where the conventional 
argument is that small bidders may earn significantly higher abnormal returns than large 
bidders upon announcements. The reason is that large firms pay higher premiums and enter 
acquisitions with negative synergy gains. This finding is consistent with managerial hubris 
playing a significant role in decision making by large firms. Large firms generally experience 
significant shareholder wealth losses when they announce acquisitions of public companies 
irrespective of how the acquisition is financed, while small firms gain significantly when they 
announce an acquisition unless it is paid with equity (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
2004). Hence, bidder asset size, proxied by the log of market value of the acquiring firm 
around four weeks prior to announcement, can be used in determining its effect on 
shareholder wealth.  
Market to Book Ratio 
As is standard in the corporate finance literature, the ratio of market to book value of a firm 
conveys information regarding the past and future investment opportunities or the cash flow 
for the acquirer‘s stock performances. There is ample empirical evidence suggesting that the 
high market to book value acquirers (or the value acquirers) earn higher abnormal returns 
upon announcement (Lang et al. 1989). However, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Petmezas 
(2009) found that the low value acquirers have outperformed the value acquirers in the short 
term. There are also some studies which hold that the relative size of acquirer and the target‘s 
market to book ratio influences the abnormal returns; for example, Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) found that that the acquisition of firms with low market-to-book ratios generates high 
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abnormal returns for the shareholders of the bidding firm whereas the takeover of firms with 
high market-to-book ratios yields substantial negative abnormal returns. 
2.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the various motives for M&As and the corresponding underlying 
theories. The literature has proposed a variety of motives which can have an impact on 
shareholder wealth and has also shown that asymmetric information (between bidder and 
target) can be a crucial factor in determining the method of payment used in M&A 
transactions. Furthermore, the theoretical arguments highlighting the relevance of target 
status, bidder experience, and diversification motives have been considered in terms of their 
relevance in determining shareholder value. The next chapter will review a number of 
existing empirical studies related to the impact of payment method, public target status, 
acquirer bidding experience, and diversification on acquiring company shareholder wealth.  
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 Evidence on the Impact of M&As on Shareholder Wealth and Risk Chapter 3:
3.1. Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions are generally viewed as a way of reallocating corporate assets in 
order to influence shareholder value according to the motives discussed in Chapter 2. 
Accordingly, researchers have studied the implications of M&As on shareholder value by 
providing empirical evidence based on the use of event studies and cross-sectional 
regressions. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of the relevant evidence in 
terms of the impact on shareholder wealth while assessing the relevance of target status, 
method of payment, acquirer bidding experience, and diversification motives. Additionally, 
evidence relating to the impact of M&As on acquirers‘ risk will also be assessed. This 
chapter thus complements the previous chapter by focussing on the empirical evidence 
pertaining to the theoretical issues discussed in that chapter. 
The chapter begins with a brief introduction in Section 3.2 to the use of the event study 
method that is commonly used to measure shareholder wealth
5
. This is followed by a broad 
overview of the evidence based on acquirer, target, and combined firms‘ shareholder wealth. 
Section 3.3 then reviews the empirical literature on CAR regressions, focussing on evidence 
relating to method of payment, public target status, diversification, and bidder experience. 
Section 3.4 discusses the evidence relating to the impact of M&A on acquirers‘ risk, and 
finally, Section 3.5 provides a brief summary identifying the potential for further research. 
  
                                                          
5
 Chapter 4 further illustrates the use of this methodology as well as the accompanying cross-sectional CAR 
regression method.  
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3.2. Evidence Based on Event Studies  
Event studies aim to analyse shareholders‘ abnormal returns during the period of transaction 
announcement. In order to analyse the impact of M&As on shareholder returns, abnormal 
returns have to be calculated for each day in the event window period, which incorporates the 
announcement day of the event itself. As highlighted by Bruner (2002: 49), an event study 
calculates ―the abnormal returns to shareholders in the period surrounding the announcement 
of a transaction‖. For each day in the event period, the raw return is calculated as the change 
in market share price from the day before divided by the closing share price of that day. 
Essentially, abnormal returns are the raw return less a benchmark of what was required by 
investors that day. This benchmark is usually the return base outlined by the either the capital 
assets pricing model (CAPM) or the market model. The cumulative abnormal return for the 
event period starts at T1 and ends at T2 and can be denoted as CAR (T1,T2), which represents 
the sum of the abnormal returns for each day over the event period. The average CAR is the 
computed average of each CARs(T1,T2) for all M&A announcements included in the sample. 
As Fama et al. (1969) predicted, event study methods have become recognised as the key 
approach for establishing the quantitative impact of an event on stock returns, and as such, it 
has become a valuable instrument of analysis for assisting firms in establishing whether or 
not the returns over a given event period are abnormal (MacKinlay 1997, Kolari and 
Pynnönen 2010, McWilliams and McWilliams 2011). According to Bodie, Kane, and Marcus 
(2005: 351), an event study ―describes a technique of empirical financial research that 
enables an observer to assess the impact of a particular event on a firm‘s stock price‖. It has 
been widely acknowledged that the reliability of an event study ultimately rests on the 
various statistical assumptions used in calculating abnormal returns. For instance, an event 
study could relate to an assessment of the impact of a firm‘s announcement of a dividend 
payment on stock returns, based on the typical assumption that, in the absence of the event, 
the returns are normally distributed.  
A good deal of literature has centred on analysing the impact of mergers and acquisitions on 
shareholder wealth using CARs for different window lengths around the announcement date. 
In this section, a broad outline of the evidence based on CARs is provided, with emphasis on 
target, bidder, and combined entity shareholder returns. The earlier event study evidence is 
primarily drawn from the works of Bruner (2000), Campa and Hernando (2004), although 
 
57 
attention is also given to more recent studies which have examined deals made within the last 
ten years.  
3.2.1. Evidence on Target Company Shareholder Returns 
In a majority of cases, the shareholders of target firms generally enjoy announcement returns 
which are positive. Table 3.1 below presents the findings of 18 different studies, and it can be 
seen that, irrespective of time period variations, deal type, sector, and observation period, the 
returns were positive and relatively significant. Broadly speaking, these results are in line 
with those detailed in other literature surveys (e.g. Datta, Pinches, and Narayanan 1992, 
Bruner 2002, Campa and Hernando 2004).  
As detailed in Table 3.1, the average cumulative abnormal returns for target firms were 
16.95%. Overall, cumulative abnormal returns tend to be somewhat lower in the financial 
sector than in industrial sectors. Karceski, Ongena, and Smith (2005), for example, report 
negative target returns for the banking sector.  
The majority of previous studies, however, recognise that positive CARs tend to occur in the 
days before and immediately following the announcement. The fact that positive CARs tend 
to be seen in the days before the announcement date implies that the market expects a target 
run-up as information leaks out about the deal. In a recent survey of the U.S. literature, Eckbo 
(2009: 153) suggests that the target run-up before an announcement typically constitutes 
about one-third of the total run-up (i.e. target plus bidder value-weighted sum) plus the 
announcement abnormal returns. In addition, the researcher notes that the largest target 




Table ‎3.1: Returns to Target Firm Shareholders. 
Returns to Target Firm Shareholders 
Study CAR 
Sample Sample Event Window 
(days) 
Industry Country 
Size Period Coverage Coverage 
Schwert (1996) 23.40% 1,814 1975-1991 (–42,+126) Diversified U.S. 
Maquieira, Megginson, 













Diversified Netherlands 11.02% (–1,+5) 
16.76% (–10,+5) 
Mulherin (2000) 10.14% 202 1962-1997 (–1,0) Diversified U.S. 
Mulherin and Boone 
(2000) 




Schwert (2000) 20.00% 2,296 1975-1996 (–63,+126) Diversified U.S. 
Andrade, Mitchell and 
Stafford (2001) 
16.00% 3,688 1973-1998 
(–1,+1) Diversified U.S. 
16.00% 598 1973-1979 
16.00% 1,226 1980-1989 
15.90% 1,864 1990-1998 
DeLong (2001) 16.61% 280 1988-1995 (–10,1) Banking U.S. 
Houston, James, and 
Ryngaert (2001) 
15.58% 27 1985-1990 
(–4,1) Banking U.S. 24.60% 37 1991-1996 
20.80% 64 1985-1996 





















18.33% (0,+1) M 
20.64% (–2,+1) M 
8.33% 
116 
(–2, –1) M 
UK Cross-
Border 
22.38% (0,+1) M 



















U.S. 4.12% (–5,5)  Institutions 
5.12% (–10,10)   








































3.2.2. Evidence on Acquiring Company Shareholder Returns 
According to the literature, results regarding returns to bidding company shareholders are 
generally thought to be less conclusive. The evidence is relatively evenly-distributed between 
studies showing negative CARs and those detailing slightly positive and zero CARs. Dodd 
(1980), for example, found that acquiring firm shareholders often face negative abnormal 
returns, while target shareholders tend to earn significant positive abnormal returns. In the 
U.S., Eckbo (2009) concludes that most of the research acknowledges that bidding firm 
abnormal returns are typically small and often negative around an announcement. In the case 
of the EU, Mangold and Lippok (2008) analysed the impacts of M&As on acquiring firms‘ 
shareholder wealth and found that such transactions can induce notable shareholder wealth 
destruction, with the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the (–1,+1) window recorded at 
–0.3%. More recently, Rani, Yadav, and Jain (2014) analysed the impact of domestic 
completed M&A deals over the period 2003-2008. Negative abnormal returns were 
experienced by the acquirers for the post-event window spanning 19 days (+2,+20) in the 
case of all acquisitions. 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 below list the outcomes of a total of 28 studies, broken down into those 
showing negative CARs (Table 3.2) and those showing positive or zero CARs (Table 3.3). 
Table 2, which details 16 studies ranging from the U.S. to developing countries and covering 
financial as well as diversified M&As, shows variation in negative announcement CARs 
ranging between –13% and –0.1%, with an average of –2.14%. On the other hand, as shown 
in Table 3.3, 12 studies, some of which have common authors, illustrate either positive or 
zero returns in the range of 0.18% to 6.14%. Thus, a majority of the studies surveyed here 
report bidder announcement returns that are typically small and often negative, which is 
consistent with what Eckbo (2009) reports for the U.S. Importantly, the evidence is fairly 
evenly-distributed between studies that report small but positive returns and those which 
report small and negative returns. Accordingly, unlike the case for target company 
shareholders, no strong evidence is demonstrated in the aggregate for one-sided negative or 
positive CARs for acquirers, which are typically positive and significant.  
It should be noted that the majority of studies report CARs which appear to increase for short 
window lengths surrounding the announcement date. Studies examining bidding company 
announcement returns for a longer period commonly establish negative and statistically 
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significant CARs, particularly in diversified M&As (e.g. Martynova and Renneboog 2011, 
Nnadi and Tanna 2013, Raj and Uddin 2013, Rani, Yadav, and Jain 2014). 
Table ‎3.2: Studies Reporting Negative Returns to Acquirers. 
Studies Reporting Negative Returns to Acquirers 
Study CAR 
Sample Sample Event 
Window 
Industry Country 
Size Period Coverage Coverage 
Mulherin and Boone 
(2000) 









Andrade, Mitchell & 
Stafford (2001) 
–0.70% 3,688 1973-1998 
(–1,+1) Diversified U.S. 
–0.30% 598 1973-1979 
–0.40% 1,226 1980-1989 
–1.00% 1,864 1990-1998 
DeLong (2001) –1.68% 280 1988-1995 (–10,1) Banks U.S. 
Houston, James, and 
Ryngaert (2001) 
–4.64% 27 1985-1990 
(–4,1) Banks U.S. –2.61% 37 1991-1996 
–3.47% 64 1985-1996 














Developing –0.20% (–20,+20) 













Martinez-Jerez (2008) –2.92% 335 1990-1998 (–1,1) Diversified U.S. 





ED + 5 
Diversified OECD 
–1.32% 
AD-5 to AD 
+ 5 









–2.83% 2,419 1993-2001 (–60,+60) Diversified 
Continental 
European 
Nnadi and Tanna (2013) –12.25% 62 1997-2007 (–30,+30) Bank European Union 








1 M to 36 M 
Rani, Yadav & Jain 
(2014) 
–0.36% 268 2003-2008 (–20,+20) Diversified India 





Table ‎3.3: Studies Reporting Zero or Positive Returns to Acquirers. 
Studies Reporting Zero or Positive Returns to Acquirers 
Study CAR 




Size Period Coverage Coverage 
Maquieira, Megginson, 
and Nail (1998) 
6.14% non-
conglomerate 
55 1963-1996 (−60,60) Diversified U.S. 





Diversified Netherlands 0.81% (−1,+5) 
0.21% (−10,+5) 





1987-1996 (0,1) Technology U.S. 
1.09% stock 673 
1.26% whole 1,634 
Mulherin (2000) 0.85% 161 1962-1997 (−1,0) Diversified U.S. 
Floreani and 
Rigamonti (2001) 
3.65% 56 1996-2000 (−20,+2) Insurance 
U.S., Europe, 
Australia 




































U.S. 0.57% (−5,5) 
0.61% (−10,10) 
Raj and Forsyth (2004) 0.09% 199 1990-1998 (−60,+10) Diversified U.K. 
Christopoulos and 





















3.2.3. Evidence on Total Gains  
The combination of positive cumulative abnormal returns to target firm shareholders and 
breakeven returns to acquiring firm shareholders raises a question concerning combined 
entity value creation. From the evidence presented in Tables 3.1 to 3.3, it appears that a 
significant positive gain to target firm shareholders is counterbalanced by an often negative 
but small loss to bidding firm shareholders, making the total combined value (target and 
bidder) generally positive.  
Numerous studies, both in the U.S. and in other countries, have recorded positive and 
significant value-weighted combined target/bidder announcement abnormal returns. Table 3.4 
below reports a selection of eight such studies, all of which highlight positive combined 
abnormal returns ranging between 0.05% and 5.73%, implying an average CAR of 2.54%.  
Table ‎3.4: Combined returns to shareholders of acquiring and target firm. 
Combined Returns to Shareholders of Acquiring and Target Firms 
Study CAR 
Sample Sample Event Window 
(days) 
Industry Country 
Size Period Coverage Coverage 









Mulherin (2000) 2.53% 116 1962-1997 (–1,0) Diversified U.S. 
Mulherin and Boone 
(2000) 




Andrade et al. (2001) 
1.80% 3,688 1973-1998 (–1,+1) 
Diversified U.S. 
1.50% 598 1973-1979 (–1,+1) 
2.60% 1,226 1980-1989 (–1,+1) 
1.40% 1,864 1990-1998 (–1,+1) 
Houston, James, and 
Ryngaert (2001) 
0.14% 27 1985-1990 
(–4,1) Banking U.S. 3.11% 37 1991-1996 
1.86% 64 1985-1996 
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3.3. Evidence Based on CAR Regressions 
Most of the event studies on M&As (including those reported above) supplement their 
analyses with cross-sectional CAR regressions in order to identify the key drivers affecting 
abnormal returns, whether to targets, bidders, or combined-entity shareholders. Focussing on 
abnormal bidder returns (which is the primary purpose of this research), the literature 
surveyed by Eckbo (2009) shows that two key drivers of negative returns are 1) bidder size 
and 2) target status (i.e. as a public or private firm). According to the evidence presented in 
Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008), the average three-day CAR was found to be –2.21% 
and arose in situations where the bidder was (i) relatively large, (ii) bidding for a public 
target, and (iii) offering an all-stock payment. However, while this evidence was based on 
U.S. data, other factors inevitably come into play regarding shareholder returns in global 
M&A transactions. In this section, the evidence on bidding company shareholder wealth 
relates to the impact of the following factors: method of payment, target status, 
diversification (both activity and geographical), and bidder experience. These main issues 
will be the focus of further attention in the empirical analysis of acquiring firm shareholder 
returns in this section.  
3.3.1. Method of Payment in M&As 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, three payment methods are commonly used to realise a merger 
transaction: all cash, all stock, or a combination of cash and stock. As noted above, the 
literature suggests that the choice of payment method has an impact on bidding company 
shareholder wealth (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller 2002). 
The evidence relating to the impact of stock payment deals is generally inconclusive. While 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) and Ismail (2008) found a positive correlation 
between stock swaps and acquiring company shareholder wealth, Andrade, Mitchell, and 
Stafford (2001) and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) found a negative relationship. On 
the other hand, while the impact of the stock payment method is uncertain, the consensus 
seems to be that acquiring firm shareholder wealth increases if cash is used as payment rather 
than stock.  
Travlos (1987), Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987), Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990), Servaes 
(1991), and Brown and Ryngaert (1991) studied deals involving the acquisition of public 
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targets and found that, on average, acquirers experienced significantly negative abnormal 
returns when the payment method was stock rather than cash. One dominant explanation for 
this pattern is that stock financing creates an adverse selection effect similar to a seasoned 
stock offering. Leland and Pyle (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984) used signalling theory 
to prove that, due to the existence of information asymmetry, managers prefer to use cash as 
payment if they believe that the bidding firm‘s shares are undervalued and stock if that firm‘s 
shares are overvalued. In other words, these researchers demonstrated that payment method 
can serve as a signal regarding the value of shares. Thus, investors will interpret a cash 
payment as a positive signal and a stock payment as a negative one. In consequence, cash 
payments will be more likely to have a positive impact on shareholder value while stock 
payments will tend to have a negative effect.  
In line with the above reasoning, Ismail (2008) and Martynova and Renneboog (2011) 
empirically demonstrate that cash acquisitions lead to higher abnormal returns for bidding 
company shareholders. Since paying cash implies a general market belief that the bidder‘s 
stock is undervalued, investors begin to buy its shares, causing the share price to increase. 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990), Fishman (1989), and Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel 
(1990) further developed the above idea by arguing that high-value bidders will use cash (or a 
higher proportion of cash/stock) in order to signal their value to the market. However, they 
also demonstrated that if the value of the target is difficult to determine, managers will prefer 
to offer stock rather than cash in order to avoid overpaying for the target. 
In terms of the effects of the choice of payment method on the bidding company‘s returns 
during the announcement period, Travlos and Papaioannou (1991), Draper and Paudyal 
(1999), and Faccio and Masulis (2005) demonstrate that these vary. In general, the evidence 
regarding the impact of stock payment acquisitions on acquiring firms‘ returns is mixed. For 
instance, Travlos (1987) has shown that financing the deal with stock yields significant 
negative abnormal returns of 1.03% for the bidder. Similarly, Wansley, Lane, and Yang 
(1987) demonstrated that the bidder earns insignificant negative abnormal returns for 
acquisitions with stock payments. Finally, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) report 
significant positive abnormal returns for the bidder in both cash and stock acquisitions. 
Hansen (1987) explains the puzzle of stock swap offers by explaining that due to the 
‗contingency pricing effect‘, the target will share the risk with the acquirer if the bidder 
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overpays when evaluating a stock offer. Moreover, acquirers prefer to use cash when there is 
high level of uncertainty about their own firm‘s value and stocks when there is a high level of 
uncertainty about the target‘s value.  
Eckbo and Thorburn (2000: 17) suggest that when the target‘s value is uncertain and the 
bidder‘s value is known, the ‗expected overpayment cost of cash‘ is greater than the 
‗expected overpayment cost of stock‘. Therefore, bidders prefer to make stock offers in such 
cases. However, if the valuation of both the acquirer and the target is uncertain, the bidder 
will be more likely to make a cash offer.  
Thus, as has been shown earlier, the theoretical analysis regarding payment choice focusses 
on the relationship between method of payment and information asymmetry surrounding the 
valuations of the target and the acquirer. Some empirical studies support these arguments, 
concluding that acquirers paying cash will have higher returns than acquirers buying with 
stock (Fishman 1989, Travlos 1987, Brown and Ryngaert 1991, Martin 1996). Moreover, 
these studies have determined that stock payments are preferred over cash offers if there is 
more uncertainty about the bid. 
Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990), Martin (1996), and Ghosh and Ruland (1998) investigated 
the determinants of payment methods in U.S. M&As over the period 1978-1988, examining 
the importance of buyer management stockholdings. All three studies conclude that this 
factor has a negative effect on stock financing, which is consistent with a corporate control 
motive. Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) report the results of an early test of the Stulz 
(1988) theory by estimating a probit regression to explain the choice of stock versus cash-
financed acquisitions as a function of officer/director share ownership and target size. The 
researchers concluded that managerial share ownership measures had a significant negative 
impact on stock financing, suggesting that ownership factors have a substantial effect on the 
choice of payment method.  
In a more recent study, Rani, Yadav, and Jain (2014) investigated domestic M&As between 
2003 and 2008 focussing on the impact of payment method on bidding company shareholder 
wealth. The study concluded that acquisitions financed through cash payments led to positive 
cumulative abnormal returns for bidding firms, while the results were inconclusive regarding 
stock payment transactions. 
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3.3.2. Public vs. Non-public Targets 
In M&A research, deals involving non-public targets have received relatively little attention, 
even though such deals represent around 70% of all merger transactions. Unlisted targets may 
include private firms or subsidiaries of independent firms. In both cases, the evidence 
overwhelmingly supports the view that bidder announcement returns will be positive when 
acquirers engage in deals with non-public as opposed to public targets (Chang 1998, Fuller, 
Netter, and Stegemoller 2002, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2004, Draper and Paudyal 
2006, Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin 2006, Capron and Shen 2007, Rani, Yadav, and Jain 
2014, Jaffe et al. 2015). 
Examining a sample involving 281 private and 255 public target companies between 1981 
and 1992, Chang (1998) performed one of the first studies to compare and analyse returns to 
U.S. acquirers. For 131 acquirers of private targets paid for with cash, no significant 
abnormal returns were observed using a two-day window. However, regarding stock payment 
for private targets, abnormal bidder returns were significantly positive at 2.64%. The 
researcher suggests that stock payment for private targets can create large block holders who 
are better able to monitor the actions of bidding firms, thus leading to improved shareholder 
returns. In order to further observe this characteristic, the acquirers were divided according to 
whether or not a new block holder emerged in the acquiring firm from acquisition of the 
target. The study concluded that the abnormal returns were significantly positive at 4.96% 
when a new block holder was created while only 1.77% when block holding was not created. 
Moreover, even if this effect was present for both public and private targets, it was 
demonstrated that block holders were created more frequently from the acquisition of private 
targets.  
Another early study analysing differences in bidding company investor returns while merging 
with public and non-public targets was performed by Hansen and Lott (1996). Their sample 
included 252 firms between 1985 and 1991, and the analysis revealed that acquirers obtained 
announcement returns which were 2% higher when merging with private targets rather than 
publicly-held firms. Moreover, it was demonstrated that in 65% of cases, acquisition of a 
public target led to a loss on the part of bidding company shareholders. This was the case 
only 43% of the time in mergers with private firms. 
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Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) observed 3,135 M&As and found that overall, returns 
were significantly positive for bidders buying private or subsidiary targets but significantly 
negative for bidders buying public targets. In addition, no significant returns to public targets 
were observed for cash or combination offers, but significant negative returns to bidders were 
experienced when stock was offered for public targets. Finally, regardless of payment 
method, bidder returns were significantly positive when the targets were private and 
subsidiary, though abnormal bidder results were higher if financed through stock. 
Capron and Shen (2007) analysed the impact of non-publicly held targets on acquiring 
company shareholder wealth. It was found that on merger announcements, acquirers of 
private firms generally performed better than acquirers of public firms. In addition, acquirers 
of private targets generally performed better than if they had acquired a public target, and 
acquirers of public targets usually performed better than if they had acquired a private target. 
While the above studies focussed on U.S. M&As, Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin (2006) 
analysed abnormal bidder returns for listed and unlisted target firms using a sample of 4,429 
acquisitions in 17 Western European countries between 1996 to 2001. The results indicated 
that bidders experienced higher abnormal returns in the case of unlisted targets (+1.48%) than 
in the case of listed ones (–0.38%). This listing effect is present in the full sample and in each 
year of the analysis. Further, when the sample of unlisted targets is split into unlisted stand-
alone targets and unlisted subsidiaries targets, the average abnormal return for each set is 
significantly positive and higher than the acquirers‘ average abnormal return for listed 
targets. Moreover, the effect persists after controlling for acquirers‘ size or relative size, the 
method of payment, pre-announcement leakage of information about the transaction, 
acquirers‘ Tobin's Q, and ownership structure. One implication of this listing effect is that it 
is not due to an institutional or regulatory feature that is unique to the US. Rather, the effect 
appears to be due to some factor that distinguishes acquisitions of listed targets from 
acquisitions of unlisted targets more generally. The implication is that shareholders of 
acquiring firms fare better when the firms they own are smaller and when the targets their 
firms acquire are not traded on an exchange. 
More recently, Rani, Yadav, and Jain (2014) analysed bidding firm shareholder wealth 
between 2003 and 2008. The authors perform a disaggregated analysis with sub-samples 
created using the status of the target based on (i) target to be totally absorbed with the 
acquiring firm (ii) target firm remaining as subsidiary (51-100 %). The study further 
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investigates the effect of the method of payment (cash or stock) and the status of the target 
firm (listed or unlisted) on the stock returns of the acquiring firms‘ CARs. The results 
indicate that acquisitions generate 1.60 % significant CARs during the event window of 5 
days (-2, +2) for the entire sample. The major finding of their disaggregated analysis is that 
when target remains as a domestic subsidiary, the acquirer earns 2.82%. In contrast, the 
acquirer loses 0.41% when the target firm is absorbed with the acquiring firm during the 
same period. The acquirers of unlisted domestic target firms experienced higher returns than 
the acquirers of listed domestic target firms.  
In another recent paper, Jaffe et al. (2015) analysed a large sample of acquisitions in the U.S. 
over the period 1981 to 2012. More specifically, the sample involved only completed deals 
and contained 835 acquisitions of subsidiaries and 2,571 acquisitions of public targets. The 
researchers found that acquirers achieved three-day announcement period returns averaging 
2.14% for subsidiary targets and –1.46% for public targets. This difference was statistically 
significant and persisted over several sub-periods. 
As discussed in some of the aforementioned studies and to a certain extent in the previous 
chapter, several explanations or hypotheses have been put forward for the positive bidder 
gains derived from the acquisition of private or subsidiary target firms, though in the view of 
some authors, none of these have been conclusive or satisfactory. Jaffe et al. (2015: 247), for 
example, tested and rejected several hypotheses and concluded that ―the acquirer 
announcement returns differential [remains] an unsolved puzzle‖. In order to elucidate the 
nature of the ongoing debate, a synthesis of the relevant arguments is presented below. 
The first explanation that has been suggested is that the takeover market for private targets is 
far less competitive than the market for public targets (Chang 1998, Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz 2004, Capron and Shen 2007). This notion relies on the hypothesis that while a 
large amount of information is available on public companies (which increases the 
competition between potential acquirers), the comparative lack of public information on non-
publicly held firms corresponds to a lack of effective competition among private acquirers. 
Added to this is the claim that non-public targets are typically less liquid than public firms, 
which heightens the negotiating power of potential acquirers and thus results in lower 
payment for the target, creating shareholder wealth and explaining the abnormal returns 
(Capron and Shen 2007). 
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Second, in the case of the comparatively lower bidding company shareholder returns in the 
acquisition of public targets, an appeal is often made to Jensen‘s (1986) agency cost theory, 
which explains that managers may be inclined to increase their own prestige and power by 
using M&As to engage in ‗managerial empire building‘. In this scenario, consistent with 
Rolls‘ (1986) hubris hypothesis, managers tend to overpay for targets, which reduces bidder 
returns. However, since the average size of public targets is larger than that of private 
companies, the acquisition of such targets tends to dramatically increase the prestige and 
power of managers, and this may ultimately have a greater impact on the bidding company‘s 
shareholder wealth. Furthermore, managers of large public companies tend to have incentives 
in the form of stockholdings which encourage them to acquire publicly-held targets with 
relatively high values.  
Third, since public firms are generally larger than non-public firms, the cost of integrating a 
public target into the structure of the acquiring firm can be much higher than that of 
integrating a non-public target, which may reflect on bidders‘ share price performance. 
Fourth, the financing method used to acquire a target can have an impact on the bidder‘s 
returns. Due to information asymmetry, if the bidder pays for the target with stock, the effect 
on the acquirers‘ stock returns may vary depending on the target‘s status. Furthermore, 
takeovers of private firms via stock payment can create block holders in the bidder firm, since 
the owners of private firms are typically highly-concentrated. As explained earlier, this can 
enhance the monitoring of the acquiring management, which can lead to improvements in 
financial performance. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that since publicly-held 
targets are, on average, larger than non-publicly held firms, they also tend to receive a larger 
ownership stake in the acquiring firm. Moreover, managers of private target firms can use the 
merger as an exit strategy and thus become uninterested in (or incapable of) acting as 
effective monitors. Thus, the block holder argument cannot be considered conclusive in 
explaining differences in bidder returns based on the public/private distinction (Fuller, Netter, 
and Stegemoller 2002). 
Fifth, where a bidder‘s stock is pledged to acquire a public firm, the corresponding market 
belief that the target is overvalued implies a negative reaction of the bidder‘s share prices 
during announcement. However, as noted above, the share price reaction is generally positive 
when the target is private. In this context, Officer, Poulsen, and Stegemoller (2009) have 
shown that bidder returns will be significantly higher in stock-swap acquisitions if valuation 
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of the target is difficult to perform, especially when the target is a private firm. Moreover, a 
stock-swap for a private firm creates a market belief that the target will own a large amount 
of shares in the acquirer (block holders), and this characteristic of private target takeover 
seems to send a positive message to the market, thus increasing the acquiring firm‘s 
shareholder value. 
Sixth, related to the above argument, M&A payment methods be influenced by tax 
considerations which can impact the bidder‘s stock prices. If takeovers are financed through 
cash, the shareholders of target firms will be subject to a higher tax rate. In contrast, payment 
through a stock-swap will lead block/shareholders of private firms to claim a higher offer 
price from the bidder in order to counterbalance the tax effect, which may reduce bidder 
returns.  
A seventh explanation relies on Hansen and Lott (1996), who pointed out that the objective of 
managers should not be to maximise shareholder wealth but instead to maximise the 
‗portfolio value‘ of the shareholder. In this case, assuming they own stock in both firms, 
diversified shareholders of public bidders will be indifferent to how the gains from the 
acquisition are divided. Thus, the bidder‘s negative returns when acquiring a public target are 
offset by the target‘s positive gains. On the other hand, when a public bidder acquires a 
private target, the acquiring company‘s shareholders will receive a greater portion of the 
gains from the acquisition, assuming the bid is value-increasing. 
A further explanation, proposed by Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), highlights the fact 
that, unlike public firms, the lack of liquidity in the acquisition of private and subsidiary 
targets can lead to difficulty in trading with them. This characteristic of non-public targets 
can deter public acquirers. Since private firms are generally less well-known than public 
ones, the bidder may achieve a discount when buying private and subsidiary target firms. 
This argument is also is consistent with the view that the greater the relative size of the target, 
the returns to acquirers of non-public targets are more positive (and, likewise, the returns to 
acquirers of public targets are more negative). 
Lastly, in view of the numerous explanations and hypotheses that have been proposed in the 
literature, it is not surprising that empirical studies often take into account a combination of 
factors, including the size of the target, uncertainty with respect to target valuation, the 
existence of liquidity discounts, the level of investor protection in the target‘s country, etc. 
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(Jaffe et al. 2015, Gonenc, Hermes, and Sinderen 2013). Moreover, the analysis of bidding 
company shareholder returns has shown that, with regard to the status of target, the method of 
payment should be considered in the following ‗pecking order‘: 1) purchase of a private 
company with stocks, 2) purchase of a private company with cash, 3) purchase of a public 
company with cash, and 4) purchase of a public company with stocks (Fuller, Netter, and 
Stegemoller 2002, Conn et al. 2005, Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin 2006).  
It can thus be seen that several elements must be considered in tandem when analysing 
discrepancies in bidder returns in the takeover of public and private targets. One notable gap 
in the analysis of the literature above is the issue of diversification in conjunction with the 
status of the target and the method of payment; the impact of this will be explored further in 
the empirical analysis. 
3.3.3. Focussed vs. Diversified M&As  
The main question surrounding corporate diversification is whether it affects value, as well as 
when and how. As classified by the Standard Industrial Code, a diversified organisation 
operates in more than one sector (Maksimovic and Phillips 2007). Realistically, firms may be 
described as focus-oriented when the parties belong to the same industry as represented by 
the two initial digits of their four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, while 
all other M&A transactions which are not related are seen as diversified (Kuppuswamy, 
Serafeim, and Villalonga 2012, Tate and Yang 2015).  
The literature reveals mixed findings in terms of market reactions to diversifying 
acquisitions. For example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Flanagan (1996), DeLong 
(2001), Santos, Errunza, and Miller (2008), Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010), and Choi and 
Russell (2004) demonstrate that associated industry mergers yield greater performance than 
those that are not associated (activity diversification). In contrast, Raj and Uddin (2013) and 
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Salleo (2008) consider related versus unrelated M&As and suggest 
that related mergers which improve performance arise predominantly in underperforming 
markets. 
A study conducted by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) is commonly cited as evidence of 
a negative market reaction to diversifying acquisitions. They considered a sample of 326 U.S. 
acquisitions spanning the period 1975-1987 and reported negative announcement day returns 
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for the bidding firms. Following this study, Flanagan (1996) utilised a stronger approach to 
establishing related mergers in which targets and bidders have the same SIC code and 
unrelated mergers where targets and bidders do not have same codes. The results confirmed 
that bidding company shareholder returns were higher for related mergers than for unrelated 
mergers. Choi and Russell (2004) examined mergers in the U.S. construction industry and 
also found that related mergers performed slightly better than unrelated ones, suggesting that 
related mergers benefit more from the operational synergy associated with horizontal or 
vertical integration.  
In the specific context of the UK, Raj and Uddin (2013) analysed the performance of related 
and unrelated acquisitions in the short- and long-term over the period 1994-1998, allowing 
for size and industry control portfolios. Their analysis suggests that related acquisitions 
which improved short-term performance occurred in the context of underperforming 
industries, though notable variations were identified in longer-term performance in relation to 
bidder size and payment method. 
In a more recent study, Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010) considered a sample of 4,764 mergers 
which occurred over a period of 57 years (1950-2006) with the aim of shedding light on a 
number of different issues related to corporate diversification. One key assumption in their 
analysis was that diversification reduces value as a result of agency issues or internal 
investment distortions. However, they established that the combined announcement returns 
were significantly positive in the case of diversifying mergers and no lower than the returns 
for associated mergers, though the returns from diversifying mergers were seen to decline 
after 1980.  
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Salleo (2008) examined the impact of financial industry M&As on 
bidder company announcement returns. Their findings indicated that activity diversification 
deals enhanced overall shareholder wealth with an average CAR of 0.52%. In contrast, 
related M&As were seen to reduce shareholder wealth with an average CAR of –0.875%, and 
the difference in CAR between related and unrelated deals was –1.397%, which was 
statistically significant at a level of 10%.  
Focussing on the banking industry, DeLong (2001) classified mergers according to activity 
and geographic similarity or dissimilarity (i.e. focus versus diversification, respectively) and 
evaluated announcement returns for each group. The findings revealed that focussed mergers 
 
73 
(both geographic and activity-based) improved shareholder value by 3.0%, whereas 
diversified types were not able to create value.  
Markedly, few studies have considered the shareholder wealth effects of diversified mergers 
in developing countries. In one study, acquisition announcement abnormal returns were 
analysed for public firms operating in East Asian countries over the period 1993-2003 (Cai 
2004). Data gathered from a number of different sources were utilised, along with 
information garnered through a standard event study methodology, with the researchers 
directing attention towards the effects of corporate ownership and control structure on 
acquiring firms‘ market valuation in a short event window. Whether diversified acquisitions 
were a result of agency problems and therefore viewed in a negative light by investors was 
also tested. Despite the diversification variable (dummy 1 if the acquirer and target were not 
from the same industry) failing to demonstrate significance, the researcher argued that 
diversification destroyed shareholder wealth. 
On the other hand, Selcuk and Kiymaz (2015) examined 98 deals among Turkish companies 
over the period 2000-2011 and found positive announcement returns for the bidder firms. In 
addition, the results of their cross-sectional regression indicated that diversification generated 
higher returns for the bidder firms compared with focussed deals.  
Finally, Santos, Errunza, and Miller (2008) examined the valuation impacts associated with 
industrial versus international diversification by analysing U.S. acquirers engaged in cross-
border transactions. The period under analysis spanned from 1990 to 2000. It was found that, 
overall, the acquisition of ‗fairly valued‘ foreign entities did not result in value discounts. On 
the other hand, unrelated transactions resulted in a notable diversification discount of 
approximately 24% after accounting for the valuation of foreign targets. More notably, 
wealth gains were accrued by foreign target shareholders irrespective of the acquisition type. 
Generally, these findings imply that international diversification does not necessarily 
decrease value, while industrial diversification has the potential to result in discounts even 
after taking into account the target‘s pre-acquisition value.  
3.3.4. Domestic vs. Cross-Border M&As 
Many studies have analysed shareholder wealth effects in cross-border M&As, but the 
literature provides mixed evidence, with most studies observing small but statistically 
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significant gains (e.g. Doukas and Travlos 1988, Morck and Yeung 1992, Markides and Ittner 
1994, Kiymaz and Mukherjee 2000, Bhagat, Malhotra, and Zhu 2011, Deshpande, Svetina, 
and Zhu 2012, Danbolt and Maciver 2012). Some studies draw a comparison between cross-
border and domestic acquisitions, with a majority showing cross-border deals yielding lower 
shareholder value than domestic deals (e.g. Eckbo and Thorburn 2000, Aw and Chatterjee 
2004, Soussa and Wheeler 2006, DeLong 2001, Moeller and Schlingemann 2005, Mangold 
and Lippok 2008). Owing to the numerous studies available, the discussion in this section 
focusses only on a selection of them.  
Kiymaz and Mukherjee (2000) suggest that country diversification helps improve shareholder 
wealth by delivering advantages that are typically unattainable in domestic M&As. Using 
data for U.S. firms involved in cross-border mergers over the period 1982-1991, the results 
revealed variation in wealth effects with differences depending on various country-specific 
characteristics and being inversely linked with the extent of co-movement in the target and 
bidder countries‘ economic growth. In subsequent research, Kiymaz (2004) analysed the 
effects of U.S. firms involved in cross-border financial M&As to find that U.S. target 
organisations experienced significant positive increases in wealth, while U.S. bidders attained 
insignificant wealth gains. Moreover, differences were identified in terms of sector 
classification as well as in the case of foreign bidder and target regional locations. Markedly, 
the wealth gains to both targets and bidders could be explained by various macroeconomic 
factors such as the level of the target country‘s economic development, the volatility of the 
exchange rate, the effectiveness of the foreign government, the management of the target, and 
the relative size of the organisations involved. 
Danbolt and Maciver (2012) examined the effects of cross-border acquisitions involving UK 
firms on both bidders and targets, comparing them with the wealth effects of domestic 
acquisitions. It was established that bidders and targets alike were able to gain more in cross-
border acquisitions than in domestic acquisitions, with targets gaining significantly more than 
bidders in cross-border acquisitions. The cross-border effect was notably greater for targets 
acquired by firms from countries with governance systems superior to their own. In addition, 
the researchers argued that there is a lack of evidence to support the belief that bidders gain 




Other studies that compare domestic and cross-border M&As draw the conclusion that cross-
border deals produce fewer benefits to shareholders than domestic deals. In this regard, 
Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) present a large sample of evidence centred on comparing the 
performance of U.S. bidders acquiring U.S. and Canadian targets. Their findings indicated 
that U.S. bidders acquiring domestic targets earned notable positive abnormal returns during 
the announcement, while U.S. bidders on Canadian targets earned abnormal returns that were 
indistinguishable from zero.  
Moeller and Schlingemann (2005), who examined a sample of 4,430 acquisitions for the 
years spanning 1985-1995, also found evidence suggesting that, relative to companies that 
acquired domestic firms, U.S. companies acquiring cross-border companies had lower 
announcement returns (amounting to an estimated 1%) as well as much lower operating 
performance.  
Aw and Chatterjee (2004) conducted a three-way comparison between the post-takeover 
performance of UK acquirers of domestic continental European, UK, and U.S. targets 
covering the period 1991-1996. They established that UK organisations acquiring large 
foreign targets experienced negative cumulative abnormal returns. Moreover, the post-merger 
performance of UK firms acquiring UK targets exceeded that of UK firms acquiring U.S. 
targets.  
In the context of the EU, Mangold and Lippok (2008) investigated whether or not cross-
border M&As create value relative to domestic transactions spanning the period 2000-2007. 
Their findings indicated that cross-border deals cause notable wealth destruction for 
shareholders, whereas domestic transactions create value for acquiring company 
shareholders. The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the (–1,+1) window were –0.3% 
for the entire sample, 0.2% for domestic M&As, and –0.9% for cross-border M&As. 
Several studies have also examined shareholder wealth effects in cross-border transactions 
with target firms located in developing markets (Kiymaz 2004, Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar 
2010). These studies typically observe significant positive abnormal returns for the acquiring 
firms. For instance, Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2010) argue that when a multinational firm 
based in a developed-country acquires majority control of a firm in a developing market, the 
acquiring organisation‘s stock prices increase significantly. Their findings, based on stock 
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market returns over a three-day event window, cover both significant and positive abnormal 
returns amounting to 1.16% overall.  
Another study involving developing -market targets and developed-country acquirers by 
Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2004) covered the years 1998 to 2002 and suggests notable value 
creation for acquirers. Their panel data estimations revealed that overall, monthly returns for 
target firms increased by 5.05%-6.68% upon announcement of a cross-border deal, while for 
the acquirers, returns rose by 1.65%-3.05% on average. These benefits derive from the 
transfer of majority control from developing market targets to developed market acquirers. 
Generally, such findings imply that the significant growth in cross-border M&As in 
developing markets during the 1990s resulted in key gains for the shareholders of both 
acquiring and target organisations.  
In cross-border acquisitions involving developing market acquirers, Bhagat, Malhotra, and 
Zhu (2011) examined announcement day stock returns for a sample of 698 deals spanning the 
period 1991-2008. They established that developing region acquirers experienced average 
positive significant returns of 1.09% on the announcement day.  
In the context of the banking sector, Soussa and Wheeler (2006) conducted a study of cross-
border bank acquisitions with targets in developing markets and established that such deals 
do not necessarily achieve benefits for the acquiring bank. The researchers posit that possible 
drawbacks include legal and social obstacles, operational risk, and political risk, which 
outweigh the possible advantages. Furthermore, decreases in value following acquisition 
were recognised as being greater in all regions directly after the Asian crisis.  
Nnadi and Tanna (2013) also analysed the impact of cross-border diversification on 
acquirers‘ returns for large commercial banks in the European Union over the period 1997-
2007. Based on a sample of 62 bank mega-mergers, event study is employed to analyse 
acquirers‘ CARs around the announcement date followed by cross-sectional regression 
analysis to determine specific characteristics driving acquirers‘ CARs. The findings showed 
that cross-border M&As had a negative impact on the acquirers‘ banks. Despite a growing 
trend of banking sector consolidation in the EU, cross-border banking mergers are found to 
yield significant negative announcement period acquirer returns, while domestic ones have 
marginally positive but insignificant returns. 
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Rad and Van Beek (1999) analysed a sample of 17 targets and 56 bidding financial 
institutions and found that target shareholders experience positive abnormal returns while the 
returns to bidders are insignificant. They also find that cross-border mergers do not yield 
returns that are significantly different from domestic ones. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) 
study 54 large European financial deals (including 18 cross-border) between 1988 and 1997 
and find positive and significant average returns around the time of announcement. 
Furthermore, they find that only domestic deals create shareholder value while cross-border 
deals reveal positive but insignificant abnormal returns. They show that the difference in the 
results between domestic/cross-border deals is not driven by country-specific effects and their 
value creating result for domestic deals is attributed to a sub-sample of mergers between 
banks and product diversification of banks into insurance. Scholtens and Wit (2001) compare 
shareholder wealth effects of bank mergers in Europe to the US and Japan. For Europe, they 
examine a sample of 17 targets and 20 bidders using event study methodology with a 31-day 
window, and find that targets realize positive excess returns while the returns to bidders are 
small, but also significant and positive.  
Recent studies for Europe focusing on the distinction between domestic and cross-border 
mergers have expressed similarly differing opinions on wealth implications. Beitel, 
Schiereck, and Wahrenburg (2004) examine the value implications of 98 large bank M&A 
transactions between 1987 and 2000 and find that the overall returns are higher for non-
diversifying transactions, particularly by domestic bidders who are involved in previously 
less merger activities and when the targets show poor past performance. Using regression 
analyses, they also test different value drivers regarding their influence on the CARs. Their 
findings indicate that cross-border deals seem to increase the CARs of the target bank, while 
the bidders create more value in domestic transactions. Campa and Hernando (2004) look at 
financial and non-financial M&A transactions over the period 1998-2000 and find that, in the 
case of cross-border deals, both targets and acquirers receive significantly lower cumulative 
abnormal returns. However, they report larger value creation from domestic mergers in a 
regulated (e.g. financial) industry. 
In summary, numerous studies have examined the implications of cross-border M&As on 
shareholder value, but the findings have been mixed. However, the evidence generally points 
to the conclusion that benefits from diversification tend to be small, which leads to the 
question of whether a discount can be associated with diversification (Aw and Chatterjee 
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2004, Mangold and Lippok 2008, Nnadi and Tanna 2013). Some studies imply that the 
diversification discount could be due to a number of factors, including biases related to the 
COMPUSTAT database, endogeneity, improper measurement techniques, or sample 
selection bias (Erdorf et al. 2013). 
3.3.5. Evidence on the Acquirer Bidding Experience (Frequent Bidder Effect) 
Numerous empirical studies have investigated the impact of bidder experience on bidding 
company shareholder wealth. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 2, the research has 
investigated a number of hypotheses and observed the impact of a hierarchy of acquisitions 
on merged entity performance. Again, due to the variety of studies investigating the frequent 
bidder effect on performance, the discussion in this section concentrates only on a selection 
of studies, beginning with earlier ones. 
In their sample of 156 acquisitions that occurred between 1963 and 1979, Asquith, Bruner, 
and Mullins (1983) discovered that up to 45% of bidders were serial acquirers realising gains 
after four or more takeovers. They investigated the CARs of serial acquirers at each stage of 
acquisition and determined that the CAR increased to +2.5% after the fourth acquisition, thus 
rejecting the merger programme announcement hypothesis which suggests that bidder gains 
are mostly achieved near the beginning of an acquisition. 
Loderer and Martin (1990) analysed the short-term effects of acquisitions using a sample of 
1,538 bidders and 5,172 targets between 1966 and 1984. They found that the first takeover 
presented greater announcement effects than the subsequent takeovers. Moreover, they 
determined that one acquisition alone generated greater CAR than if it was paired with a 
series of acquisitions. They explained these results by suggesting that investors are able 
anticipate the long-term lack of performance and therefore show less confidence in relation to 
the series of takeovers. 
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) observed a sample of 449 takeovers between 1980 and 1992 
in the U.S. and found an overall U-shaped relationship between performance and bidders‘ 
experience. This is consistent with behavioural learning theory.  
Stegemoller (2002) investigated the long-term performance of 542 companies in the U.S. 
which had realised more than five takeovers between 1990 and 1999. The targets could be 
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public, private, or subsidiary companies. It was found that serial bidders tended to outperform 
their single-bidding counterparts in terms of accounting profits and share performance, and 
these conclusions held irrespective of target status and payment method. This is consistent 
with the learning-by-doing hypothesis. Baker and Limmack (2001) reached the same 
conclusions observing the UK market. 
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) analysed the short-term performance of 539 acquirers 
over the period 1990 and 2000, concentrating on those with five or more successful bids 
within three years. They found that the first takeover led to highly significant positive returns 
while the rerun from the fifth takeover were negative or null, a finding which is consistent 
with the hubris hypothesis. They also found that acquirer returns tended to be lower when the 
time period between acquisitions was shorter. Their suggested explanation for this finding is 
that bidders either negotiate less efficiently or create less synergy in later deals after making a 
series of quick acquisitions.  
Ismail (2008) investigated the performance of 16,221 acquisitions in the U.S. from 1985 to 
2004 and found that single acquirers generated a value 1.66% higher than frequent acquirers, 
with this gap widening to 5% in equity exchange offers. Their assertion and finding suggests 
that unsuccessful first-time bidders learned from their mistakes while successful first-time 
bidders suffered in subsequent acquisitions. This is consistent with the hubris hypothesis.  
Aktas, De Bodt, and Roll (2011) reported similar findings suggesting that managers consider 
the reaction of shareholders during subsequent takeovers and adapt their takeover strategy to 
these reactions, thus implying that lower returns in serial acquisitions are in line with the 
CEO learning curve.  
Dandapani, Hibbert, and Lawrence (2013) investigated the effect of U.S. bidders‘ experience 
in cross-border mergers, comparing acquisitions in developed and developing markets and 
taking into account public, private, and subsidiary targets. They found that bidders 
experienced significantly positive abnormal returns in developed markets whether the target 
was public or private, and for acquisitions in developing markets when the target was private. 
Moreover, using a cross-sectional analysis based on a sample of acquisitions between 1998 
and 2010, they showed that prior experience had a more significant and positive impact on 
bidding company shareholder wealth in the case of private targets in developed markets. 
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To conclude, some empirical studies show that serial acquirers achieve better performance 
than single acquirers while other studies find the opposite, and thus the overall evidence is 
mixed. 
3.4. M&As and Risk: The Evidence  
Most of the empirical studies discussed here investigate the impact of M&As on systematic 
or market risk, although in the aftermath of the recent global financial crises some recent 
studies have also emerged to examine the effect of banking M&As on systemic risk.   
Focussing on the elements of systematic/market risk, as discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.6) 
standard portfolio theory suggests that such risk cannot be diversified away by creating a 
portfolio of bidders and targets that are uncorrelated. Therefore, the main issue is whether and 
how M&As affect systematic/market risk (beta) in practice, as reflected in the cost of capital 
and shareholder wealth (i.e. the value of the firm).  
The empirical evidence on this relationship, however, is ambiguous. For example, Lev and 
Mandelker (1972), Sharma and Thistle (1996), and Amihud, Delong, and Saunders (2002) 
argue that M&As have no impact on acquirer risk, while Rahim and Ananaba (2000), 
Chatterjee et al. (1992), Mei and Sun (2007), Evripidou (2012), Mishra et al. (2005), and 
Chen et al. (2011) find that M&As reduce acquirer risk. On the other hand, Joehnk and 
Nielsen (1974), Rahim and Ananaba (2000), Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Salleo (2008), Bozos, 
Koutmos, and Song (2013), and Casu et al. (2015) find that M&As may actually increase 
acquirer risk.  
Table 3.5 below summarises the results of these studies on different measures of risk, which 
in some cases include total and systematic risk, where total risk (measured by the variance of 
the acquirer‘s returns) is the sum of both systematic and unsystematic (or idiosyncratic) risk. 
Most studies have focussed on evaluating systematic risk (beta) because of its direct 
relationship with shareholder wealth and required rate of return, as increasing the beta is 
synonymous with an increase in the cost of capital.  As Table 3.5 shows, studies have 
focussed on financial as well as non-financial sectors, and investigated the impact of focussed 
as well as diversified M&As. 
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Table ‎3.5: M&As and Acquirer Risk. 






1952-1963 Diversified U.S. 69 deals, Diversified SR No effect 
Joehnk and 
Nielsen (1974) 
1962-1969 Diversified U.S. 
21 Conglomerate and 
23 Non-Conglomerate 
SR Increased SR 
Lubatkin and 
O‘Neill (1987) 
1954-1973 Diversified U.S. 
297 Vertical, Related, 




reduce SR & TR 




























1975-1992 Diversified U.S. 
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TR, SR No effect 
Mishra et al. 
(2005) 





Reduce TR & 
USR, no effect 
for SR 
Mei and Sun 
(2007) 




1988-2007 Financial Industry 75 countries 
1400 cross-border and 
cross-industry deals 
SR 
Increased SR & 
WACC 






42 Domestic and 
Cross-Border 
TR, SR  
Reduce SR, no 
effect for TR 
Evripidou (2012) 2005-2010 Airline Industry 
European, 
U.S. 
5 Horizontal Mergers SR 
Reduce SR & 
WACC 
Bozos, Koutmos, 
and Song (2013) 
1998-2010 Bank U.S. 177 Large Deals SR Increased SR 


















* Note: TR is total risk, SR is systematic risk, USR is unsystematic risk, WACC is weighted average 
cost of capital 
Lev and Mandelker (1972) argue that unless the returns to both parties involved in the merger 
are perfectly correlated, the variances of the combined firms‘ returns will be less than the 
weighted average of the variances of the individual firms‘ returns (based on the 
diversification principle of portfolio theory). They therefore assess the reduction in the 
acquirer‘s risk by analysing the systematic risk (beta) for over five years, pre- and post- 
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month of announcement. However, they find that M&As have an insignificant impact on 
systematic risk. 
Joehnk and Nielsen (1974) examined the effects conglomerate and non-conglomerate 
mergers have on the beta of the acquiring firms. The results indicate that systematic risk tends 
to be responsive, in varying degrees, to major conglomerate mergers, with betas changing as 
a function of the confined pre-merger values. The results also indicate that conglomerate 
mergers only contribute to increased absolute and relative systematic risk levels - the same 
pattern exhibited by the non-conglomerate, non-merging sample of peers included in their 
study. 
Lubatkin and O‘Neill (1987) examined the effect of 297 large merger transactions on three 
measures of risk: total, systematic, and unsystematic risk. Their results revealed that mergers 
tend to be associated with increased levels of unsystematic and total risk. This finding is 
inconsistent with predictions based on modern financial theory and therefore points out a 
fundamental difference between the challenges facing securities managers and corporate 
managers. The findings also show that at least one type of merger - that involving related 
businesses - demonstrates the ability to reduce systematic risk regardless of market 
conditions. Although inconsistent with modern financial theory, that finding is grounded in 
the evolving literature on strategic management.  
Sharma and Thistle (1996) evaluated the impact of horizontal mergers (based on SIC codes) 
which occurred over the period 1981-1984 for acquirers listed in AMEX or the NYSE index 
in order to examine whether market power was a motive for these merger activities. They 
suggest that an increase in market power was a possible source of reduction in systematic risk 
(beta). However, their empirical findings revealed insignificant market power, and systematic 
risk was thus found to be unchanged as a result of the acquisition. 
Chatterjee et al. (1992) evaluated the influence of concentric mergers and conglomerate 
mergers on the risk features of the bidding companies by using the acquiring company 
industries, the average of competition of the acquired company, and the average of industry 
growth of the acquiring industry. After controlling for the target company‘s systematic risk, 
heteroskedasticity, and estimating shifts in risk over daily as well as monthly time horizons, 
the empirical findings indicated that bidding firms which combine through merger non-
competing products that share core technologies are able to reduce the systematic variability 
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in the returns to their securities. Chatterjee et al. (1992) also suggested that unrelated mergers 
may be as effective at mitigating general environmental risks. While the latter result is 
surprising, it may be explained by the different risk characteristics depicted by related and 
unrelated bidders prior to merging.  
Mei and Sun (2008) analysed the impact of forest industry M&As and found that merger 
activity decreased acquirers‘ systematic risk (beta). Evripidou (2012) analysed the influence 
of merger activities in the airline industry in the U.S. and Europe using small samples (five 
deals). Evripidou (2012) found that horizontal mergers reduced systematic risk which in turn 
reduced the cost of capital. A reduced post-merger systematic risk indicates success in 
achieving management objectives. Mergers can generate synergetic gains from increasing 
cost efficiencies and/or scale economies and can also increase shareholders value through the 
reduction in the new firm‘s cost of capital.  
Rahim and Ananaba (2000) examined the impact of non-conglomerate and conglomerate 
mergers on the risk of merged entities by comparing the difference between pre-merger and 
post-merger market risk (beta) and total risk. The empirical results showed that, first, total 
risk increased in both cases, and second, the post-merger betas increased significantly in both 
cases (0.08 for conglomerate and 0.153 for non-conglomerate mergers). This supports the 
view that conglomerates are better able to diversify their risk. Results of the paired sample 
analysis indicate that the difference in risk between the two groups of mergers is due to the 
difference in their non-systematic risk.  
As noted in Table 3.5 above, subsequent empirical studies analysed the impact of M&As 
within the financial or banking sectors (e.g. Allen and Jagtiani 2000, Amihud, Delong, and 
Saunders 2002, Mishra et al. 2005, Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Salleo 2008, Chen et al. 2011, 
Bozos, Koutmos and Song 2013, Casu et al. 2015). 
Allen and Jagtiani (2000) evaluated the impact of diversified M&As with acquirers from the 
banking sector and targets in the insurance and securities industries. They found that non-
bank activities increased banking bidders‘ systematic risk, while total risk was reduced. In 
addition, the unit price of risk did not appear to contain a risk premium to price the enhanced 
systemic risk exposure that might be engendered by greater convergence across financial 
firms. However, Allen and Jagtiani (2000) suggested that the benefits of diversification are 
not large enough to justify the increase in bank power to operate in the insurance 
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underwriting business and non-bank securities. They also indicated that bank holding 
companies‘ systematic risk exposure may be considered a proxy for the systemic risk faced 
by the U.S. banking system. If the expanded bank powers into securities and insurance 
activities increased bank holding companies‘ systematic risk, this would suggest that it would 
be more likely that a common economic shock could lead to massive bank failures across the 
entire banking system. 
Amihud, Delong, and Saunders (2002) analysed cross-border bank mergers from three 
perspectives. First, they examined the change in total risk of an acquiring bank as a result of a 
cross-border banking merger. According to the authors, it is the acquiring bank‘s total risk 
relative to the risk of home banks that is of greatest concern to bank regulators (such as the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Federal Reserve) in the acquirer‘s home country, 
because of the regulators‘ undiversified exposure to domestic bank risk. Second, they 
examined the changes in the systematic risk of acquiring banks relative to three bank indexes: 
the world bank index, the domestic bank index and the bank index of the host country (i.e. the 
country where the target is located). Third, they studied the reaction of stock prices to news 
about the acquisition and examined the relationship between the stock price reaction and 
changes in risk brought about by cross-border bank mergers. They found an insignificant 
impact on the total and systematic risk of acquirer banks. As a result, they emphasised that 
regulators need not be concerned with the risk implications of cross-border mergers.  
Similarly, Mishra et al. (2005) found an insignificant impact of non-conglomerate U.S. 
mergers (banks with banks) on the systematic risk of acquiring banks, while such mergers 
reduced the unsystematic risk (and hence the total risk) of the banks. On the other hand, 
Bozos, Koutmos, and Song (2013) analysed 177 large bank-to-bank merger deals which 
occurred in the U.S. during the period 1998-2010. Their findings showed that large bank 
mergers not only increased acquirer systematic risk, but there was also a tendency for beta to 
rise immediately following deal announcements and remain relatively high for up to two 
years afterwards. This corroborates the view that the newly consolidated big banks resulting 
from mergers entail higher systematic risk and, instead of providing risk diversification to 
shareholders, exhibit greater co-movement with the market. The broad asset pricing 
implication here is that the ‗too big to fail‘ mentality that arises from large bank mergers 
actually translates into more risk for shareholders and susceptibility to adverse movements in 
the aggregate market. 
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Focarelli, Pozzolo and Salleo (2008) examined the impact of financial industry M&As on the 
systematic risk of acquirers by analysing 1,400 deals that occurred in 75 countries during the 
period 1988-2007. The empirical findings of this study indicated that the systematic risk - and 
hence the cost of capital - of acquirers increased in the overall sample after announcement, 
though in the case of cross-border M&As, systematic risk decreased somewhat for acquirers 
that had a high ex-ante beta. The study also found that M&As in which the acquirer was an 
insurance company were followed by a relative decrease in systematic risk.  
Chen et al. (2011) examined the impact of M&A transactions between banks and insurance 
companies on the total and systematic risk of acquirers and found that systematic risk 
decreased after announcement while total risk remained constant. When comparing risk and 
returns for both domestic and cross-border acquirers, the results revealed that total risk was 
reduced without loss of wealth for the acquiring banks, and the reduction in systematic risk 
was associated with negative abnormal returns. The results also indicated that, due to high 
leverage in banks, there is a transfer of wealth from stockholders to debt holders due to a 
reduction in beta risk.  
Casu et al. (2015) analysed the impact of bank activity diversification on systematic and 
unsystematic risk by examining the influence of bank-insurance and bank-securities deals 
over the period 1991-2012. They found that M&As between banks and securities firms 
yielded increases in the total risk through higher levels of systematic and idiosyncratic risks. 
In contrast, bank acquisitions of insurers (underwriters and agents) realised an increase in 
betas. In addition, Casu et al. (2015) argued that bank size is an important and consistent 
determinant of risk whereas diversification is not, which confirm the continuing debate on 
diversification versus functional separation of bank activities. 
While the findings of the above studies indicate that the effects of mergers on systematic risk 
are mixed, there are other studies which have pointed out that consolidation in banking 
industry reduces idiosyncratic bank risk and hence improves the overall solvency of the 
financial system. Here, the theoretical reasons for mitigation of risk are based on the concepts 
of geographical and loan portfolio diversification (Boyd and Prescott 1986; Mishra et al. 
2005). 
Furthermore, Emmons et al. (2004) investigated the default probabilities of the US banks and 
found a significant reduction after consolidation through mergers, since the mergers help 
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create greater diversified portfolio. Other studies show that consolidations can increase 
collusion between banks, increasing profits of the remaining banks and thus reducing their 
vulnerability to system wide shocks (Boyd et al. 2004; Uhde and Heimeshoff 2009). Boot 
and Thakor (2000) have argued that larger banks have the tendency to limit extension of 
credit only to quality borrowers with reliable credit history, and such practices help boost 
profitability and reduce their insolvency risk levels.  
Other studies investigate whether individual risk reduction of banks through diversification or 
consolidation generate systemic risk reduction in the banking sector, and this issue has 
become important owing to the recent banking crisis. One strong argument is that banks 
motive to become ‗too big to fail‘ by merging with other banks clearly increases system wide 
risk as the individual bank risk becomes socialised. The implicit or explicit bail out 
guarantees increases the moral hazard problem in banking. Moreover, the decrease in the 
costs for monitoring competitors could be exceeded by the increase in the monitoring 
problems regarding the customer base and the operating cost structure of the target, thus 
increasing the individual default risk and therefore the systemic risk of banks (Weiß, 
Neumann and Bostandzic 2014). 
The possibility of regulatory arbitrage can also induce further risks typically associated with 
cross border bank mergers. As financial institutions can alter their poorly monitored risk by 
shifting their geographic locations to new countries, such regulatory arbitrage can increase 
the overall fragility of the financial system, which can be traced back to an increase in the 
individual banks‘ default and systemic risk (Campa and Hernando, 2008, Carbo-Valverde et 
al. 2008, Kane, 2000). A similar argument is put forward by Caminal and Matutes (2002), 
who show that monopolistic banks are more likely to make riskier loans which can 
potentially destabilize the financial system. Similarly, the collusion of banks in the aftermath 
of bank mergers could also destabilize the financial system as the joint defaults of customers 
become more likely. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) investigated this issue and provided 
empirical support for the concentration hypothesis, which suggest a positive relationship 
between concentration and the fragility of banks using a Z-score measure of risk. Carbo-
Valverde et al. (2008) show that European bank mergers between 1993 and 2004 were driven 
mainly by the desire to shift the risk towards the EU safety nets. Finally, Boyd and Graham 
(1998) have also reported a negative impact of bank concentration on the financial stability of 
the banking sector. This last study also showed that large banks have a greater propensity to 
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failure than smaller banks. However, Beck et al. (2006), Cihák et al. (2009) and Schaeck and 
Cihiak (2012) have found little support for this ‗concentration-fragility‘ hypothesis. 
Apart from the concentration-fragility hypothesis, there is also the concentration-stability 
hypothesis, which argues that consolidation in the banking sector decreases individual bank 
risk hence also decreases the systemic risk. The theoretical motivation behind such 
hypothesis is provided by Freixas and Rochet (1997) and Allen and Gale (2004), who argue 
that monopolistic banks can provide higher capital buffers that can serve as a cushion against 
external shocks to the financial system. Boot and Thakor (2000) have also provided 
arguments for the better credit quality and loan diversification via the credit rationing 
channel. One additional benefit can be that due to the reduction in market participants there 
can be better supervision and monitoring, which may again lead to decrease in systemic risk.   
While numerous studies have investigated the impact of bank consolidation on systemic risk, 
the change in the systematic risk (beta) of the acquiring banks have not been the concern of 
these studies. There are, however, a few such risk related studies, for example, Craig and 
Cabral dos Santos (1997), Amihud et al. (2002), Bharath and Wu (2005) and Vallascas and 
Hagendorff (2011), which have used Z-score measure of bank risk., as well as the acquiring 
banks‘ stock volatility, Distance-to-Default (DTD), or the implied volatility of the at-the-
money call options for acquirers‘ equity. The systemic risk of the banking system is typically 
measured by the correlation of the joint cash flows of banks in the system (Weiß, Neumann 
and Bostandzic, 2014). Hence, systemic risk can hardly be relevant in assessing the beta 
factors or the implied volatilities of banks‘ stock prices as a result of mergers. In general, 
there are more sophisticated concepts like extreme value theory, or copula theory, which 
attempt to measure any dependence between the acquiring bank returns and the rest of the 
system in the tail regions of joint return distributions, although such measures are rarely in 
bank merger studies.  
There are, however, some recent studies which have proposed systemic risk measures in the 
wake of global financial crisis. Weiß, Neumann and Bostandzic (2014), for example, have 
analysed portfolio (systematic), systemic and default risk of bank mergers in an attempt to 
test the concentration-fragility versus the concentration-stability hypotheses. Using a sample 
of 440 international and cross border mergers which happened between 1991 and 2009, and 
addressing reverse-causality issues, they find clear evidence of increase in the default and 
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systemic risk of the acquiring banks following the mergers, confirming support for the 
concentration-fragility hypothesis.  
Muhlnickel and Weiß (2015) have investigated the impact on systemic risk of mergers/ 
consolidation in the international insurance industry. They find that firm size, leverage and 
diversification across insurance lines all add to the destabilizing effect of insurance industry 
consolidation while geographic diversification is found to contribute to financial stability.  
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the empirical evidence relating to the impact of M&As on 
acquiring company shareholder wealth, focussing on studies that cover both the industrial and 
financial sectors and referring to issues relating to method of payment, public target status, 
diversification, acquirer bidding experience, and acquirer risk.  
Most of the evidence relates to M&A deals in developed countries, especially the U.S. and 
European countries (e.g. Walker 2000, DeLong 2001, Martinez-Jerez 2008, Kuipers, Miller, 
and Patel 2009, Martynova and Renneboog 2011, Raj and Uddin 2013, Nnadi and Tanna 
2013, Ran, Yadav, and Jain 2014, Jaffe et al. 2015), although a limited number of studies 
have taken into account cross-border deals with targets in developing or emerging markets 
(e.g. Beitel, Schiereck, and Wahrenburg 2004, Soussa and Wheeler 2006). In the same 
regard, the literature has traditionally focussed on M&As involving publicly-held companies, 
though more recently, interest in deals involving private and subsidiary targets has increased 
(Draper and Paudyal, 2006; Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin 2006, Capron and Shen 2007; 
Jaffe et al. 2015). Furthermore, many of the studies examine only completed deals, thereby 
excluding deals that were unsuccessful. It is therefore appropriate to extend this analysis to 
include a broader sample which covers both developed and developing economies as well as 
deals that are both completed and terminated, while distinguishing between public and non-
public targets and taking into account issues such as method of payment, diversification, 




 Research Methodology and Preliminary Analysis Chapter 4:
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to elaborate on the methodologies that will be subsequently employed in 
the empirical analysis. These include, first and foremost, the use of the event study 
methodology to analyse the impact of M&As on acquirers‘ shareholder returns, taking into 
account the main assumptions and factors used in the calculation of cumulative abnormal 
returns. This is followed by a discussion of the empirical strategy which highlights three sets 
of hypotheses associated with (1) acquiring company shareholder returns, (2) acquirer market 
risk, and (3) the probability of deal failure. For each of these hypotheses, various sub-
hypotheses relate to four main dimensions of M&A transactions, as covered in the literature 
review: (a) method of payment, (b) target status, (c) diversification, and (d) acquirer bidding 
experience. 
The empirical methodology for testing these hypotheses draws a distinction between 
univariate and multivariate analysis. The former deals with the investigation of an association 
between two groups of variables (i.e. dependent and independent variables) and involves the 
use of both parametric and non-parametric tests to account for the continuous and discrete set 
of variables which are included in the analysis. The latter deals with issues relating to a set of 
multiple variables and involves regression analysis accompanied by a parametric approach to 
hypothesis testing. A discussion of the sampling procedure for data collection is also included 
in this chapter, together with a preliminary empirical analysis highlighting global trends in 
M&As and some pre-regression testing of cross-sectional data to examine the validity of the 
underlying assumptions. 
Section 4.2 discusses the use of the event study methodology, including the use of a 
MATLAB code that was developed for calculating measures of abnormal returns and risk. 
Section 4.3 highlights the process of sample construction and discusses the preliminary data 
analysis. Section 4.4 proposes an empirical strategy covering both univariate and multivariate 
analysis and includes discussion of CAR, risk, and probit regressions for testing the relevant 




4.2. Event Study Framework 
The event study methodology is commonly used to analyse the impact of initial bid 
announcements for a sample of M&A deals on shareholder stock/share price returns. 
Abnormal returns on a stock/share are computed as the difference between the actual return 
and the expected return (Peterson 1989). As the impact of the announcement can be observed 
immediately, the event impact will be observed in the stock return over a short time period 
surrounding the announcement date (MacKinlay 1997).  
Conducting an event study requires, as a first step, to determine the interest of the event. In 
the case of this research, the interest is to measure the impact of deal announcements on 
acquirers‘ stock returns. The next step is to generate the sample of data, which will be 
discussed in Section 4.3. The third step is to determine the time period for base estimation 
and the event period (or window) for the calculation of abnormal returns. The estimation 
period must be prior to the event period in order to observe the market reaction around the 
actual event. The final step is to calculate the abnormal return and the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) and to analyse their statistical significance, which will be discussed in Section 
4.2.3. 
Estimation requires the specification of a model for the calculation of expected returns. There 
are two statistical and two economic models which are widely considered. The two main 
economic models are the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and arbitrage pricing theory 
(APT). Under the CAPM assumption, the expected return of a stock relies on the covariance 
of the market portfolio (MacKinlay 1997). This takes into account a risk-free rate to 
determine the expected return. This risk-free rate generally depends on government bond 
returns, such as treasury bills and gilts. However, the financial markets in many developing 
markets are inefficient, and the use of government bond returns may therefore not be 
appropriate, since using the CAPM can lead to biases in the calculation of expected and 
abnormal returns for M&A announcements using a cross-country sample (Ma, Pagán, and 
Chu 2009).  
Arbitrage pricing theory (APT), on the other hand, takes into account different factors which 
underlie the belief that if all stocks are impacted by the same factors, then the expected 
returns depend on the risk associated with the security (Binder 1998). Thus, the expected 
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return on a stock is a linear equation tempered by the risk involved. On the other hand, as 
MacKinlay (1997: 19) indicates,  
the gains from using an APT motivated model versus the market model are 
small. The main potential gain from using a model based on the arbitrage pricing 
theory is to eliminate the biases introduced by using the CAPM. However, 
because the statistically motivated models also eliminate these biases, for event 
studies such models dominate. 
As a result of the difficulties associated with the use of the above economic models, 
MacKinlay (1997) suggests the use of alternative statistical models based on their higher 
discriminatory power compared to that of the economic models. The two key statistical 
models are the constant mean return model and the market model. The constant mean return 
model is used to calculate mean-adjusted returns by deducting the return for a stock during 
the estimation period from the stock‘s return during the event period. The methodology for 
determining mean-adjusted returns does not take into account an accurate measurement of the 
risk or the market portfolio returns during the estimation window. Furthermore, the abnormal 
returns value will exhibit higher variance than the market model disturbances (Binder 1998). 
In addition, MacKinlay (1997: 15) indicates that, ―the constant mean return model, as the 
name implies, assumes that the mean return of a given security is constant through time. The 
market model assumes a stable linear relation between the market return and the security 
return‖.  
The market model, on the other hand, offers an advantage over the constant mean return 
model in that the portion of the return which is related to variation in the market‘s return is 
removed. This results in lower variance in the abnormal returns and is considered to be more 
accurate for observing the event impact (MacKinlay 1997). Thus, the market model is 





A number of assumptions underlie the use of the event study methodology. The first is the 
fact that the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) should hold in the semi-strong form 
(McWilliams and Siegel 1997, Eckbo 2008, Chandra 2011). The EMH asserts that market 
stock prices reflect all available information, that there are no transaction costs and full public 
disclosure. Given the existence of transaction costs and information asymmetry in reality, this 
obviously does not hold in the real world. However, the weak form of the EMH describes a 
market in which historical price data are efficiently digested and, therefore, information on 
historical price trends is of no value for the prediction of either the magnitude or direction of 
subsequent price changes (Fama 1970). 
The EMH also precludes opportunities for arbitrage. Jensen (1978: 3) defines it as follows: 
―A market is efficient with respect to information set θt if it is impossible to make economic 
profits by trading on the basis of information set θt‖. However, three different formulations of 
the EMH have been proposed: the weak form, the semi-strong form, and the strong from 
(Jensen 1978). 
The main differences between these three forms rely on Jensen‘s definition of information set 
θt. The weak form of the EMH implies that the information set includes partial historical data 
only, the semi-strong form states that the information set includes all publicly available 
information, and the strong form assumes that all public and private information on share 
prices is available (Frankfurter and McGoun 2002). 
The event study methodology assumes that the semi-strong form of the EMH holds in the real 
world. Under this assumption, stock prices reflect all publicly available information (Binder 
1998). Moreover, the event study methodology assumes that an M&A deal is an 
unpredictable event and that no other events in the event window period could also lead to 
abnormal returns for the acquirer. Therefore, any M&A deals for firms which have made 
other announcements during the short event window must be excluded from the sample. 
Elimination of these additional announcements allows more accurate calculation of the 




4.2.2. Determination of Event and Estimation Windows 
Stock returns which are expected if no event occurs or if public information is fully available 
are called ‗expected‘ or ‗normal‘ returns (Pablo and Javidan 2009, Jeng 2015). In order to 
observe the impact of an M&A on shareholder wealth, the expected returns for a given stock 
must be calculated for the period of interest (Armitage 2006). In other words, expected 
returns must be calculated during a specific period before the acquisition announcement date. 
This period is called the ‗estimation period‘ or ‗estimation window‘.  
The next step is to determine the period over which the share price reaction will be analysed 
as a result of the M&A announcement. This period is called the ‗event window‘ (Kliger and 
Gurevich 2014). As there is no consensus in the literature about the use of a standard event 
window, in this study a small window of three trading days (-1,+1) has been used, which is 
also the most common practise among the academics (see Eckbö 1983, Graham, Lemmon 
and Wolf 2002, Mulherin and Boone 2000, Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford 2001, Bouwman, 
Fuller and Nain 2003, Sudarsanam and Mahate 2003, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 2004, 
Campa and Hernando 2004, Moeller and Schlingemann and Stulz 2005, Moeller and 
Schlingemann 2005). The conventional view is that very short windows of 1-3 days can 
avoid confounding biases which are very likely to be present in the longer windows, hence 
the conventional view is that shorter windows can provide better empirical results, 
particularly in multi country event studies (Binder, 1998; MacKinlay, 1997; Park, 2004).  
There are further considerations about the shareholder valuations which may be 
underestimated due to any leakage problem before one day of the announcement. For 
example, if the window length is greater than one day prior to the announcement, there can be 
overvaluation of managerial estimations as well as private benefits. However, there are many 
researchers who prescribe that longer windows should be used, since it is uncertain when the 
information regarding the event is revealed to the market (Keown and Pinkerton 1981; Jarrell 
and Poulsen 1989; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Aktas et al. 2001; Nicolau 2010). Hence, 
different window lengths are used to ensure consistency of results, as follows.  
1. Event window of 21 working days (–10,+10) 
2. Event window of 11 working days (–5,+5) 
3. Event window of 7 working days (–3,+3) 
4. Event window of 5 working days (–2,+2) 
5. Event window of 3 working days (–1,+1) 
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The use of the above five event windows follows several previous empirical studies including 
Beitel, Schiereck, and Wahrenburg (2004), Choi and Russell (2004), Ismail (2008), Andrade, 
Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), Martynova and Renneboog (2011), Rani, Yadav, and Jain 
(2014), and Jaffe et al. (2015). Observing the impact of announcements over five different 
event windows will help assess the consistency of the results. Furthermore, observing the 
impact over the short-term implies that it is not necessary to control for the impact of acquirer 
size, which is important in evaluating long-term performance in relation to an M&A 
announcement (Gregory 1997).  
The estimation period, however, has to be pre-determined, and such estimation periods are 
different for different types of models used. For example, if the market model is used then a 
common estimation period is 120 days prior to the event. This means that the parameters of 
the model can be estimated using daily prices over 120 days prior to the event. Generally, the 
event period itself is not included in the estimation period to prevent the event from 
influencing the normal performance model parameter estimates (Mackinlay 1997). 
There are certainly some complex problems related to the pricing of assets during the event 
periods, hence several authors have used estimation periods other than the period just prior to 
the event window, though there are generally for long run studies using monthly data. 
Mandelker (1974) estimated separately the parameters in the model before and after the event 
period. Copeland and Mayers (1982) have also used post event estimation data, which is due 
to bias associated with the event which generates abnormal returns. Agrawal et al. (1992) and 
Gregory (1997) have used post-estimation data for investigating mergers over the long run.  
In the present study pre event data are used for model estimation, since that is the most 
common procedure (Ahern 2009).  
Regarding the length of the estimation period, again there are many contradicting views 
(Pettengill and Clark 2001). Some authors have used dates ranging from 90 business days to 
255 business days. The study by Aktas et al. (2001) used 90 daily observations from a period 
prior to their initial announcement (going from -180 to -91 relative to the announcement 
date). Keown and Pinkerton (1981) have used 100 trading days, Ma et al. (2009) have used 
125 days prior to the event till six days prior to the event, Liargovas and Repousis (2011) has 
used a period of 100 trading days. Chang (2008) used 200 days as estimation period (from 
day -210 to day -11). Martynova and Renneboog (2009) used 240 days starting 300 days 
prior to the acquisition announcement. As longer estimation period reduces the number of 
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deals (due to the unavailability of share price data for long periods), this study considers an 
estimation window which includes 100 working days prior to the event period along with the 
five different event periods as mentioned earlier. 
Figure 4.1 below illustrates the estimation and event windows. The event day is t, the 
estimation window runs from T0 to T1–1, and the event window runs from T1 to T2. 
 
4.2.3. Calculation of Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The abnormal returns associated with an announcement are calculated as the difference 
between the actual returns and the expected returns during the event period (MacKinlay 
1997). Accordingly, for an acquirer i at time t, the abnormal return is calculated as follows:  
                         (4.1) 
Where: 
- ARi,t is the abnormal return for stock i at time t 
- ri,t is the actual return for stock i at time t 
- E(ri,t) is the expected return for stock i at time t  
 
The expected return is based on the estimation of the market model using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) specifying the relation between the stock return and the market return as 
follows: 
Figure 4.1: Estimation and event windows. Source: MacKinley (1997) 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be 
found in the Lancester Library, Coventry University.
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 (    )                               (4.2) 
 Where: 
- ri,t is stock return i at the time t 
- rm,t is the market return based on an index (benchmark) at time t 
- εi,t is the error term 
- αi and βi are the parameters of the model 
 
Following MacKinlay (1997), the parameter estimates of the model are: 
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Where: 
-  L1= T1-T0 corresponds to the period of the estimation window (see Figure 4.1 above). 
 
The actual return of the stock i at time t will be: 
        
  
    
        (4.8) 
The return of the market index is calculated as follows: 
        
   
     
       (4.9) 
The daily market share price data for the acquirer and the market index have been collected 
from DataStream. The DataStream code for the firm price is P (Close Price) and the index 
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price code is LI (Local index price
6
). For example, LI for Lloyds Bank is ―FTSE ALL 
SHARE - PRICE INDEX‖. As a robustness check, the abnormal returns were re-calculated 
using MSCI World Index from DataStream, and the same results were obtained for betas and 
returns. 
The abnormal return is the difference between the actual return and the expected return for 
every share i at time t for the event window (T1, T2), calculated as follows: 
                               (4.10) 
In order to calculate the M&A announcement impact over the event period, the abnormal 
return values must be summed for the event window period. The cumulative abnormal return 
CAR (T1, T2) for each share during the event period starting from T1 and ending at T2 is 
calculated as follows: 
   ̂         ∑   ̂   
  
    
     (4.11) 
Then, for a sample of size N (number of announcements), the average abnormal return for 
each date t is calculated as follows: 
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         (4.12) 
The variance of the abnormal return for each date t in the event window is: 
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        (4.13) 
Finally, the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for the event period (i.e. the overall 
impact of the announcement) is calculated as follows: 
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     (4.14) 
Then, the variance of the CAAR can be calculated as follows: 
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 A robustness check is done using the return index for potential variations in the results compared with the price 
index, and it is found that there are no significant differences in the abnormal returns whether the price index or 
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Where: 
-   
                    ̂  
    (4.17) 
 
4.2.4. Testing the Statistical Significance of Abnormal Returns  
In order to test the hypotheses relating to the impact of M&A announcements on acquirer 
returns, the statistical significance of the CAR can be determined using the following 
formula: 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅                (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        )     (4.18) 
To test that the CAR is statistically significant, MacKinlay (1997) shows that a parametric 
test can be conducted for the following hypothesis: 
                vs.                   (4.19) 
which is calculated as follows: 
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4.2.5. Matlab Program 
In order to derive all the CAR results for different window lengths, a Matlab
TM
 code was 
programmed using the Matlab R2010a edition of the software (developed by MathWorks), 
which is a numerical computing environment and fourth-generation programming language. 




The program was written using a begging algorithm which calculates all the mathematical 
equations given above, including a price-to-return converter for the acquiring firms and the 
market index for each date during the estimation and event periods, along with the estimates 
of the alpha and beta parameters as well as the expected, abnormal, and cumulative abnormal 
returns during the event periods, etc. The data for the announcement dates and share prices 
were sourced from the Thomson One Banker and DataStream databases, respectively. The 
program facilitates the calculation of CARs for a large volume of data on deals and daily 
share prices via an iterative process.  
This program was checked for consistency with a sample of results obtained using the Excel 
spreadsheet that was initially considered, but it was found to be limited in handling the large 
volumes of data and the required repeated calculations of CARs for different event windows. 
The Matlab code incorporates the flexibility of calculating all CARs for shorter window 
lengths within the maximum window length. Matlab coding was added to the appendix. 
4.3. Sampling and Data Collection  
4.3.1. Basis for Construction of the Global Sample 
Prior studies in the literature have examined a range of M&A characteristics that influence 
bidding company shareholder wealth, as discussed in Chapter 3, although much of the 
empirical evidence is limited to specific industries in specific regions or countries. No 
previous empirical work has tackled a worldwide sample of M&A deals spanning a broad set 
of countries and industries and including failed deals. This study aims to contribute to the 
literature by investigating the relevance of M&A characteristics relating to the method of 
payment, target status, diversification and acquirers bidding experience on acquirers‘ 
performance based on a worldwide sample of 46,759 deals, covering 180 countries and 88 
industries. This has been selected on the basis of data availability with information sourced 
primarily from two databases, Thomson One Banker‘s M&A Database and Datastream. It 
should be noted that the data from Thomson One Banker M&A Database were originally 
collected by Securities Data Corporation (SDC) and accessed for this study through a 




                                                          
7
 See the University of Chicago Library http://guides.lib.uchicago.edu/mergers , and Thomson ONE Banker - 
Thomson Financial http://www.tfsd.com/marketing/banker_r2/HomeFAQs.asp  
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4.3.2. Sampling Criteria 
The M&A data include, as far as possible, all initial bids announced between 1977 and 2012. 
At the time of data collection in 2014, the status of many of the deals announced after 2012 
was uncertain (incomplete) and so such deals could not be included, given that the analysis of 
acquirers‘ risk requires not only certainty about completed deals but also daily share price 
data availability for at least one year before and one year after announcement date. Lack of 
share price data also meant that deals announcement before 1997 could also not be 
considered. 
Table 4.1 depicts, step-by-step, the criteria for inclusion in the sample of M&As deals 
announced between 1997-2012: 
Table ‎4.1: Sampling Criteria 
# Criterion Operator Description / Code Count 
1 Acquirer Public Status (Code) Include P 362396 
2 Target Public Status (Code) Include P,V,S 352511 
3 Deal Type (Code) Include 1,2 263158 
4 Deal Status (Code) Include C,W 247926 
5 Deal Value ($ Mil) Between 1 to HI 120811 
6 
Acquirer Market Value 4 weeks prior to 
Announcement ($ Mil) 
Between LO to HI 72340 
7 Percent of shares owned after Transaction Between 50 to 100 57562 
Note: see below for descriptions of codes  
The initial process involved identifying all M&A bids that were announced and duly recorded 
in the Security Data Corporation‘s M&A database. As explained, the time period 1977-2012 
was the most feasible and appropriate that could be entertained at the time of the initial 
screening process, which yielded 362,396 deals. As Table 4.1 shows, the sample size was 
sequentially reduced by applying the stipulated criteria. The first criterion for the deals to be 
included in the list is that the acquirers should be publicly listed and the targets should be 
public, private or subsidiary firms. The next criterion is that the bidder should acquire an 
interest of 50% or more in the target, where the interest had risen from below 50% to above 
50.  Moreover, the deal value to be included should be at least $1 million to avoid outliers
8
 
(Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller 2002; Jaffe, et al. 2015). The reason for restricting to the 
larger transactions is that they have a stronger effect on the share prices, and they also have 
                                                          
8
 We follow Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) and employ a 
one million dollars cut-off point to avoid results being generated by very small deals, which amount to outliers. 
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unthinly traded stocks (Miles and Rosenfeld 1983; Healy et al. 1992). For an M&A bid to be 
further included in the sample, the market value of the acquirer should be available from 
Datastream. Finally, only bidders who acquired a controlling stake in the target (set to be 
greater than 50% of the equity) were considered. These restrictions further reduced the 
sample size to 57, 562 deals. 
The next process included carrying out a manual review of the deals in terms of verifying the 
criteria used, by checking in the Thomson Datastream database the availability of data for the 
daily historical stock price data and the market index.  In cases where these were not fulfilled 
the deals were eliminated from the sample.  
Care was also taken to avoid the confounding effects of multiple bids, for example there were 
cases where more than one bid was announced by the bidder over a window of 21 days, and 
such cases were excluded. In addition, the M&A announcements made by the same bidder 
within less than 110 days were also removed from the sample.  
Campell and Wansley (1993) argue that for those firms whose stocks are thinly traded there 
can be high frequency of zeros which could result in non-normal distributions. Such a 
problem of non-normal return distribution has to be tackled in the methods suggested by 
Maynes and Rumsey (1993), Cowan and Sergeant (1996), and Campell and Wansley (1993), 
whereby a stock needs to be traded for at least 40 days of the 100-days estimation period in 
order to be included in the sample. Again the trading period is as suggested by Bartholdy et 
al. (2007) who classify thinly traded stocks as stocks trading less than 40% of all trading 
days.  
In summary, therefore, the criteria for inclusion in the sample after the initial screening 
process of identifying all M&A transactions in the SDC database, are: 
1. The acquirer is a public firm. 
2. The target is a public, private, or subsidiary firm. 
3. The acquirer is acquiring an interest of 50% or more in a target, raising its interest 




4. Status of Transaction: C, W, where C = Completed (the transaction has closed), and 
W = Withdrawn (the target or acquirer in the transaction has terminated its agreement, 
letter of intent, or plans for the acquisition or merger). 
5. Value of Transaction: $1 million or more, i.e. the total value of consideration paid by 
the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses. 
6. The market value of the acquirer approximately 4 weeks prior to announcement is 
available in Datastream.   
7. The percentage of shares owned by bidder in the target company after transaction 
should be between 50% and 100%. This represents the number of common shares 
acquired in the transaction plus any shares previously owned by the acquirer divided 
by the total number of shares outstanding. 
8. The acquirer‘s share prices and the local index prices are available in DataStream. 
9. No more than one bid was announced by the bidder within 21 days. 
After all the aforementioned criteria were applied, 46,758 deals remained in the sample. The 
total sample therefore comprises 46,758 initial bids from a total of 180 countries covering 88 
sub-industries over the period 1977-2012. Of these, 36,489 deals were completed 
transactions, implying successful deals, while 10,269 deals were unsuccessful (i.e. 




4.3.3. Descriptive Analysis: M&A Trends and Waves 
 
Figure ‎4.2: M&A Trends and Waves. 
Figure 4.2 above shows the number of deals in the sample per year by value of transaction, 
and it is clear that there was a significant increase in both the number of deals and their value 
between 1993-2001 and 2003-2008. These are referred to as ‗merger waves‘. In fact, there 
was also an earlier merger wave that occurred between 1981-1989, and it is possible to isolate 
the causes of these three waves according to Martynova and Renneboog (2005, 2011) and 
Matthews (2011). 
The Wave of the 1980s (1981-1989) 
This wave began because of the regrowth of the stock markets after the 1973-74 oil crisis, 
following the relaxation of the legislation on antitrust laws, the deregulation of the financial 
services sector, and the creation of new financial instruments and markets. This period 
encompassed numerous hostile takeovers, disinvestments, and private transactions in the 
form of leveraged and management buyouts (LBOs and MBOs). 
The Wave of the 1990s (1993-2001) 
This was the largest wave in terms of volume and the value of transactions. According to the 
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occurred in Europe during this period (compared to 34,494 and 12,729 deals in the U.S. and 
Europe, respectively, during the 1980s wave). This wave corresponds to a period of sustained 
economic growth and stability as well as further deregulation and consolidation of the 
financial markets, including the creation of the single currency in the Eurozone.  
A New Wave (2003-2008) 
The period of 2003-2008 is referred to as the new merger wave. It began in the middle of 
2003 after the decline of the previous merger wave and following a period of gradual market 
recovery after the downturn that began in 2000 due to the technological bubble. This wave 
included a large number of cross-border M&As between companies located in Europe, the 
USA, and Asia. According to the Thomson Financial Database, the volume of deals increased 
by 71% between 2002 and 2004, prompted by the availability of greater liquidity in the 
markets.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, several studies (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 2003, Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan 2004, Mitchell and Mulherin 1996, Harford 2005) have characterised merger 
waves as resulting from industry-level economic, technological, or regulatory shocks (in the 
neoclassical view) or from managerial timing of firms‘ market overvaluation (in the 
behavioural view).  
Finally, it is a notable that M&A activity declined during the period 2009-2012 following the 
recent global financial crisis, which led to a credit crunch and decline in liquidity in the 




4.3.4. Trends in Payment Methods 
 
Figure ‎4.3: Trends in Payment Methods. 
Figure 4.3 presents the number of M&A deals according to method of payment announced 
for the transaction (i.e. cash-only, stock-only, and cash/stock combination). The chart shows 
that during the period 1977-1989, cash was the most common method used to finance 
transactions, while from 1990-1999, stock was the most common method of payment. After 
the year 2000, cash again became increasingly more important. Hence, as other studies 
(Heron and Lie 2002, Faccio and Masulis 2005) have suggested (see Chapter 2) the use of the 
stock to finance M&As became increasingly common during the 1990s, although its use has 
again declined since 2000. It should be noted that the use of a cash/stock combination also 
increased noticeably after 1996, although the cash or stock only methods of financing have 
been more common, and there is not a single year in which the cash/stock method has 
dominated over cash or stock only financing. 
One reason for the shifts in the methods of payment over time could be a change in the nature 
of determinants influencing the management‘s decision to finance the transactions. As noted 
in Chapter 2, several explanations exist to explain the choice of the payment method in 
merger transactions, including asymmetric information problems and cash flow 
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methods during the 1990s, cash flow considerations may reflect the relative prominence of 
cash payment methods in the 2000s. It could also be that potential investment opportunities 
and the possibility of greater risk sharing saw the rise in the mixed methods of payment after 
2000s. The change in the financing pattern may have also been the result of lower interest 
rates and the record high corporate cash balances after 2000, leading to more debt and free 
cash flow. For instance, Alexandridis et al. (2012) highlights the yearly average of the Wall 
Street Journal‘s prime rate for the 2003-2007 (2005-2006) periods as 6.14% (7.07%) 
compared to 7.84% (8.18%) for 1993-1999 (1998-1999).  
4.3.5. Public vs. Non-Public Targets 
 
Figure ‎4.4: Public vs. Non-Public Targets. 
As noted earlier, in M&A research, deals involving non-public targets have received little 
attention, even though such deals represent in excess of 70% of the total transactions (Capron 
and Shen 2007). Figure 4.4 confirms that in our analysis, exactly 70% of the deals involved 
private or subsidiary targets, while only 30% involved public targets.  
4.4. Empirical Strategy for Hypothesis Testing  
This study aims to analyse the impact of payment methods, target status, acquirer bidding 
experience, and diversification on acquirers‘ cumulative abnormal returns and market risk. 
Additionally, the study aims to analyse the factors affecting the probability of deals being 
failure after announcement. In other words, the main objective of the empirical analysis is to 
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examine these three sets of hypotheses associated with (1) acquirer returns, (2) acquirer 
market risk, and (3) the probability of deal failure. For each of these hypotheses, four sub-
hypotheses will be tested relating to the four main dimensions associated with M&As: (a) 
method of payment, (b) target status, (c) diversification, and (d) acquirer bidding experience. 
Within each of these four sub-sets of hypotheses, several additional hypotheses can 
potentially be proposed using appropriate combinations of the dimensions in question, such 
as the method of payment used in focussed vs. diversified M&As and whether the impact on 
acquirer returns or risk is statistically significant or not. Within the context of diversification, 
a distinction is also drawn between (i) activity (focussed vs. diversified M&As) and (ii) 
geographic scope (domestic vs. cross-border M&As). Furthermore, between these two 
dimensions of diversification, cross-combinations are also possible, for example, in cases of 
M&A deals where the acquirer and the target are located in different countries and operate in 
different industries (cross-industry and cross-border deals). Thus, it is clear that numerous 
hypotheses can be investigated using a global sample of M&A data, and in the foregoing 
analysis, the specific hypotheses to be investigated will be explicitly stated and explained. 
Table 4.2 summarises these main sets of hypotheses relating to acquirers‘ shareholder returns, 
acquirers‘ risk and the probability of deal completion/failure. 
Table ‎4.2: Hypotheses of Study. 
H0 1) CAR 2) Market risk (Beta) 3) Probability of deal failure 
(a) Method of 
payment 
There are no significant 
differences in acquirers‘ 
cumulative abnormal returns 
based on whether a deal 
involves a cash or stock 
payment. 
There are no significant 
differences in acquirers‘ 
market risk based on 
whether a deal involves a 
cash or stock payment. 
There are no significant 
differences in the probability 
of deal failure based on 
whether a deal involves a cash 




There are no significant 
differences in acquirers‘ 
cumulative abnormal returns 
based on whether a deal 
involves a public or non-
public target (private and 
subsidiary). 
There are no significant 
differences in acquirers‘ 
market risk based on 
whether a deal involves a 
public or non-public target 
(private and subsidiary). 
There are no significant 
differences in the probability 
of deal failure based on 
whether a deal involves a 
public or non-public target 




There are no significant 
differences in acquirers‘ 
cumulative abnormal returns 
based on domestic or cross-
border and focussed or 
diversified M&A deals. 
There are no significant 
differences in acquirers‘ 
market risk based on 
domestic or cross-border 
and focussed or diversified 
M&A deals. 
There are no significant 
differences in the probability 
of deal failure based on 
domestic or cross-border and 





There is no association 
between acquirers‘ 
cumulative abnormal returns 
and acquirer bidding 
experience. 
There is no association 
between acquirers‘ market 
risk and acquirer bidding 
experience. 
There are no significant 
differences in the probability 
of deal failure based on the 
involvement of multiple 
acquirers and single acquirers. 
 
108 
The foregoing discussion provides a number of rationales for the hypotheses stated but relates 
mainly to the impact of M&A deal characteristics on shareholder wealth (acquirers‘ CAR) 
since there are no prior studies of deal characteristics (other than diversification) focussing on 
risk and hardly any studies on the probability of deal completion/failure.  In what follows, 
referring to Table 4.2, null hypotheses (a1), (a2), (a3) refer to the impact of the method of 
payment on acquirers CAR, risk and probability of deal failure respectively; (b1), (b2), (b3) 
correspondingly refer to the impact of target status; and so on for diversification (c1, c2, c3) 
and acquirers‘ bidding experience (d1, d2, d3).    
With regard to the method of payment, Fullers, Netters and Stegemoller (2002) among others 
have proposed that stock is a less preferable payment mechanism than cash, keeping in mind 
the information asymmetry that characterising bidder and target valuations as well as 
uncertainty about the expected synergy.  Since each party in the transaction is in a better 
position to judge whether their own stocks are overvalued or undervalued, from the 
perspective of the bidder the stock payment mechanism accounts for the valuation 
uncertainties. This is the implication of the overvaluation hypothesis, originally developed by 
Myers and Majluf (1984), which suggests that if the bidder offers stock the market perceives 
that its stock is overvalued, and there would be negative response to its stock upon 
announcement. However, from the perspective of the target firm, since it‘s difficult to gauge 
the valuation of the bidder‘s stocks it would prefer cash payments in general cases.  
Correspondingly, if the bidder offers cash instead of stock, it conveys a stronger signal to the 
market about its valuation and expected synergy, which therefore yields a positive response 
from the market upon announcement. Stated simply, therefore, the alternative to the null 
hypothesis (a1) is that stock payments will generate negative CARs and cash payments will 
yield positive CARs for bidders upon announcement in general. The implications for 
acquirers‘ risk (a2) and the probability of deal completion (a3) can be inferred from the risk-
return trade-off theory, implying that cash payment will incur lower risk than stock payment 
deals for acquirers and the likelihood of deal completion is correspondingly higher with cash 
than with stock payments.  However, such inferences are based on the assumption of targets 
being public and therefore not capable of explaining the anomalies in the positive bidder 
returns associated with stock payments for acquisitions of private or subsidiary targets.   
Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002), Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), and Jaffe et 
al. (2015) have argued that the mergers with private targets are to be treated differently than 
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the mergers with public targets. When a target is private, information about it is generally 
limited. Public firms, on the other hand, are exposed to the scrutiny of the entire stock 
market, as it is subject to regulations regarding transparency and the issuance of certain types 
of information, which implies less uncertainty regarding their value (Feito-Ruiz and Requejo 
2014). However, private firms have more control over the kind and amount of information 
they disclose to markets (Reuer and Ragozzino 2008). This information asymmetry increases 
the risk of inaccurately valuing the target‘s assets and so the acquiring company may be able 
to obtain shareholder gains by forcing the target to accept a substantial discount in the 
purchase price (Makadok and Barney 2001). The comparative lack of public information on 
non-public target corresponds to a lack of effective competition among private acquirers. 
Added to this is the claim that non-public targets are typically less liquid than public firms, 
which heightens the negotiating power of potential acquirers in seeking lower payment for 
the target, thus creating shareholder wealth and explaining the abnormal returns (Capron and 
Shen 2007). These explanations indicate, as alternative to the null hypothesis (b1), that non-
public target M&A will yield positive abnormal return while public target will generate 
negative abnormal return for the bidder firms. Correspondingly, deals with non-public targets 
incur higher market risk for acquirers than deals with public targets (b2). However, the 
probability of deal failure (b3) is higher with public targets, as their shareholders are more 
likely to ‗free-ride‘ on bidder offers and raises the premium paid, while private targets, which 
tend to have concentrated shareholders, have better negotiating power to ensure deal success. 
The alternative hypotheses relating to diversification concerns different motives which may 
be economic, finance or strategy based. In cross-industry mergers, besides growth there may 
be other opportunities to exploit such as imperfections in the capital markets (Chan et al. 
1992), differences in taxation (Weston et al. 2001), capturing rents resulting from market 
inefficiencies (Servaes and Zenner 1994), and synergies based on different knowledge and 
skills which gets diffused through such mergers. In cross-industry cases, the market power 
theory holds that such mergers actually help the merged entity influence the price in the 
market and hence beat the rivals (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2005). These considerations suggest 
that the bidder abnormal returns in cross-border or diversified M&A announcements are 
likely to be significantly higher than for domestic or focused ones.  Similarly, the 
implications for acquirers‘ risk (c2) can be inferred from the standard international 
diversification theory, which suggests that diversification or integration of markets may 
reduce acquirers‘ systematic risk. However, the greater degree of information asymmetry and 
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uncertainty associated with diversified deals may be riskier and, therefore, their probability of 
deal failure (c3) is lower than for domestic and focussed (DAF) deals.  
With regard to acquirers‘ bidding experience, although experience in acquisitions is not 
always a criterion for success, the acceptable view is that unsuccessful acquirers have little 
bidding experience in this context. Previous experience of acquisition aids companies insofar 
as they are able to learn from previous errors, which therefore helps them to be successful in 
subsequent attempts. Serial acquirers, who tend to have the experience and skills necessary to 
achieve success in acquisitions, are recognised as being more likely to achieve positive 
outcomes in this regard. Nevertheless, as noted in chapters 2 and 3, the hubris or over-
optimism motives of M&As, which stands in contrast to the rational, synergy-based theories 
of mergers, suggest that with increased experience, acquirers destroy rather than improve 
their shareholders‘ wealth. In line with the hubris theory, the alternative to the null hypothesis 
(d1) is that the bidder abnormal returns for serial acquirers are significantly lower than for 
single acquirers. Correspondingly, serial acquirers will incur higher systematic risk for 
shareholders (d2). Also, acquirers with prior experience of successful acquisitions ought to 
have greater expertise in ensuring deal completion, implying lower likelihood of deal failure 
(d3), although this does not imply that they make efficient decisions.   
Prior to that, however, it is important to explain the basis for the construction of the global 
sample as well for the univariate and multivariate analyses involved in the pre-hypothesis 
testing. 
4.4.1. Univariate analysis: Testing the mean differences of two groups  
Univariate analysis explores the association between two variables, in particular the 
dependent variable and an explanatory variable that is included in subsequent regressions. As 
such, it involves pre-regression testing to determine the underlying distribution of the data 
relating the two variables, which may be continuous or discrete. The choice of the appropriate 
statistical analysis for pre-regression testing depends on these two factors: the type of 
variable (whether continuous or discrete) and the underlying distribution of the data (whether 
parametric or non-parametric). 
Table 4.3 below characterises the nature and type of the main dependent and explanatory 
variables that are used in the subsequent analysis. 
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Table ‎4.3: Type of Dependent and Explanatory Variables. 
Variable Nature  Type  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Dependent Variable Continuous 
Risk (Market or Systematic) Dependent Variable Continuous 
Probability of Deal Failure Dependent Variable Categorical  
Method of Payment Independent Variable Categorical 
Target Status Independent Variable Categorical 
Diversification Independent Variable Categorical 
Acquirer Bidding Experience Independent Variable Continuous 
Of the three dependent variables characterising the three sets of hypotheses to be considered, 
the acquirers‘ CAR and market/systematic risk are regarded as continuous variables, while 
the probability of deal failure is a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deal was failure (a 
unsuccessful deal) or ‗0‘ if the deal was completed (a successful deal), and this dependent 
variable is thus considered to be discrete (i.e. categorical or dichotomous). 
The next important step is to determine whether the data for each variable are normally 
distributed or not. This determines the appropriate parametric or non-parametric test for 
evaluating the significance of the mean difference between the dependent and independent 
variables. According to Field (2013), the main assumption underlying the use of parametric 
tests is that the data must be normally distributed. A number of approaches can be utilised to 
assess the normality of a data distribution, including plotting histograms, using skewness and 
kurtosis, or using the Shapiro-Wilk (SW) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests. These last 
two tests compare the scores from the sample to a normally distributed set of scores with the 
same mean and standard deviation. They are typically used to determine how well a sample 
of data fits a normal distribution using the following hypothesis: 
H0: The data are assumed to be normally distributed. 
against the alternative: 
H1: The data are assumed not to be normally distributed. 
Table 4.4 below tests for the normality of the underlying distribution relating to the sets of 
dependent and independent variables employed in the regression. The definitions of the 
specific variables are also given in the Table. Using KS test, the results indicate that none of 
the variables are normally distributed. This suggests that a non-parametric test of mean 
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differences should be employed. However, in the foregoing analysis, both parametric and 
non-parametric tests are used to check for consistency.  
Table ‎4.4: Tests of Normality. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is used to test the normality of the underlying distribution relating to the 
following variables: (1) CARs(-5,+5) is the cumulative abnormal return five days before and after the 
announcement date. (2) CARs(-3,+3) is the cumulative abnormal return three days before and after the 
announcement date. (3) CARs(-2,+2) is the cumulative abnormal return two days before and after the 
announcement date. (4) CARs(-1,+1) is the cumulative abnormal return one day before and after the 
announcement date. (5) Cash-only is a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the acquirer used cash-only as the method 
of payment and ‗0‘ otherwise. (6) Stock-only is a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the acquirer used stock-only as 
the method of payment and ‗0‘ otherwise. (7) Public status (Public) is a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the 
bidder acquired a public target and ‗0‘ otherwise. (8) Private status (Private) is a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if 
the bidder acquired a private target and ‗0‘ otherwise. (9) Subsidiary status (Sub.) is a dummy variable equal to 
‗1‘ if the bidder acquired a subsidiary target and ‗0‘ otherwise. (10) Domestic and focussed deal (DAF) is a 
dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the bidder and target firms operate in the same country and industry, and ‗0‘ 
otherwise. (11) Domestic and cross-industry deal (DCI) is a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the bidder and target 
are located in the same country but operate in different industries according to the initial two digits of their four-
digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, and ‗0‘ otherwise. (12) Cross-border and focussed deal 
(CBF) is a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the bidder and target operate in the same industry but are located in 
different countries, and ‗0‘ otherwise. (13) Cross-border and cross-industry deal (CBCI) is a dummy variable 
equal to ‗1‘ if the bidder and target are located in different countries and operate in different industries 
according to the initial two digits of their four-digit SIC codes, and ‗0‘ otherwise. (14) Exp. 3-Y is the 
cumulative number of takeovers by the same acquirer during a three-year period. (15) Exp. 5-Y is the 
cumulative number of takeovers by the same acquirer during a five-year period. (16) Failure is a dummy 
variable equal to ‗1‘ if the announced deal was failure and ‗0‘ if the announced deal was success. 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
Statistic df Sig. 
CARs(-5,+5) 0.169 46758 0.000*** 
CARs(-3,+3) 0.177 46758 0.000*** 
CARs(-2,+2) 0.183 46758 0.000*** 
CARs(-1,+1) 0.196 46758 0.000*** 
Cash-Only 0.452 46758 0.000*** 
Stock-Only 0.468 46758 0.000*** 
Public 0.444 46758 0.000*** 
Private 0.356 46758 0.000*** 
Sub. 0.478 46758 0.000*** 
DAF 0.395 46758 0.000*** 
DCI 0.411 46758 0.000*** 
CBF 0.519 46758 0.000*** 
CBCI 0.528 46758 0.000*** 
Exp. 3-Y 0.316 46758 0.000*** 
Exp. 5-Y 0.304 46758 0.000*** 
Failure 0.482 46758 0.000*** 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
4.4.1.1. T-test vs Mann-Whitney U Test for Categorical Variables 
When testing for differences between two groups, the independent samples t-test is 
commonly used, but it may be inappropriate if the assumption of parametric tests is not met, 
as noted above. Therefore, it is necessary to consider a non-parametric, distribution-free 
version of the t-test (such as the Mann-Whitney U test) to deal with two samples which are 
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independent and may be of different sizes (Pallant 2001, Field 2013). The Mann-Whitney U 
test is used to compare differences between two independent groups when the dependent 
variable is continuous but the independent variable is categorical.  
Despite the rejection of the normality assumption above, both a Mann-Whitney U test and an 
independent samples t-test will be employed to test for significant differences between the 
dependent variables (acquirers‘ cumulative abnormal return, market risk) and the appropriate 
dichotomous independent variable. More specifically, referring to Table 4.2, this test is 
appropriate for testing the following null hypotheses: 
 There are no significant differences in acquirers‘ cumulative abnormal returns (or 
market risk) based on whether a deal involves a cash or stock payment. 
 There are no significant differences in acquirers‘ cumulative abnormal returns (or 
market risk) based on whether a deal involves a public or non-public target (private 
and subsidiary). 
 There are no significant differences in acquirers‘ cumulative abnormal returns (or 
market risk) based on domestic or cross-border M&A deals. 
 There are no significant differences in acquirers‘ cumulative abnormal returns (or 
market risk) based on focused or diversified M&A deals. 
 There are no significant differences in acquirers‘ cumulative abnormal returns 
between M&A deals that are ultimately success or failure. 
4.4.1.2. Pearson and Spearman’s Correlations Tests for Continuous Variables 
Correlation analyses are employed to assess the strength of association between two 
continuous variables. Since acquirer bidding experience can be a continuous variable 
(represented by the cumulative number of prior completed deals), a correlation analysis is 
appropriate in this case to investigate the strength of association between acquirer bidding 
experience and acquirer CAR or risk. The statistical significance of the correlation between 
the two variables can be tested using the non-parametric Spearman‘s rho test or the 
parametric Pearson test (Brown et al. 1989). Sheskin (2003) suggest that the Spearman rank-
order (rho) test is more appropriate under non-normal, non-constant variance and when 
outliers exist in the data, although both tests may generate similar results if the association 
between the two variables is strong. Therefore, both tests are employed here to test the 
following null hypothesis: 
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 There is no association between acquirers‘ cumulative abnormal returns (or market 
risk) and acquirer bidding experience. 
4.4.1.3. Chi-square analysis for categorical variables 
When both variables are categorical or dichotomous, the appropriate test of statistical 
association between the two is the chi-square test for independence. Therefore, the chi-square 
test is employed here to look for potential significant mean differences in the probability of 
deal failure and the independent variables that are categorical, i.e. diversification, method of 
payment, target status, and acquirer bidding experience (if treated as a dummy variable). 
More specifically, the chi-square test will be used to test the following null hypotheses: 
 There are no significant differences in the probability of deal failure between 
domestic and cross-border deals. 
 There are no significant differences in the probability of deal failure between focussed 
and cross-industry deals. 
 There are no significant differences in the probability of deal failure between cash and 
stock-funded M&As. 
 There are no significant differences in the probability of deal failure between deals 
involving public and non-public targets. 
 There are no significant differences in the probability of deal failure based on the 
involvement of multiple acquirers and single acquirers. 
4.4.2. Multivariate analysis 
Multivariate analysis refers to a group of statistical techniques for handling three or more 
variables at a time (Kervin 2003). This type of analysis amounts to using multiple regressions 
in order to test the significance of the impact of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable. However, the assumptions underlying cross-sectional regression using OLS 
estimation should be checked beforehand to ensure that valid inferences are made from the 
estimated results. Five important assumptions must be taken into account in this regard: 
1. Normality of Data:  
This assumption was checked above (see Section 4.4.1, Table 4.4), and the results indicate 




Multicollinearity refers to the correlation among the explanatory variables in a regression 
model. Field (2013) indicates that the presence of multicollinearity among independent 
variables represents a threat to the use of multiple regressions. The variance inflation factor 
(VIF) is commonly used to check if there is any strong correlation between the explanatory 
variables. If the value of VIF>10, then there is a problem of multicollinearity (Neter, 
Nachtsheim and Neter 2004). Table 4.5 below presents the results of the multicollinearity 
test, which confirm that this value is below 10 for all the explanatory variables of interest, 
suggesting the absence of multicollinearity. In addition, the tolerance value should be more 
than 0.2 (Field 2013) to indicate the absence of multicollinearity, and Table 4.5 confirms that 
all tolerance values are above 0.5. 
Table ‎4.5: Multicollinearity Test. 
Multicollinearity test is relating to the following variables: (1) Cash-only is a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the 
acquirer used cash-only as the method of payment and ‗0‘ otherwise. (2) Stock-only is a dummy variable equal 
to ‗1‘ if the acquirer used stock-only as the method of payment and ‗0‘ otherwise. (3) Public status (Public) is a 
dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the bidder acquired a public target and ‗0‘ otherwise. (4) Private status (Private) 
is a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the bidder acquired a private target and ‗0‘ otherwise. (5) Domestic and 
cross-industry deal (DCI) is a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the bidder and target are located in the same 
country but operate in different industries according to the initial two digits of their four-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, and ‗0‘ otherwise. (6) Cross-border and focussed deal (CBF) is a dummy 
variable equal to ‗1‘ if the bidder and target operate in the same industry but are located in different countries, 
and ‗0‘ otherwise. (7) Cross-border and cross-industry deal (CBCI) is a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the 
bidder and target are located in different countries and operate in different industries according to the initial two 
digits of their four-digit SIC codes, and ‗0‘ otherwise. (8) Exp. 3-Y is the cumulative number of takeovers by 
the same acquirer during a three-year period.  
  
Collinearity Statistics 
                                   Tolerance                                              VIF 
Cash-Only 0.860 1.163 
Stock-Only 0.826 1.211 
Public 0.594 1.683 
Private 0.609 1.642 
DCI 0.805 1.242 
CBF 0.842 1.188 
CBCI  0.862 1.160 
Exp. 3-Y 0.991 1.009 
a. Dependent Variable: CARs(-1,+1) 
3. Outliers: 
Multiple regressions are very sensitive to outliers, which can potentially cause under or over-
estimation of the coefficient, particularly in small samples. Scatter plots are used to check for 
outliers, and here, the results demonstrate that very few, isolated cases of outliers were found 
in the data, and this is not particularly serious considering the size of the sample. For 




Figure ‎4.5: CAR (-1,+1) Outliers. 
4. Heteroskedasticity 
The assumption of homoscedasticity is central to the use of OLS estimation in cross-sectional 
regressions. It refers to a situation in which the error term is consistent across all values of the 
independent variables. Heteroskedasticity (the violation of homoscedasticity) is present when 
the variance of the error term differs across the values of an independent variable, although 
its impact on the significance of the estimated results is a matter of degree, which increases as 
heteroskedasticity increases.  
The White‘s test and the Breusch-Pagan test have been used to check for heteroskedasticity, 
and the results of both tests
9
 are significant at 1%. Thus, the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity is rejected, and it is inevitable that heteroskedasticity is present in the data. 
This was to be expected, however, given the global nature of the sample. 
Two steps have been employed to tackle the issues of the violation of normality and 
heteroskedasticity and the few isolated cases of outliers in the data: (i) transformation of the 
data and (ii) the use of heteroskedasticity-corrected estimates. The next section outlines these 
procedures in more detail. 
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4.4.3. Data Transformation and Heteroskedasticity Corrected Estimates 
One of the most common ways to overcome violation of OLS assumptions in multiple 
regression is to transform the data. Although Cooke (1998) recommends transforming the 
data when the assumptions of the regression analysis are violated, Field (2013) asserts that 
transforming the data does not change the relationship between different variables but rather 
the unit of measurement (the scale on which a variable is measured), and Comrey and Lee 
(2006) likewise states that transformation changes only the variable‘s measurement scale. 
Several statistical transformation methods can be used, including log transformation, square 
root transformation, and rank transformation (Field, 2013). In addition, Baguley (2012) notes 
that a recent development in dealing with such problems involves transforming the data and 
using rank regression rather than conventional OLS. There are, however, both advantages and 
disadvantages to using rank regression (Baguley 2012). 
A simple rank transformation assigns rank one to the smallest observation in the sample and 
rank N to the largest one. Additionally, the dependent variable (e.g. CAR) is ranked 
according to the following formula: 
            
 
   
  
Where: 
- N = the ranked score  
- n = number of deals  
Cheng et al. (1992) explains that the ranked variables will have a maximum value of N/(n-1) 
and a minimum value of 1/(n-1). Hence, according to the above formula, the ranks are 
standardised by the number of observations minus 1. Thus, the coefficient produced in the 
rank regression will have the desirable property of being independent of the observations. It 
should be noted that rank regression is only useful when the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables is nonlinear, non-normal, and there are outliers in the 
data. With rank transformation, however, it is difficult to interpret the significance of the 
regression coefficients using f and t-tests as well as the normality of the error distribution 
(Cooke 1998).  
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In the presence of heteroskedasticity, the use of heteroskedasticity-corrected estimates is 
applicable where heteroskedasticity is present in the form of an unknown function of the 
regressors, which can be approximated through a quadratic relationship. In such a context, 
heteroskedasticity-corrected estimates offer the possibility of obtaining consistent standard 
errors and more efficient parameter estimates as compared to OLS. The procedure, as 
suggested by White (1980) and others, involves (i) OLS estimation of the model, (ii) an 
auxiliary regression to generate an estimate of the error variance, and (iii) the use of weighted 
least squares (WLS) in which the reciprocal of the estimated variance is used as a weight. In 
the auxiliary regression (ii), the procedure involves regressing the log of the squared residuals 
from the first OLS estimation on the original regressors and their squares. The log 
transformation is usually performed to ensure that the estimated variances are non-negative.  
In light of the above considerations, both rank regression and heteroskedasticity-corrected 
estimation have been applied in addition to OLS estimation. The results are very consistent in 
terms of having the same sign and similar magnitudes of the estimates. Additionally, log 
transformation has been applied to CAR values in selected cases, and the results are found to 
be consistent. Furthermore, as a consistency check, the isolated cases of outliers observed in 
some CAR values were restricted to a range within appropriate levels, and the results were 
found to be unaffected. Except for heteroskedasticity-corrected OLS estimates, the other 
results for rank regressions and outliers are not reported due to lack of space.  
4.4.4. CAR Regressions  
In order to analyse the effect of the independent variables on acquirers‘ shareholder wealth as 
represented by cumulative abnormal returns obtained from the event study, cross-sectional 
CAR regressions are performed in accordance with the relevant hypotheses tested. To 
simplify the analysis and following various studies in the literature (Andrade, Mitchell and 
Stafford 2001, Mulherin and Boone 2000, Beitel, Schiereck, and Wahrenburg 2004, 
Martinez-Jerez 2008, Jaffe et al. 2015), a three-day event window for CAR (-1,+1) is used in 
the regression, though CARs with varying window lengths are used in the univariate analysis. 
Taking the four sets of explanatory variables (i.e. method of payment, target status, 
diversification, and acquirer bidding experience) into account, as well as a set of control 
variables (to be discussed later), the basic model encompasses the various hypotheses to be 
tested and is expressed as follows: 
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        (4.21) 
Where: 
- CARi is the cumulative abnormal return for deal i for a three-day window (-1,+1). 
- DAFi is a dummy variable equal to 1 for deal i if the acquirer and target are located in the 
same country and operate in the same industry, and 0 otherwise. 
- DCIi is a dummy variable equal to 1 for announcement i if the acquirer and target are 
located in the same country but operate in different industries, and 0 otherwise. 
- CBFi is a dummy variable equal to 1 for announcement i if the acquirer and target operate 
in the same industry but are located in different countries, and 0 otherwise. 
- CBCIi is a dummy variable equal to 1 for announcement i if the acquirer and target are 
located in different countries and operate in different industries, and 0 otherwise. 
- CSHi is a dummy variable equal to 1 for announcement i if the acquirer paid by cash-
only, and 0 otherwise. 
- STCi is a dummy variable equal to 1 for announcement i if the acquirer paid by stock-
only, and 0 otherwise. 
- Pubi is a dummy variable equal to 1 for announcement i if the target is a public company, 
and 0 otherwise. 
- Privi is a dummy variable equal to 1 for announcement i if the target is a private 
company, and 0 otherwise. 
- Subsi is a dummy variable equal to 1 for announcement i if the target is a subsidiary 
company, and 0 otherwise. 
- Expi is the cumulative number of takeovers by the same acquirer during a three-year 
period. 
- VTi is the logarithm of the value of transactions for deal i. 
- GDPj is the logarithm of GDP per capita of country j, which includes both target and 
acquirer countries. 
- M/Bi is the acquirer‘s market-to-book ratio on announcement day. 
- ASi (Acquirers‘ Size) is the market value of acquirer‘s four weeks prior to announcement 
i. 




- IPj is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bidder (target) is located in a country that applies 
common law (proxy for investor protection), and 0 otherwise. 
Table 4.6 outlines the basic framework for hypothesis testing, which accounts for the subsets 
of the explanatory variables and their respective effects in terms of sign (positive or negative) 
on the dependent variable. 
Table ‎4.6: Framework for Hypothesis Testing. 
Independent Variables  
CBCI DCI CBF DAF Failure  
+ + + – N/A 
Dependent Variable  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Independent Variables  





Cash  Stock Aq. Exp. 
The sections that follow explain the basis for considering the choice of explanatory variables 
characterising the relevant hypotheses postulated earlier. The expected signs of the effects of 
the explanatory variables on the dependent variable are determined from the discussion of the 
hypotheses stated in Chapter 4 (section 4.4). The following discussion, therefore, is centred 
on providing precise definitions of the explanatory variables listed in the model above. 
4.4.4.1. Activity and Geography Diversifications  
Acquiring a company located in another geographic area or which focusses on a different 
type of activity can give the acquirer a competitive advantage based on a transfer of skills 
from the target to the bidder (e.g. marketing, patents, technology, etc.). It can improve the 
acquirer‘s performance and its competitive position on the industry (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
2005). On the other hand, an important disadvantage of cross-border M&As from the 
bidder‘s perspective is the lack of country/firm-specific knowledge of the target‘s context, 
which could potentially lead to an erroneous valuation of the target and poor performance. 
This can be observed when the target has large amounts of intangible assets and human 
capital (Reuer, Oded, and Ragozzino 2004, Nnadi and Tanna 2013). In addition, activity 
diversification can occur within or across countries, and its effect on shareholder wealth can 
be influenced by various factors. 
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Figure ‎4.6: Activity and Geography Diversifications 
Note: the chart shows the four types of activity and geographic diversification: 1) domestic focussed deals 
(DAF): the bidder and target are located in the same country and operate in the same industry, 2) domestic 
cross-industry deals (DCI): the bidder and target are located in the same country but operate in different 
industries according to the initial two digits of their four-digit SIC codes, 3) cross-border focussed deals (CBF): 
the bidder and target operate in the same industry but are located in different countries, and 4) cross-border 
cross-industry deals (CBCI): the bidder and target are located in different countries and operate in different 
industries according to the initial two digits of their four-digit SIC codes.   
In the view of DeLong (2001) (see Figure 4.6), activity and geographic diversification are 
classified according to four dummy variables: 
- Domestic and focussed deals (DAF) are represented by a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the acquirer and target are located in the same country and operate in the same 
industry, 0 otherwise. 
- Domestic and cross-industry deals (DCI) are represented by a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the acquirer and target are located in the same country but operate in different 
industries (based on the initial two digits of their four-digit SIC codes), and 0 
otherwise. 
- Cross-border and focussed deals (CBF) are represented by a dummy variable equal to 
1 if the acquirer and target operate in the same industry but are located in different 
countries, and 0 otherwise. 
- Cross-border and cross-industry deal (CBCI) are represented by a dummy variable 















different industries (based on the initial two digits of their four-digit SIC codes), and 0 
otherwise. 
The standard practice in empirical research using cross-country firm level data is to include 
the four digit SIC codes to identify industry level diversification (e.g. Montgomery 1994; 
Flanagan 1996; Sharma and Thistle 1996; Hubbard and Palia 1999; Allen and Jagtiani 2000; 
Rahim and Ananaba 2000; Graham, et al. 2002; Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Salleo 2008; Bozos, 
Koutmos, and Song 2013; Arikan and Stulz 2016). In the current study, the activity 
diversifying M&As are represented by using the SIC codes so that the results can also be 
compared with those of related papers. Activities are considered as focussed when the first 
two digits of the SIC codes are identical, and as diversifying when the first two digits of the 
main industry codes are not the same (Selcuk and Kiymaz 2015). 
However, some studies claim that the SIC system is suboptimal for industry classification. 
Bhojraj, Lee and Oler (2003), for example, compare four industry classification systems (i.e., 
SIC, North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS), and Fama and French (1997) industry groupings (FFIG)) in a variety of 
applications common in empirical capital market research. Comparison among these 
measures reveal that the GICS system is significantly better for explaining the cross sectional 
variations in the samples for the variables like forecast growth rates, and key financial ratios. 
The performances of the inferior systems differ little from each other (Schreiner, 2009). 
Eberhart (2004) include five industry classification systems in the analysis of accuracy for 
valuation of small firms in the US. The author also provides evidence that the Dow Jones 
industry classification system (renamed as the Industry Classification benchmark, ICB) 
generates most accurate market value predictions. 
Summarily, Eberhart (2004), Bhojraj, Lee and Oler (2003) suggest that the ICB and GICS 
systems which are propriety data are also frequently used by the analyst and the investment 
bankers, and these two systems provide superior industry classification for the fundamental 
analysis and the valuation study which uses industry based control samples. Hence, 
academics working in these areas should try to gain either GICS or ICB industry codes for 
the research projects (Schreiner, 2009).  However, due to the unavailability of these codes, 




4.4.4.2. Method of Payment  
As has been shown in the literature, payment method can have an impact on acquirer value 
(Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller 2002, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2004). For 
regression-based hypothesis testing, the impact of acquirers offering cash or stock only as a 
means of payment is considered and tested using two dummy variables: 
- Cash-Only (CHS) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer pays by cash-only, 
and 0 otherwise. 
- Stock-Only (STC) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer pays by stock-only, 
and 0 otherwise. 
4.4.4.3. Target Status 
The literature suggests that target status matters for returns of the acquiring shareholders 
(Draper and Paudyal 2006, Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin 2006, Faccio, McConnell, and 
Stolin 2006, Capron and Shen 2007, Cooney, Moeller, and Stegemoller 2009, Rani, Yadav, 
and Jain 2014). In order to test this hypothesis, a dummy variable is introduced in order to 
observe the impact of the target status – characterised by whether the target is public, private, 
or subsidiary - on the acquirers‘ CAR.  
- Public (Pub) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target is a public company, and 0 
otherwise. 
- Private (Priv) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target is a private company, and 0 
otherwise. 
- Subsidiary (Subs) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target is a subsidiary 
company, and 0 otherwise. 
4.4.4.4. Acquirer Bidding Experience  
The empirical studies relating to the frequency of prior acquisitions have shown that these 
bidders have generally underperformed their single-acquisition counterparts (Fuller, Netter, 
and Stegemoller 2002, Ismail 2008). However, the evidence is mixed, and a number of 
arguments have been suggested to justify both positive or negative impacts on acquirer value. 
In this study, the effect of acquirer bidding experience (Exp.) on bidding company 
shareholder wealth is tested according to the following hypotheses: 
 
124 
- Exp. 3-Y is the cumulative number of completed takeovers by the same acquirer 
during the preceding three-year period.  
- Exp. 5-Y is the cumulative number of completed takeovers by the same acquirer 
during the preceding five-year period. 
- Dum. Exp. 3-Y is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the same bidder has two or more 
completed deals over the preceding three-year period (frequent bidder), and 0 
otherwise.  
- Dum. Exp. 5-Y is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the same bidder has two or more 
completed deals over the preceding five-year period (frequent bidder), and 0 
otherwise. 
4.4.4.5. Control Variables 
Several control variables are included in the CAR regressions to control for both firm-level 
and country-specific heterogeneity. In all regressions, the minimum set of control variables 
includes the value of the transaction (as a proxy for target size) and the per capita GDP of the 
bidder and target countries. In a further robustness analysis, additional control variables are 
added to check for consistency in the results. These include acquirers‘ market-to-book ratios, 
acquirers‘ sizes, investor protection, and institutional quality.  
Value of Transaction (VT): Total value of initial offer by the acquirer, excluding fees and 
expenses (Source: SDC database, data in $m).  
GDP per capita (GDPj): Gross domestic product divided by mid-year population (Source: 
Datastream). 
Market-to-Book ratio (M/B): Market share price divided by the book value of the acquiring 
firm‘s shares on announcement day (Source: SDC). 
Acquirers‘ size (AS): the acquirer‘s market capitalisation four weeks prior to announcement 
day (Source: SDC). 
Legal Institutional Quality (LIQ): (Regarding both bidder and target countries). The quality 
of institutions (i.e. the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, shareholder 
protection, etc.) has received a great deal of attention in recent years. According to Kuncic 
(2014), legal institutions are the most common type of institution, and some form of 
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legislature or other can be found in practically every kind of social interaction (Source: 
Kuncic 2014). 
Investor Protection (IP): (Regarding both bidder and target countries). La Porta et al. (1996) 
indicate that common law countries generally have the best legal protections for investors 
compared with French civil law countries and others (e.g. German and Scandinavian civil law 
countries). Thus, Common Law is used as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bidder (target) 
is located in a country that applies common law (a proxy for investor protection), and 0 
otherwise. 
Finally, additional dummy variables are included in the regressions to control for, year, 
country, and industry-based fixed effects.  
4.4.5. Risk Regressions 
In order to analyse the impact of M&A announcements on acquirers‘ market risk, this study 
follows the approach of previous studies by comparing the acquirers‘ market risk one year 
before and one year after the deal announcement (Amihud, Delong, and Saunders 2002, 
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Salleo 2008). As with the analysis of the impact of M&As on 
shareholder wealth, a two-step approach is followed. In the first step, an estimate of the 
acquirer‘s market risk is obtained using the CAPM model. The use of CAPM is necessary in 
order to obtain an estimate of the change in the acquirer‘s market risk (beta), which reflects 
its systematic volatility, brought about by the deal announcement. The second step involves 
(as with the CAR regressions above) conducting both univariate and multivariate analyses on 
the change in the acquirer‘s beta in order to test the aforementioned hypotheses relating to the 
impact of diversification, payment method, target status, and acquirer bidding experience on 
risk.  
Estimating Beta: Consider a standard CAPM model in the presence of a risk-free asset: 
                 (       )           (4.22) 
Where:  
- Rf is the risk-free rate. 
- Rijt is the return of the stock of firm i in country j at time t.  
 
126 
- Rmjt is the return of market m index in country j at time t.  
- Betaijt is the measure of the firm‘s market risk. 





mjt as the variances of Rijt and Rmjt, respectively, a measure of the firm‘s 
risk (volatility) is given in Equation 4.23 by taking the variance of Equation 4.22: 
    
               
      
       (4.23) 
Where: 
       
       
  
        (4.24) 





ejt. It is well-known from standard portfolio theory that 
idiosyncratic risk does not affect prices (e.g. Cochrane 2001, Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Salleo 
2008). Therefore, to analyse the effect of a deal announcement on an acquirers‘ market risk 
(or cost of capital), we can concentrate on the component reflecting systematic volatility and 
neglect that of idiosyncratic volatility.  
The change in acquirers‘ market risk following deal announcement is reflected by the change 
in its beta before and after announcement (i.e. ∆Beta = Beta after deal - Beta before deal). An 
acquirer‘s pre-merger risk is calculated during the period –260 to –20 working days before 
announcement day, and post-merger risk is calculated for the period +20 to +260 working 
days after announcement day
10
. This measure of the change in beta before and after the event 
represents an estimate of the systematic volatility brought about by the M&A deal on the 
price of the acquirer‘s risk, and therefore on its cost of capital (Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Salleo 
2008, Evripidou 2012).  
Estimating Risk Regression: As with CAR regressions, taking the four sets of explanatory 
variables (method of payment, target status, diversification, and acquirer bidding experience) 
into account, as well as a set of control variables including the initial level of beta, the basic 
risk model for parametric estimation is stated as follows: 
                                                          
10
 Only trading days are considered; in a year, there are thus 260 working days. The 40 days surrounding the 
event is kept out from the calculation to avoid any distortion in the results caused by the announcement.  
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                   (4.25) 
Where: 
-       : is the change in the market risk (∆Beta is the Beta after announcement - Beta 
before announcement). 
-          : is the acquirer‘s ‗beta before deal‘ calculated from –260 to –20 working 
days before the announcement day. 
 
The other explanatory variables are the same as in the model for the CAR regressions 
discussed in Section 4.4.4. 
4.4.6. Estimating the Probability of Deal Failure  
According to the efficient market hypothesis, the market reaction at the time of deal 
announcement reflects all available information regarding deal, firm, and country-level 
characteristics. However, there is always uncertainty about whether a deal will eventually 
succeed or fail. Given that our sample includes both completed and unsuccessful deals, it 
seems natural to consider whether specific deal, firm, and country-level characteristics 
influence the probability of deal failure. Additionally, it is important to investigate whether 
the market reaction at the time of deal announcement reflects an expectation regarding deal 
failure, an assumption that is inconsistent with the EMH on which the event study is based. In 
view of these considerations, it is appropriate to extend the analysis by identifying the 
aforementioned factors which may influence the probability of deal failure. This is 
undertaken using probit and logit estimations.  
The dependent variable, in this case, is binary: equal to ‗1‘ if an M&A deal is terminated and 
‗0‘ if the deal is completed: 
   {
                      
                    
     (4.26) 
In the probit model, the dependent variable is the probability of deal i being failure depending 
on a set of explanatory variables given by the function: 
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Pr(Z = 1 | x) = 1- Pr(Z = 0 | x) =                                  (4.27) 
Where  
- α is the intercept term.  
- βd, βf, and βd are the coefficients associated with the corresponding set of explanatory 
variables representing deal, firm, and country level characteristics. 
In the logit model, the probability of a deal i being failure is given by the function: 
   (
 
      
)           (4.28) 
Where: 
-      (
  
    
)                                    (4.29) 
The coefficient estimates in both models are obtained using maximum likelihood estimation 
which, in principle, accounts for the potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables, 
though this is unlikely to be a critical consideration here. 
The difference between logit and probit lies in the assumption about the distribution of the 
error term εi. In logit, the error is assumed to follow a standardised logistic distribution while 
in probit, it is normally distributed. According to Long and Freese (2006), the estimated 
coefficients between logit and probit differ only slightly, by a factor of about 1.7. 
In the empirical analysis, both probit and logit estimations are undertaken for the illustration 
and discussion of results in Chapter 6. As with the CAR and risk regressions, the four sets of 
explanatory variables (method of payment, target status, diversification, and acquirer bidding 
experience) are taken into account along with a set of control variables, and the basic probit 
model for parametric estimation can thus be expressed as follows: 
                                                                    
                                                                     
            (4.30) 
The explanatory variables are the same as in the model for the CAR and risk regressions 




This chapter has presented the methodological framework for the analysis of the impact of 
M&As on acquiring companies‘ shareholder wealth and market risk and for assessing the 
probability of M&A deals being failure. Following an illustration of the event study 
methodology used to compute acquirers‘ CARs, the empirical strategy, which draws a 
distinction between univariate and multivariate analyses, was highlighted in order to follow 
the appropriate process for estimation and hypothesis testing and to account for the 
continuous and discrete sets of variables included in the analysis. The empirical strategy 
involves the use of both parametric and nonparametric tests along with key drivers included 
in the estimation of cross-sectional models for testing the relevant hypotheses relating to 
acquirers‘ shareholder returns, acquirers‘ risk, and the probability of deal failure. The 
preliminary empirical analysis following the discussion of the sampling procedure used for 
data collection reveals the presence of heteroskedasticity in the data, which is tackled 
satisfactorily by use of log transformations and heteroskedasticity-corrected estimation in 
CAR and risk regressions.  
The next chapter begins with a formal empirical analysis testing the hypotheses relating to the 
impact of M&As on acquirers‘ shareholder wealth. This is followed in Chapter 6 by a 




 The Impact of M&As on Acquirers’ Shareholder Returns Chapter 5:
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to analyse the impact of M&As on acquirers‘ (or bidders‘) shareholder 
returns, using evidence based on both an event study and cross-section regressions to test the 
four main hypotheses proposed in Chapter 4 relating to target status, method of payment, 
diversification, and acquirer bidding experience. In testing these hypotheses, the empirical 
strategy, as explained in Chapter 4, will focus initially on univariate analyses highlighting the 
results of both parametric (an independent samples t-test and Pearson correlations) and 
nonparametric tests (Mann-Whitney U tests and Spearman‘s rho correlations) on CARs of 
several window lengths. This is followed by a multivariate analysis highlighting the results of 
multiple regressions obtained with a specific CAR window (-1,+1) as the dependent variable, 
supplemented by appropriate robustness checks to ensure the consistency of the results. 
Owing to the presence of heteroskedasicity detected in the cross-section of CARs, the 
regression results will report heteroskedasticity-corrected estimates and standard errors. 
Prior to testing the hypotheses, it is sensible to examine the overall characteristics of CARs 
for the global sample of M&A deals, which includes both completed and unsuccessful 
transactions. The evidence for the global sample is compared with sub-samples involving 
success vs. failure deals, developed vs. developing countries, and the three sub-periods 
corresponding to the merger waves identified earlier. Further disaggregation of the sample is 
characterised by the need to investigate the four sets of hypotheses dealing with target status, 
method of payment, diversification (activity and geographic), and acquirer bidding 
experience. Finally, the sample is adjusted according to the need to test robustness issues that 
include taking account of additional factors. 
Section 5.2 discusses the event study results in order to analyse overall characteristics of 
CARs in the global sample as well as the sub-samples mentioned above. Section 5.3 details 
the univariate analysis, and Section 5.4 analyses the results of the CAR regressions to test the 
hypotheses. Section 5.5 discusses the results of some robustness tests, and Section 5.6 
concludes the chapter.   
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5.2. Event Study Results 
5.2.1. Overall Sample ARs and CARs 
Table ‎5.1: Abnormal Returns (ARs) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs). 
Abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) have been calculated using the market model, 
i.e. by subtracting the actual returns made during the event window from the expected returns based on the 
projections of the market model during the event period. The AR results are presented for event windows up to 
ten days before and after the announcement date (-10,+10). A deal‘s announcement date is day 0. The sample 
consists of 46,758 initial bids announced in 180 countries covering 88 sub-industries over the period 1977-2012, 
where 36,489 deals were completed and 10,269 were terminated.  
  All Sample (n= 46,758) Success, n=36,489 Failure, n=10,269 
Day ARs % t p-value CARs% t p-value CARs% t p-value CARs% t p-value 
-10 .030 1.33 .184 .030 1.33 .184 .014 0.59 .558 .086 1.51 .130 
-9 .071 2.74 .006 .101 3.08 .002 .073 2.03 .042 .201 2.57 .010 
-8 .018 0.63 .529 .119 2.84 .004 .112 2.68 .007 .145 1.21 .226 
-7 .020 0.90 .368 .139 3.01 .003 .115 2.51 .012 .225 1.69 .091 
-6 .084 3.86 .000 .223 4.50 .000 .175 3.51 .000 .393 2.81 .005 
-5 .116 4.90 .000 .338 6.23 .000 .258 4.71 .000 .625 4.09 .000 
-4 .112 4.80 .000 .451 7.67 .000 .368 6.09 .000 .746 4.66 .000 
-3 .134 6.01 .000 .585 9.26 .000 .490 7.50 .000 .922 5.43 .000 
-2 .178 7.50 .000 .763 11.38 .000 .639 9.18 .000 1.200 6.72 .000 
-1 .308 12.32 .000 1.071 14.87 .000 .868 11.62 .000 1.790 9.31 .000 
0 .827 21.32 .000 1.897 23.16 .000 1.657 19.29 .000 2.751 12.85 .000 
1 .438 10.96 .000 2.335 25.72 .000 2.131 22.06 .000 3.061 13.29 .000 
2 -.030 -1.13 .259 2.305 24.43 .000 2.161 21.35 .000 2.817 11.99 .000 
3 -.121 -4.19 .000 2.184 22.38 .000 2.070 19.95 .000 2.586 10.44 .000 
4 -.119 -4.43 .000 2.064 20.63 .000 1.990 18.75 .000 2.328 9.11 .000 
5 -.121 -5.42 .000 1.944 19.08 .000 1.917 17.64 .000 2.039 7.93 .000 
6 -.091 -3.23 .001 1.853 18.12 .000 1.811 16.35 .000 2.002 8.04 .000 
7 -.104 -4.97 .000 1.750 16.80 .000 1.748 15.43 .000 1.754 7.00 .000 
8 -.097 -4.48 .000 1.653 15.47 .000 1.687 14.52 .000 1.533 5.95 .000 
9 -.134 -6.54 .000 1.519 14.00 .000 1.569 13.31 .000 1.339 5.11 .000 
10 -.114 -5.57 .000 1.404 12.72 .000 1.499 12.50 .000 1.066 4.00 .000 
Table 5.1 presents the event study results of M&A announcements on the acquirers‘ 
abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for an overall sample of 
46,758 initial bids announced over the period 1977-2012, as well as the results for the sub-
samples of 36,489 completed and 10,269 unsuccessful deals. The results uniformly indicate 
that the ARs (presented for the overall sample only) increase dramatically in the days 
immediately before and up until the announcement day, remain positive for the day after 
announcement, and thereafter decline steadily. Furthermore, the CARs in all cases (both 
completed and unsuccessful deals) increase steadily until one day after announcement and 
then begin to decline gradually. All values are statistically significant (from 0) for at least five 
days before and after the announcement date. Figure 5.1 presents a typical picture of CARs 
for different window lengths around the announcement date; these are not unique for the 
overall sample and also apply to the sub-samples. These results seem to show that M&As 
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have a uniformly positive and significant impact on acquiring companies‘ shareholder wealth. 
This is not entirely consistent with the mixed evidence from the literature, as presented in 
Chapter 3, although it should be borne in mind that this evidence relates to a global sample. 
Figure ‎5.1: CARs for different window lengths around the announcement date 
 
Note: The chart presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for four windows: 1) ten days before and after 
the announcement date (-10,+10), 2) five days before and after the announcement date (-5,+5), 3) three days 
before and after the announcement date (-3,+3), 4)  one day before and after the announcement date (-1,+1). 
The results in Tables 5.1 suggest significant leakage of information prior to announcement.  
In essence, the anticipation of mergers can be inferred from the significant positive abnormal 
returns in the market before the announcement dates. Halpern (1983) has argued that such 
leakage is the result of signalling which may be provided by earlier successful bids, or there 
may be insider trading. Seyhun (1990) has also argued that such leakages may be due to 
hubris bias which leads to overconfidence, and which further leads to overestimations, in a 
systematic manner, of the merger synergies. 
In order to check the robustness of the results relating to leakage of information prior to 
merger announcements, the average abnormal returns (AARs) have been calculated in Table 
5.3 after splitting the overall sample according to: (1) bidders and targets both located in 
developed countries, (2) bidders and targets both located in developing/emerging countries, 
(3) bidders (targets) located in developed country and targets (bidders) located in 
developing/emerging country, (4) target status (public, target, subsidiary), (5) method of 
payment (cash, stock), (6) deals involving U.S. and Non-U.S. acquirers, (7) financial and 














after 2000. The results robustly confirm that there is clear evidence of information leakage 
before announcement.  
Furthermore, there are significant post-announcement returns. This is mainly because any 
new information relating to takeovers is revealed in few days to weeks after the event, such 
as information concerning synergy estimates, the terms of the transaction, or the potential 
success/failure of the bid as the market perceives. The revelation of such information corrects 
the inaccurate predictions made on the event data (Martynova and Renneboog, 2011). Hence, 
when the conditions of the bid become clear, the market makes corrections and reassesses the 
quality of the takeovers and also make downward corrections to the expected returns. 
Evidence about the information leak prior to announcement creates two important problems 
for the regulatory authorities. First of all, there is price sensitive information in the 
announcements, and second, such announcements implicate the agents who are involved in 
insider decision making (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981). For example, to quote William 
Robinson, who is a principal in Georgeson & Co, which solicits for the shareholders in cases 
of takeover battles, has the following statement to make, ―You start with a handful of people, 
but when you get close to doing something the circle expands pretty quickly. You have to 
bring in directors, two or three firms of lawyers, investment bankers, public relations people, 
and financial printers, and everybody‘s got a secretary. If the deal is a big one, you might 
need a syndicate of banks to finance it. Every time you let in another person, the chance of a 
leak increases geometrically.‖ 
Hence there is both greater chance and actual happening of leakage of insider information 
when the announcement day approaches, and in fact many empirical studies show that this 
takes place. There is, however, very less regulation on such trading activities, which can 
either be routed through banks who refuse to disclose the trading activities, or simply through 
friends and relatives.  
There are many studies on the leakage of information around the M&A announcements 
(Aktas, et al. 2001). The main two explanations which have been proposed for such run ups 
are the market anticipation of takeovers and the corporate private trading activities. Jarrell 
and Poulsen (1989) have provided empirical evidence for the former, but there is some 
degree of inconsistency as far as the second type of leakage channel is concerned.   
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Table ‎5.2: Abnormal returns and the leakage of information around M&A announcements 
Abnormal returns (ARs) have been re-calculated for event windows up to ten days before and after the 
announcement date (-10,+10) for 16 subsamples. In the first table, the AARs are calculated for sub-samples 
according to: (1) bidders and targets both located in developed country (36,479 deals), (2) bidders and targets 
are both located in developing/emerging country (6,998), (3) bidder located in developed (developing) and 
target located in developing (developed) country (3.281 deals), (4) target is public (14,013), (5) target is private 
(22,022 deals), (6) target is subsidiary (10,723 deals), (7) bidder used cash only as the method of payment 
(13,259 deals), (8) bidder used stock only as the method of payment (11,681 deals), (9) deals involving U.S. 
acquirers only (17,434 deals), (10) deals involving non-U.S. acquirers only (29,324 deals). In the second table, 
the AARs are calculated for sub-samples comprising: (1) deals involving financial acquirers only (7,826 deals), 
(2) deals involving non-financial acquirers only (38,932 deals), (3) deals announced between 1977-1986 (1,854 
deals), (4) deals announced between 1987-1996 (7,761 deals), (5) deals announced between 1997-2006 (21,995 
deals), (6) deals announced between 2007-2012 (15,418 deals), (7) deals announced before 2000 (15,787 deals), 






DVD&EMR Public Private Sub. Cash Only Stock Only US Bidder Non-US Bidder 
-10 0.014 0.125*** -0.001 0.051* 0 0.063 -0.043 0.165*** 0.033 0.028 
-9 0.064** 0.103** 0.082 -0.001 0.133*** 0.039 0.001 0.126 0.04 0.090*** 
-8 0.005 0.054 0.079 0.027 0.004 0.034 -0.008 -0.008 -0.057 0.062** 
-7 -0.004 0.012 0.308*** -0.051 0.062* 0.027 -0.01 0.101* 0.012 0.025 
-6 0.074*** 0.117** 0.12 0.067** 0.083** 0.106*** 0.013 0.200*** 0.062 0.097*** 
-5 0.106*** 0.189*** 0.067 0.043 0.170*** 0.098* 0.021 0.207*** 0.136*** 0.104*** 
-4 0.128*** 0.066 0.036 0.100*** 0.121*** 0.110** 0.048* 0.243*** 0.111** 0.113*** 
-3 0.148*** 0.08 0.1 0.053* 0.176*** 0.155*** 0.003 0.280*** 0.170*** 0.112*** 
-2 0.171*** 0.183*** 0.240*** 0.057** 0.246*** 0.196*** 0.055* 0.273*** 0.166*** 0.184*** 
-1 0.284*** 0.305*** 0.586*** 0.104*** 0.380*** 0.428*** 0.103*** 0.550*** 0.239*** 0.349*** 
0 0.794*** 0.658*** 1.543*** -0.332*** 1.485*** 0.988*** 0.474*** 1.185*** 0.757*** 0.868*** 
1 0.436*** 0.361*** 0.622*** -0.111** 0.650*** 0.718*** 0.367*** 0.596*** 0.426*** 0.444*** 
2 -0.04 0.047 -0.074 -0.147*** 0.013 0.035 -0.003 -0.104 -0.035 -0.027 
3 -0.126*** -0.159*** 0.013 -0.132*** -0.123** -0.104* -0.029 -0.157** -0.09 -0.140*** 
4 -0.105*** -0.174*** -0.165 -0.113*** -0.088* -0.192*** -0.076** -0.196** -0.05 -0.161*** 
5 -0.128*** -0.140*** -0.003 -0.034 -0.116*** -0.244*** -0.075*** -0.114* -0.144*** -0.107*** 
6 -0.073** -0.242*** 0.033 -0.136*** -0.081 -0.052 -0.126*** -0.054 -0.011 -0.138*** 
7 -0.078*** -0.139*** -0.316*** -0.112*** -0.108*** -0.084** -0.048* -0.166*** -0.086** -0.114*** 
8 -0.103*** -0.154*** 0.099 -0.059** -0.122*** -0.094** -0.102*** -0.120* -0.125*** -0.080*** 
9 -0.119*** -0.131*** -0.311*** -0.066** -0.200*** -0.088** -0.067** -0.167*** -0.118*** -0.144*** 




AARs % Financials Non-Financials 1977-86 1987-96 1997-06 2007-12 Before 2000 After 2000 
-10 0.056 0.025 -0.008 0.004 0.051 0.017 0.01 0.04 
-9 0.016 0.083*** -0.044 0.022 0.101** 0.069 0.077 0.068** 
-8 0.067 0.008 -0.034 0.001 -0.019 0.086* 0.053* 0 
-7 0.015 0.021 0.032 0.005 -0.025 0.092** -0.015 0.038 
-6 0.064 0.088*** 0.126** 0.009 0.102*** 0.090** 0.042 0.105*** 
-5 0.088* 0.121*** -0.008 0.109*** 0.150*** 0.085* 0.104*** 0.122*** 
-4 0.063 0.122*** 0.022 0.043 0.092*** 0.189*** 0.088*** 0.125*** 
-3 0.045 0.152*** 0.06 0.079** 0.150*** 0.148*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 
-2 0.116* 0.190*** 0.069 0.118*** 0.187*** 0.208*** 0.096*** 0.219*** 
-1 0.144*** 0.341*** 0.084 0.203*** 0.325*** 0.365*** 0.239*** 0.344*** 
0 0.566*** 0.879*** -0.197*** 0.397*** 0.822*** 1.179*** 0.414*** 1.037*** 
1 0.297*** 0.466*** -0.043 0.313*** 0.406*** 0.606*** 0.193*** 0.562*** 
2 0.044 -0.045 -0.022 -0.001 -0.075* 0.019 -0.049 -0.02 
3 -0.082 -0.129*** -0.055 -0.087** -0.196*** -0.039 -0.163*** -0.100** 
4 -0.084* -0.126*** -0.096* -0.098** -0.101** -0.160*** -0.131*** -0.113*** 
5 -0.044 -0.136*** -0.008 -0.065* -0.106*** -0.185*** -0.090*** -0.136*** 
6 -0.092* -0.090*** -0.083* -0.137*** -0.051 -0.125*** -0.129*** -0.071* 
7 0.006 -0.125*** -0.028 -0.012 -0.133*** -0.116*** -0.062** -0.125*** 
8 -0.043 -0.107*** -0.112** -0.069* -0.123*** -0.071* -0.075*** -0.108*** 
9 -0.072 -0.147*** -0.019 -0.123*** -0.155*** -0.124*** -0.118*** -0.143*** 
10 -0.055 -0.126*** 0.078 -0.069* -0.106*** -0.174*** -0.067** -0.139*** 
Legend: BD: bidder; TR: target; DVD: Developed country; EMR: developing/emerging country. The symbols 




Several empirical studies have found evidence of significant market reaction before 
announcement day.  For example, Aktas et al. (2001) have observed that the CARs start 
exhibiting variations from 30 days before the announcements in the French market, even for 
cases where there is no financial press news. Nicolau (2010) has also investigated the 
implications of volatility of the abnormal returns prior to the announcements and find 
evidence of information leakage. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) also confirmed such leakages 
before the announcements via different types of insider trading. Firth (1980) has found 
significant positive monthly residual since the last month before the announcement. Keown 
and Pinkerton (1981) found such deviation was significant 11 days before the announcement 
(at 10% significance level) and five days before the announcement (at 5% level). These 
results suggest substantive leakage of information before merger announcements. 
5.2.2. Completed vs. Unsuccessful Deals 
The standard theory for an efficient market holds that if a target is initially overvalued and the 
deal is ultimately terminated, a severe downward correction in acquirer share prices will 
follow in the form of steep negative abnormal returns for acquirers in the case of 
unsuccessful deals. This theory is based on the informational efficiency of markets (EMH), 
which means that completed and unsuccessful deal announcements have different 
informational contents, hinting at the overvaluation of targets, which may then culminate in 
the failure of a deal to reach completion. However, abnormal returns at the time of initial 
announcement are not influenced by uncertainty about whether an announced deal will 
complete or terminate. Thus, both completed and unsuccessful deals are included in the 
above data set to avoid any sample selection bias.  
As the results of Table 5.1 above illustrate, the CARs for all samples are very consistent. To 
confirm this finding, Table 5.3 below presents the results of a t-test and a Mann-Whitney U 
test of the mean differences between the two groups (completed and unsuccessful deals), 
using different event windows. Both sets of results are insignificant, this provides strong 
evidence that the market reaction is neutral to both subgroups and reacts on the basis of 
available information only. In another sense, this also supports the semi-strong form of 
market efficiency, which holds that market reactions reflect all public information as revealed 
in the form of announcements and corporate disclosures before the completion or termination 
of a deal.  
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Table ‎5.3: Mean Differences in M&As: Completed vs. Unsuccessful Deals. 
An independent samples t-test and a Mann-Whitney U Test have been employed to compare the differences in the 
CARs of completed and unsuccessful deals. Although the CARs are not normally distributed, both the t-test and the 
U test have been applied for consistency checks. Four event windows have been used, including five days before 
and after the announcement date (-5,+5), three days before and after the announcement date (-3,+3), two days before 
and after the announcement date (-2,+2), and one day before and after the announcement date (-1,+1). Of the overall 
sample of 46,789 deals, 36,489 were completed, and 10,269 were terminated. The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
      Independent Samples t-Test Mann-Whitney U 
  Deal N Mean % Mean Dif. t p-value Mean Rank Z p-value 
CARs (-5,+5) 
Complete 36489 1.712 
.148 .641 .522 
23465 
-2.573 .170 
Incomplete 10269 1.564 23077 
CARs (-3,+3) 
Complete 36489 1.672 
-.092 -.461 .645 
23423 
-1.311 .190 
Incomplete 10269 1.764 23225 
CARs (-2,+2) 
Complete 36489 1.642 
-.175 -.994 .320 
23391 
-.357 .721 
Incomplete 10269 1.817 23337 
CARs (-1,+1) 
Complete 36489 1.473 
-.330 -1.504 .133 
23359 
-.629 .529 
Incomplete 10269 1.803 23453 
 
       
To summarise, these findings suggest that there are no significant differences in CARs based 
on whether a deal was completed or terminated. Importantly, since most of the previous 
empirical literature has considered samples involving completed deals only (e.g. Rani, 
Yadav, and Jain 2014, Jaffe et al. 2015), and our results show that the market reaction to deal 
announcements is indifferent to this factor, ignoring unsuccessful deals in empirical work 
could potentially lead to sample selection biases.  
5.2.3. Developed and Developing Countries 
In general, the empirical evidence relating to the impact of M&As in developing economies 
remains fragmented with very few studies synthesising evidence which contributes to a broad 
understanding of cross-border M&As. Recently, however, there has been some interest in 
cross-border M&As between firms located in developed and developing countries (Burns and 
Liebenberg 2011, Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar 2010), which has provided evidence that 
acquiring company shareholder gains from these cross-border M&As tend to be greater than 




Table ‎5.4: Mean Differences in M&A Groups for Developed and Developing Countries. 
Independent samples t-tests and Mann-Whitney U tests are employed in order to test the mean differences in 
CARs. The overall sample comprises 46,758 deals. In the first two rows of the table, ‗Yes‘ indicates that both 
bidder and target are located in the same region (developed and developing making up 36,479 and 6,998 deals, 
respectively), and ‗No‘ otherwise. In the third row, ‗Yes‘ indicates that bidders and targets are located in 
different regions (making up a total of 3,281 deals), and ‗No‘ otherwise. These distinctions between ‗Yes‘ and 
‗No‘ are necessary for testing mean differences among the groups concerned. The symbols ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
        Independent Samples Test Mann-Whitney U 
  














No 10279 1.913 23865 
CARs(-2,+2) 




No 10279 1.932 24091 
CARs(-1,+1) 












No 39760 1.741 23317 
CARs(-2,+2) 




No 39760 1.714 23275 
CARs(-1,+1) 














No 43477 1.595 23322 
CARs(-2,+2) 




No 43477 1.590 23307 
CARs(-1,+1) 




No 43477 1.457 23297 
Table 5.4 provides the results of the t-tests and Mann-Whitney U tests for the mean 
differences relating to the geographical diversification of M&As between developed and 
developing countries. Three categories of diversification are considered. The first row 
presents the data for bidders and targets which are both located in developed countries with 
no distinction made between domestic and cross-border M&As (a total of 36,479 deals). The 
second row presents the data for bidders and targets located in developing countries with no 
distinction drawn between domestic and cross-border M&As (a total of 6,998 deals). In the 
third row, data are presented for cross-border deals involving bidders located in developed 
countries and targets located in developing countries, or vice versa (a total of 3,281 deals
11
).  
Despite the fact that the CARs for all of these types of M&A deals are positive, it can be seen 
that cross-border deals involving both developed and developing countries (third row) 
                                                          
11
 Here, cross-border deals are distinguished from the overall sample using a dummy variable, Developed & 
Developing or Developing & Developed, that equals 1 if the acquirer is located in developed (developing) and 
the target is located in a developing (developed), 0 otherwise. Furthermore, a Yes/No dummy distinguishes 
between the two groups of samples in order to test for mean differences. The distinction between developed and 
developing countries is based on MSCI classification of countries. 
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achieve the highest returns for acquiring firms. For example, the seven-day CAR (-3,+3) for 
cross-border deals involving both groups of countries is 2.975%, compared to 1.63% and 
1.416%, respectively, for deals involving developed or developing countries alone. The mean 
differences are all significant according to the Mann-Whitney U tests. 
Importantly, these results on cross-border M&As between developed and developing 
countries are consistent with recent empirical studies. For example, Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar 
(2010) demonstrated that when a firm in developed country acquires majority control of a 
firm in a developing market, the acquiring company‘s stock prices increase significantly. 
Furthermore, Du and Boateng (2012) argue that cross-border M&As in countries with 
developing economies have led to economic reforms in these countries and facilitated their 
integration into the world economy. 
5.2.4. Merger Waves  
Given that the overall sample covers 35 years of M&A deals, it could be argued that deals are 
influenced by the particular business cycles and economic conditions of specific time periods. 
For example, Duchina and Schmidt (2013) provide evidence that financial performance 
related to M&As which began during a merger wave was significantly worse than 
acquisitions out with a wave due to the higher levels of uncertainty, poorer quality of analysis 
forecasts, weaker CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, and weaker corporate governance 
of in-wave acquirers, suggesting that agency problems may be present in merger wave 
acquisitions. 
To investigate this assertion with respect to this study‘s global sample, Table 5.5 below 
presents the results for mean differences in acquirers‘ returns characterising the periods of the 
three different merger waves identified earlier, i.e. Wave 1, which occurred over the period 
1981 to 1989, Wave 2, covering the period 1993 to 2001, and Wave 3, over the period 2003 
to 2008. For each wave, the mean difference between two groups is tested by splitting the 
overall sample according to whether the deals were announced during that wave period (in-




Table ‎5.5: Mean Differences in Acquirers’ Returns over Different Periods: M&A Waves. 
An independent samples t-test and a Mann-Whitney U test have been employed to compare the differences in 
CARs between the M&A waves. The overall sample covers the period between 1977 and 2012. This period is 
distinguished by three waves, with Wave 1 covering the period 1981-1989 (3,082 deals), Wave 2 covering the 
period 1993-2001 (15,729 deals), and Wave 3 covering the period 2003-2008 (16,087 deals). In each row of the 
table, ‗Yes‘ indicates that the deals were announced during the wave, ‗No‘ indicates otherwise. This distinction 
between ‗Yes‘ and ‗No‘ is necessary for testing mean differences among the groups concerned. The symbols 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
        Independent Samples Test Mann-Whitney U 














No 43676 1.817 23507 
CARs(-2,+2) 




No 43676 1.802 23521 
CARs(-1,+1) 




















No 31029 1.927 23675 
CARs(-1,+1) 












No 30671 1.476 23066 
CARs(-2,+2) 




No 30671 1.492 23041 
CARs(-1,+1) 




No 30671 1.385 23081 
         
The results indicate that acquirers‘ abnormal returns were lower in deals announced during 
Waves 1 and 2 (in-wave). For instance, the acquirers‘ seven-day CARs were -0.073% and 
1.067% respectively, compared to the values of 1.817% and 2.009% for deals announced 
outside of merger waves (out-wave). However, during Wave 3, the in-wave acquirer returns 
were higher than out-wave, yielding seven-day CARs of 2.104% and 1.476%, respectively.  
Overall, the evidence is mixed. The results for the first two waves are consistent with 
previous studies supporting agency and hubris motives (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
2005). One of the main reasons for this may be that acquirers go for high-value acquisitions 
which are ultimately value-destroying, with such takeovers creating negative average returns. 
On the other hand, the positive acquirer returns in the third wave could be related to the 
characteristics of the new wave associated with globalisation, as corporate companies 
emphasised the need to create an international reach. This period witnessed a boom in private 
equity as shareholders looked to spread ownership amongst themselves, day-to-day 
management, and institutional investors. 
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5.3. Hypotheses Testing (Univariate Analysis) 
This section and the following one present evidence on acquiring company shareholder 
returns relating to the four main sub-hypotheses characterising the main dimensions of 
M&As: (a) target status, (b) method of payment, (c) diversification, and (d) acquirer bidding 
experience. Within each of these four sub-sets of hypotheses, as noted earlier, more specific 
hypotheses are investigated by associating one or more dimension with another, such as the 
impact of target status and method of payment, or the impact of method of payment and 
target status along with acquirer bidding experience, on shareholder returns. In proceeding, 
each dimension is taken in turn before introducing added complexity, and the results of the 
univariate analysis testing mean group differences are presented and discussed before the 
multivariate results based on CAR regressions (which follow in Section 5.4). 
For ease of analysis, the impact of target status is considered first, drawing the distinction 
between public and non-public targets, the latter comprising private and subsidiary targets.  
5.3.1. Target Status 
The main hypothesis to be tested here is that there are no significant differences in acquirers‘ 
CARs based on M&A deals with public or non-public (private and subsidiary) targets. Table 
5.6 below presents the results of the t-test and Mann-Whitney U test of mean differences in 
the acquirers‘ CARs between public/non-public, private/non-private, and subsidiary/non-
subsidiary targets. The results clearly show that the mean differences in CARs are statistically 
significant at a level of 1% for all event windows. Additionally, unlike the results for the 
overall sample, dividing the sample according to target status reveals that acquirer returns are 
significantly negative for deals with public targets and significantly positive for deals with 
private/subsidiary targets. Thus, the results clearly show that M&A deals destroy acquiring 
companies‘ shareholder wealth when the target is a public firm but improve it when the target 




Table ‎5.6: Independent Samples t-test and Mann-Whitney U Test for Public vs. Non-Public Targets. 
An independent samples t-test and a Mann-Whitney U test have been used to compare the differences in the 
CARs of public, private, and subsidiary targets. From the overall sample of 46,758 deals, 14,013 involved 
public targets, 22,022 involved private targets, and 10,723 involved subsidiary targets. The symbols ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
        Independent Samples t-Test Mann-Whitney U 



























Private 22022 2.778 19051 
CARs (-2,+2) 




Private 22022 2.729 19100 
CARs (-1,+1) 





















Sub 10723 2.377 13420 
CARs (-2,+2) 




Sub 10723 2.317 13451 
CARs (-1,+1) 





















Sub 10723 2.377 16356 
CARs (-2,+2) 




Sub 10723 2.317 16327 
CARs (-1,+1) 




Sub 10723 2.099 16311 
As noted in Chapter 2, there are several explanations for positive acquirer gains from the 
acquisition of non-public targets. For example, there is less competition in the market for the 
acquisition of private companies than for public ones. This corresponds to the hypothesis that 
the large amount of information available regarding public companies increases the 
competition between potential acquirers while the lack of information about non-publicly-
held firms can lead to less interest by potential acquirers. Moreover, in the case of publicly-
held companies, there are agency costs associated with the fact that managers of acquiring 
firms may wish to increase their prestige and power through M&As (Jensen 1986). The 
evidence here is consistent with the literature (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller 2002, Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz 2004, Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin 2006, Jaffe et al. 2015). 
In this regard, the method used to finance the acquisition can also have an impact on acquirer 
returns. For instance, if an acquirer pays for the target with stock, the impact on the acquirer‘s 
stock price may depend on the target type. For example, takeovers of private firms through 
stock payments can create blockholders in the acquirer firm since the owners of private firms 
are concentrated, and this may influence the monitoring of the acquirer‘s management, which 
could lead to an improvement in financial performance. On the other hand, the concentration 
of ownership and the creation of blockholders are much less likely in the takeover of public 
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targets. The next section further analyses the impact of the method of payment on acquirer 
returns. 
5.3.2. Method of Payment  
The main hypothesis tested here is that there are no significant differences in acquirers‘ 
CARs in M&A deals based on cash, stock, and mixed (cash and stock) modes of payments. 
According to the literature, however, it is generally the case that acquirers‘ shareholders 
benefit more from deals that involve cash payments rather than stock, although this is likely 
to depend on the status of the target. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the influence of 
target status when examining the impact of payment mode in M&A deals. 
Table 5.7 below presents the results of the t-tests and Mann-Whitney U tests of mean 
differences in acquirers‘ CARs between deals that were pledged using the three alternative 
payment modes (cash vs. non-cash, stock vs. non-stock, and a cash-stock combination vs. 
otherwise). The results show that the t-test mean differences are statistically significant at a 
level of 1% in each case, though the Mann-Whitney U test (which is more reliable in the case 
of non-normally distributed CARs—see Chapter 4) does not confirm a statistically significant 
difference, even at a 10% level for cash deals. Furthermore, the results show that the acquirer 
receives the highest return for stock-only deals and the lowest return for cash-only deals. For 
example, the results for the three-day CARs (-1,+1) event window are 2.275%, 1.198%, and 
0.937% for stock-only, cash-only, and cash-stock deals, respectively. These results contradict 
the conventional view that cash deals are more beneficial for acquiring company shareholders 
(Travlos 1987, Wansley, Lane, and Yang 1987, Amihud, Lev, and Travlos 1990, Servaes 
1991, Brown and Ryngaert 1991). However, the results in Table 5.7 do not take in account 




Table ‎5.7: Independent Samples t-test and Mann-Whitney U Test for Method of Payment. 
An independent samples t-test and a Mann-Whitney U test have been employed to compare differences in CARs 
between deals involving cash vs. stock payments, cash vs. cash-stock combination payments, stock vs. cash-
stock combination payments. Of the overall sample of 46,758 deals, 13,259 were pledged using cash-only, 
11,681 were pledged using stock-only, and 6,806 involved a cash-stock combination. The symbols ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 

























Stock 11681 2.534 12344 
CARs(-2,+2) 




Stock 11681 2.416 12280 
CARs(-1,+1) 
























C&S 6806 1.261 9857 
CARs(-2,+2) 




C&S 6806 1.272 9787 
CARs(-1,+1) 
























C&S 6806 1.261 9208 
CARs(-2,+2) 




C&S 6806 1.272 9202 
CARs(-1,+1) 




C&S 6806 1.198 9158 
 
There are, however, several possible explanations for why acquirers may enjoy a higher 
return for stock payment deals irrespective of target status. For example, one of the benefits 
of the stock swap is the new share capital which is issued during the takeover process and 
which does not affect the liquidity of acquiring firms. Moreover, considering that the target is 
exposed to the same risk as the acquirer after the takeover, the risk of a high premium is 
limited. In contrast, cash deals can be relatively costly since target shareholders have to pay 
capital gains tax once a cash deal is completed. Since the tax base is larger and the premium 
may be higher for cash deals, the market perception may be that this is more detrimental than 
beneficial to shareholder wealth, and for this reason, a negative market response to cash 
payment deals may occur.  
However, the empirical literature usually distinguishes target status when considering the 
impact of payment modes on acquirer returns (Jaffe et al. 2015), and it is therefore 




Table ‎5.8: Independent Samples t-test and Mann-Whitney U Test for Method of Payment and Target 
Status. 
An independent samples t-test and a Mann-Whitney U test have been employed to compare the mean 
differences in CARs according to payment method and target status, distinguished by introducing an interaction 
variable to filter the sample. For example, CSH×PUB equal to ‗1‘ for public targets paid for with cash-only, 
STC×PUB is an interaction variable equal to ‗1‘ for public targets paid for with stock-only, CSH×PRV is equal 
to ‗1‘ for private targets paid for with cash-only, STC×PRV is an interaction variable equal to ‗1‘ for private 
targets paid for with stock-only, CSH×SUB is equal to ‗1‘ for subsidiary targets paid for with cash-only, and 
STC×SUB is equal to ‗1‘ for subsidiary targets paid for with stock-only. The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
      Independent Samples Test Mann-Whitney U 
      Mean % 
Mean 
Difference 





















































































































STC×SUB 4.400 2464 
Accordingly, Table 5.8 presents the mean differences in acquirer returns for groups of deals 
based on method of payment combined with target status. Six groups have been identified 
based on the six possible interactions between variables: Cash × Public, Stock × Public, Cash 
× Private, Stock × Private, Cash × Subsidiary, Stock × Subsidiary
12
. In each case, the t-test 
and Mann-Whitney U test compare the mean differences within each group based on whether 
or not the relevant criterion is met. The results show that the CARs for all groups mean 
differences are statistically significant at a level of 5% according to the Mann-Whitney U 
test. In addition, most are significant even at the 1% level using the t-test (except for Cash × 
Subsidiary deals). The results also clearly indicate that acquirers receive the highest returns 
on stock deals involving non-public (private or subsidiary) targets and the lowest returns on 
                                                          
12
 To avoid complications, the results of this table compare cash and stock only deals while taking into account 
target status in an overall sample that includes both completed and unsuccessful deals. In almost all cases, no 
significant differences were observed in the results for samples including only completed deals, and these 
findings have thus not been reported for reasons of space.  
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stock deals involving public targets. These findings thus imply that acquirers should use cash 
to acquire public targets and stock to acquire non-public targets. These results are consistent 
with the findings of previous empirical studies (e.g. Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller 2002). 
There are several possible explanations for a positive market reaction to deal announcements 
which pledge stock to acquire non-public targets. For instance, the takeover of a private firm 
through stock can create blockholders in the acquiring firm, which improves the monitoring 
of the acquiring company‘s management. This concentration of ownership is much less likely 
in the case of public target acquisitions. Additionally, if stock is pledged for the takeover of a 
public firm, it can signal to the market that the acquiring firm is overvalued, leading to a 
decrease in its share price (Myers and Majluf 1984). Officer, Poulsen, and Stegemoller 
(2009) have shown that acquirer returns will be significantly higher in stock swap 
acquisitions if the valuation of the target is difficult to determine, which is often the case for 
non-public targets. 
5.3.3. Diversification 
Following DeLong (2001), activity and geographic diversification is classified into four 
categories: 1) domestic focussed deals (DAF), in which both acquirers and targets are located 
in the same country and operate within the same industry (i.e. share the same 4-digit SIC 
codes), 2) domestic cross-industry deals (DCI), in which acquirers and targets are located in 
the same country but operate in different industries (different first two digits of their SIC 
codes), 3) cross-border focussed deals (CBF), in which acquirers and targets are located in 
different countries but operate in the same industry, and 4) cross-border cross-industry deals 
(CBCI), in which acquirers and targets are located in different countries and operate in 
different industries. 
In view of the above distinction, the main hypotheses to be tested are: 
 There are no significant differences in acquirers‘ CARs between domestic or cross-
border M&A deals. 
 There are no significant differences in acquirers‘ CARs between focussed or 
diversified M&A deals. 
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Table 5.9 below presents the results for the mean differences in acquirers‘ CARs relating to 
each of the four categories (DAF, DCI, CBF, CBCI). In each case, the statistical significance 
of the mean difference is determined by comparing two groups of deals, one that belongs to 
one of the four categories and one that does not. The results show that the mean differences 
are not statistically significant in all cases, most notably for CBCI deals, where the sample is 
relatively heterogeneous compared to the other categories. According to both tests, the mean 
differences are more significant for domestic than cross border deals, whether focussed 
(DAF) or diversified (DCI). Additionally, according to the Mann-Whitney U test, the mean 
differences are significant for CBF deals and for the shorter, three-day window CAR (-1,+1) 
of CBCI deals. Importantly, the results show that the mean differences are positive in 
diversified deals (DCI, CBF, CBCI) but negative in domestic focussed deals (DAF). This 
result implies that diversification improves acquirers‘ shareholder wealth, which will also be 




Table ‎5.9: Independent Samples t-test and Mann-Whitney U Test for Activity and Geography 
Diversification. 
An independent samples t-test and a Mann-Whitney U test have been employed to compare the differences in 
CARs between 1) domestic focussed deals (DAF) (i.e. the bidder and target are located in the same country and 
operate in the same industry) (18,470 deals), 2) domestic cross-industry deals (DCI) (i.e. the bidder and target 
are located in the same country but operate in different industries according to the initial two digits of their four-
digit SIC codes) (17,065 deals), 3) cross-border focussed deals (CBF) (i.e. the bidder and target operate in the 
same industry but are located in different countries) (6,221 deals), and 4) cross-border cross-industry deals 
(CBCI) (i.e. the bidder and target are located in different countries and operate in different industries according 
to the initial two digits of their four-digit SIC codes) (5,002 deals). The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  
   
Independent Samples t-test Mann-Whitney U 















DCI 17065 2.259 18045 
CARs (-
2,+2) 




DCI 17065 2.175 18050 
CARs (-
1,+1) 













CBF 6221 1.845 12704 
CARs (-
2,+2) 




CBF 6221 1.884 12709 
CARs (-
1,+1) 













CBCI 5002 2.191 12036 
CARs (-
2,+2) 




CBCI 5002 1.943 12018 
CARs (-
1,+1) 













CBF 6221 1.845 11708 
CARs (-
2,+2) 




CBF 6221 1.884 11709 
CARs (-
1,+1) 




CBF 6221 1.734 11799 
 
Although previous empirical studies have found that diversification does not guarantee either 
an increase or decrease in shareholder wealth (Berger and Ofek 1995), the advantages of 
diversification can stem from various factors. For example, portfolio diversification theory 
suggests that the cross-border diversification of a portfolio will drive down the cost of capital 
and increase asset price. Cross-border mergers can generate gains if certain macroeconomic 
factors, like bilateral trade and regulation, are favourable. 
However, it is important to account for additional heterogeneity in diversified deals in order 
to check the consistency of the results. Therefore, the next analysis relates diversification to 
target status and method of payment in testing for significance in acquirers‘ mean returns. 
Table 5.10 below compares acquirers‘ three-day CARs (-1,+1) for deals that distinguish 
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between diversification and target status. Table 5.11 allows for further distinction relating to 
method of payment in these deals, distinguishing between cash-only, stock-only, and 
cash/stock combination deals. A simple t-test is employed to test for the statistical 
significance of the mean returns in each sub-group, where the null hypothesis is that the mean 
three-day CAR (-1,+1) is zero. The results in Table 5.10 show that, irrespective of 
diversification, deals involving non-public targets improve acquiring companies‘ shareholder 
wealth. This contrasts with deals involving public targets, which reduce shareholder wealth. 
Furthermore, the results in Table 5.11 show that diversification reduces acquirer returns in 
deals involving public targets and a payment method of stock only or a cash/stock 
combination. In the latter, for example, the highest CARs (5.53%) were obtained for CBCI 
deals with non-public targets using stock only as the method of payment. 
Table ‎5.10: Activity and Geography Diversification for Public vs. Non-Public Targets. 
A simple t-test has been used to test the statistical significance of means for each group of CARs 
associated with diversification and the distinction between public and non-public targets. The null 
hypothesis is that the mean for three-day CARs (-1,+1) in each sub-group is zero. N refers to the number 
of deals in each sub-group. The figures under the %+ column show the percentage of deals with positive 
returns. 
    Mean p-value N % + 
DAF 
Non-Pub 2.113% 0.000 8447 57% 
Pub -0.251% 0.054 4197 45% 
DCI 
Non-Pub 2.259% 0.000 9931 56% 
Pub -0.004% 0.983 2717 47% 
CBF 
Non-Pub 2.204% 0.000 7697 57% 
Pub -0.734% 0.000 4350 45% 
CBCI 
Non-Pub 2.991% 0.000 6670 57% 
Pub -0.252% 0.160 2749 46% 
Table ‎5.11: Activity and Geography Diversification, Public vs. Non-Public Targets, and Method of 
Payment. 
A simple t-test has been used to test the statistical significance of means for each group of CARs associated with 
diversification and the distinction between public and non-public targets and the cash vs. stock methods of payment. 
The null hypothesis is that the mean for three-day CARs (-1,+1) in each sub-group is zero. N refers to the number of 
deals in each sub-group. The figures under the %+ column show the percentage of deals with positive returns. 
      Mean p-val N %+       Mean p-val N %+ 
DAF  
Non-Pub 
Cash &Stock  2.57% 0.000 1212 57% 
DCI  
Non-Pub 
Cash &Stock 2.39% 0.000 1118 60% 
Cash-Only 1.13% 0.000 2243 55% Cash-Only 1.01% 0.000 2973 55% 
Stock-Only 4.00% 0.000 1870 58% Stock-Only 5.03% 0.000 2061 58% 
Pub 
Cash &Stock -0.95% 0.000 876 39% 
Pub 
Cash &Stock -1.21% 0.002 412 36% 
Cash-Only 0.21% 0.320 756 49% Cash-Only 0.34% 0.139 801 52% 
Stock-Only -0.40% 0.055 1849 44% Stock-Only 0.07% 0.855 838 47% 
CBF  
Non-Pub 
Cash &Stock 3.41% 0.000 1179 60% 
CBCI  
Non-Pub 
Cash &Stock 2.01% 0.000 861 54% 
Cash-Only 1.19% 0.000 2028 57% Cash-Only 1.45% 0.000 1792 56% 
Stock-Only 3.10% 0.000 1589 54% Stock-Only 5.53% 0.000 1524 57% 
Pub 
Cash &Stock -2.04% 0.000 767 35% 
Pub 
Cash &Stock -1.28% 0.026 381 36% 
Cash-Only 0.63% 0.000 1485 54% Cash-Only 0.46% 0.016 1181 51% 
Stock-Only -2.20% 0.000 1302 38% Stock-Only -1.40% 0.005 648 38% 
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5.3.4. Acquirer Bidding Experience 
Table ‎5.12: Pearson and Spearman’s rho Correlations for Acquirer Bidding Experience. 
Pearson and Spearman‘s rho correlations have been employed to analyse the relationship between CARs and 
acquirer bidding experience. ‗Exp. 3-Y‘ refers to the cumulative number of takeovers by the same acquirer 
during the preceding three-year period. ‗Exp. 5-Y‘ refers to the cumulative number of takeovers by the same 
acquirer during the preceding five-year period. The first panel of results shows the correlations between acquirer 
returns and previous experience of completed takeovers, where N refers to the total number of deals (46,758). 
The second panel shows the means and statistical significance of CARs for groups of deals (totalling up to 75) 
categorised according to the number of bidders who were involved in previous bids, where X is the cumulative 
number of bids between 1 and 75, and N refers to the total number of deals for each group of bidders with a 
previous number of X deals. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively. 
N=46758 
Pearson Correlation Spearman's rho Correlations 
Exp. 5-Y Exp. 3-Y Exp. 5-Y Exp. 3-Y 
CARs (-10,+10) -0.035*** -0.029*** -0.034*** -0.033*** 
CARs (-5,+5) -0.035*** -0.029*** -0.04*** -0.037*** 
CARs (-3,+3) -0.039*** -0.034*** -0.047*** -0.041*** 
CARs (-2,+2) -0.033*** -0.026*** -0.046*** -0.038*** 
CARs (-1,+1) -0.031*** -0.024*** -0.045*** -0.037*** 
ARs (-10,+10) -0.035*** -0.029*** -0.034*** -0.033*** 
ARs (-5,+5) -0.035*** -0.029*** -0.04*** -0.037*** 
ARs (-3,+3) -0.039*** -0.034*** -0.047*** -0.041*** 
ARs (-2,+2) -0.033*** -0.026*** -0.046*** -0.038*** 
ARs (-1,+1) -0.031*** -0.024*** -0.045*** -0.037*** 
  Bidder have X Deals CARs   Bidder have X Deals CARs 
 X 
Deals 
Number  % Mean 
p-
value 




1 11401 24.4 3.12% 0.000 11401 20 12 0.5 -0.86% 0.004 240 
2 4445 19 2.04% 0.000 8890 21 2 0.1 -0.12% 0.840 42 
3 2098 13.5 1.59% 0.000 6294 22 6 0.3 -1.89% 0.002 132 
4 1060 9.1 1.14% 0.000 4240 23 5 0.2 0.61% 0.267 115 
5 616 6.6 0.75% 0.000 3080 24 2 0.1 -0.37% 0.287 48 
6 386 5 0.22% 0.121 2316 25 3 0.2 -0.17% 0.771 75 
7 249 3.7 0.28% 0.191 1743 26 1 0.1 -0.13% 0.838 26 
8 178 3 0.33% 0.067 1424 27 4 0.2 -0.95% 0.006 108 
9 115 2.2 0.55% 0.006 1035 28 1 0.1 -0.56% 0.218 28 
10 102 2.2 0.21% 0.226 1020 30 1 0.1 0.26% 0.576 30 
11 61 1.4 -0.22% 0.341 671 31 1 0.1 -1.98% 0.004 31 
12 51 1.3 0.13% 0.541 612 32 1 0.1 -0.10% 0.905 32 
13 43 1.2 0.06% 0.775 559 34 1 0.1 -1.09% 0.046 34 
14 23 0.7 -0.39% 0.220 322 37 3 0.2 4.86% 0.000 111 
15 35 1.1 0.11% 0.599 525 39 1 0.1 5.75% 0.039 39 
16 29 1 -0.59% 0.009 464 46 1 0.1 -1.55% 0.001 46 
17 15 0.5 -0.47% 0.028 255 48 1 0.1 -0.46% 0.240 48 
18 18 0.7 -0.75% 0.004 324 57 1 0.1 -0.11% 0.755 57 
19 14 0.6 -0.39% 0.172 266 75 1 0.2 -0.06% 0.923 75 
Total Number of acquirers 32388 100%     46758 
Total Number of acquirers have 5 or more deals 1983   
    
The main hypothesis tested here is that there is no association between acquirer CARs and 
previous experience. Acquirer bidding experience, in this context, is represented by the 
frequency of prior acquisitions as represented by the cumulative number of completed 
takeovers by the same acquirer during the preceding three or five years (Exp. 3-Y and Exp. 5-
Y). Alternatively, bidder experience can be measured by the number of previous (initial) bids 
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that the acquirer has made in M&A deals, irrespective of whether such deals were ultimately 
completed or not. The former method is considered a more representative measure of acquirer 
bidding experience in M&As. 
The first panel in Table 5.12 shows the results for the correlations between acquirers‘ 
CARs/ARs (for different window lengths) and previous acquisition experience measured by 
the cumulative number of completed takeovers by the same acquirer during the previous 
three and five-year periods (Exp. 3-Y and Exp. 5-Y, respectively). The results clearly indicate 
a statistically significant and negative correlation between acquirer bidding experience and 
returns for both correlation measures.  
The second panel in Table 5.12 shows the means and statistical significance of acquirers‘ 
CARs for groups of deals (which total up to 75) categorised according to the number of 
bidders who were involved in previous bids. In the latter case, for example, 11,401 deals 
were announced by ‗single acquirers‘ who had made only one previous bid in the overall 
sample of 46,758 deals. At the other extreme, one acquirer (Cisco Systems
13
) made 75 
previous bids. The results clearly show that ‗single acquirers‘ have higher returns, while 
returns tend to decrease for acquirers with higher numbers of previous bids, confirming that 
‗multiple acquirers‘ may destroy their shareholders‘ wealth as they engage in more and more 
bids.  
These findings are consistent with several hypotheses mentioned in Chapter 2 (e.g. hubris, 
indigestion, overvaluation, accounting manipulation, merger programme announcement, and 
managerial empire building) and contrary to the expectation that greater acquisition 
experience contributes to more knowledgeable actions based on better valuation of targets. 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) observed a larger contribution of irrational hubris in the 
valuation the targets. If the market learns that the true synergy value of the acquisition is 
lower than the premium paid, this may lead to a negative market reaction as reflected by 
negative acquirer returns. The results appear to be consistent with this view. 
As with diversification, it is possible to account for additional heterogeneity in the above 
analysis regarding acquirer bidding experience in order to check for consistency of results. 
Table 5.13 below compares acquirers‘ CARs for deals distinguishing between acquirer 
bidding experience, method of payment, and target status. The results show that, irrespective 
                                                          
13
 Total Value of transaction for the 75 completed deals is $49,069.472 million 
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of acquirer bidding experience, deals involving non-public targets improve acquiring 
company shareholder wealth, while deals involving public targets reduce shareholder wealth. 
Furthermore, single bidders achieve higher returns than multiple bidders in all cases, which is 
consistent with the results obtained in Table 5.12. This confirms that acquirer bidding 
experience reduces returns irrespective of target status or method of payment.  
Table ‎5.13: Activity and Geography Diversification, Public vs. Non-Public Target Status, and Method of 
Payment. 
A simple t-test has been used to test the statistical significance of the means for each group of CARs associated 
with distinctions based on method of payment (cash, stock, and cash-stock), target status (public vs. non-public), 
and acquirer bidding experience (single vs. multiple bidders). The null hypothesis is that the mean CAR in each 
sub-group is zero. N refers to the number of deals in each sub-group. The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  
  CARs(-1,+1) CARs(-2,+2) 
N Mean p-value Mean p-value 
Cash and Stock 
Combination 
Private 
Single 2400 2.79% 0.000*** 3.04% 0.000*** 
Multiple  981 0.83% 0.000*** 0.98% 0.000*** 
Public 
Single 1326 -0.63% 0.016** -0.94% 0.002*** 
Multiple  1110 -2.30% 0.000*** -2.49% 0.000*** 
Sub. 
Single 795 4.74% 0.000*** 5.21% 0.000*** 
Multiple  194 1.36% 0.004*** 1.39% 0.016** 
Cash-Only 
Private 
Single 3814 1.15% 0.000*** 1.31% 0.000*** 
Multiple  1747 1.03% 0.000*** 0.97% 0.000*** 
Public 
Single 2223 0.89% 0.000*** 0.77% 0.000*** 
Multiple  2000 -0.04% 0.696 -0.14% 0.298 
Sub. 
Single 2307 1.60% 0.000*** 1.80% 0.000*** 
Multiple  1168 0.56% 0.001*** 0.69% 0.003*** 
Stock-Only 
Private 
Single 3805 6.00% 0.000*** 6.44% 0.000*** 
Multiple  1773 1.15% 0.000*** 1.34% 0.000*** 
Public 
Single 2685 -0.63% 0.009*** -0.57% 0.038** 
Multiple  1952 -1.50% 0.000*** -1.78% 0.000*** 
Sub. 
Single 1166 5.08% 0.000*** 5.17% 0.000*** 






5.4. Hypotheses Testing (Regression Results) 
The purpose of this section is to supplement the above findings using cross-sectional CAR 
regressions with heteroskedasticity-corrected estimates in order to allow for further testing of 
the aforementioned hypotheses through the addition of relevant conditioning variables that 
may influence acquirers‘ CARs. Consistent with the univariate analyses, cross-sectional 
regressions are conducted in a sequential manner to account for the impact of the following 
factors on acquirers‘ shareholder returns: 
1. Target status and method of payment.  
2. Activity and geographical diversification. 
3. Acquirer bidding experience. 
While the first two hypotheses relating to target status and method of payment were treated as 
distinct in the univariate analyses, it makes sense to combine these factors in the regressions 
so that both their individual and joint impacts can be observed. Furthermore, while the impact 
of diversification and acquirer bidding experience are considered separately from target status 
and method of payment, their combined impact, where appropriate, will also be considered 
here. Unlike the univariate analyses (where it was possible to examine CARs with varying 
window lengths) the regression results reported below take into account only the specific 
three-day window CARs (-1,+1), which is consistent with the literature. 
Several control variables are included in the CAR regressions to account for both firm and 
country-level heterogeneity. In all regressions, the minimum set of control variables includes 
the value of the transaction (as a proxy for target size) and the GDP per capita for both bidder 
and target countries. In a further robustness analysis, additional control variables will be 
added to check for consistency of the results. 
In what follows, the above hypotheses are tested separately but in a progressive manner to (i) 
ensure that the results are consistent with the Univariate analysis and (ii) to avoid 
complicating the analysis while investigating issues that are pertinent to the specific 
hypotheses. In the robustness section, the analyses are extended with additional controls 
(which reduce the sample size) and, where appropriate, using interaction effects. While it is 
possible to estimate a ―complete‖ regression, allowing for all the hypotheses to be tested 
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together, doing so with all the control variables included reduces the sample size 
considerably. 
5.4.1. Target Status and Method of Payment 
Table 5.14 presents the results of the regressions analysis in which the dependent variable is 
acquirers‘ three-day CARs (-1,+1). Method of payment (cash or stock) and target status 
(public, private, subsidiary) have been used as explanatory variables while controlling for 
deal value and the level of economic development in acquirer and target countries. The 
regressions have been conducted using the maximum available dataset of completed and 
unsuccessful deals, as well as for the sample of completed deals only, in order to check for 
consistency of results. 
Table ‎5.14: Regressions Analysis of Target Status and Method of Payment. 
The dependent variable is acquirers‘ 3-day CARs (-1,+1). The independent variables are: (1) logarithm of transaction 
values, (2) logarithm of the GDP per capita of the target country, (3) a cash-only dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the 
acquirer used cash-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (4) a stock-only dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if 
the acquirer used stock-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (5) ‗public‘ as a dummy variable equal to 
‗1‘ if the deal involves a public target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (6) ‗private‘ as a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deal 
involves a private target, ‗0‘ otherwise, and (7) ‗subsidiary‘ as a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deals involves a 
subsidiary target, ‗0‘ otherwise. Models 1-5 are estimated using the entire sample including unsuccessful deals 
(45,631 deals), Models 6-10 are estimated using the sample of completed deals only (35,749 deals). 
Heteroskedasticity-corrected estimates are reported with p-values shown in parentheses. All estimations include year 
and industry effects as well as country effects. 
  All Completed 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
No. obs 45631 45631 45631 45631 45631 35749 35749 35749 35749 35749 
R
2
 0.008 0.015 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.015 0.011 0.010 0.012 
Adjusted R
2
 0.008 0.015 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.015 0.011 0.010 0.012 
F-test 52.366 114.365 89.348 78.483 66.318 41.310 91.623 68.025 61.085 54.789 
P-value(F) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 
0.022 0.017 0.022 0.018 0.015 0.026 0.026 0.031 0.025 0.020 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Value of Trans. 
-0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP (Target) 
0.003 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.003 
(0.004) (0.000) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) (0.082) (0.056) (0.819) (0.037) (0.028) 
Cash-Only 
-0.004 
   
-0.002 -0.004 
   
-0.002 
(0.000) 
   
(0.029) (0.000) 




   
0.003 0.003 
   
0.003 
(0.038) 
   
(0.021) (0.081) 
































Sub.    
0.007   
   
0.008 
 
   
(0.000)   
   
(0.000) 
 
Country Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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All regressions are statistically significant as confirmed by the value of the F-statistic. 
Although the explanatory power indicated the values of R
2
 and adjusted R
2
 is generally low, 
this is consistent with most empirical studies using cross-sectional market data (Conn et al. 
2005, Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin 2006, Ismail 2008).  
In order to assess the impact of target status on acquirers‘ CARs, three dummy variables are 
introduced to distinguish the impact of public, private, and subsidiary targets. The results 
show that the impact of acquiring a public target on CARs is significant and consistently 
negative across all models. On the other hand, the impact is positive when a private or 
subsidiary target is involved. These results thus confirm that acquiring company shareholders 
receive higher returns when the bidder acquires a private or subsidiary firm and lower returns 
when a public target is acquired. 
The results also indicate that the value of transactions, which reflect the impact of target size, 
have a negative impact on acquirer returns. While there is no strong justification as to why 
large acquisitions should lead to negative returns for acquirers, one possible explanation is 
that due to the greater information asymmetry associated with larger-sized targets, there is 
greater uncertainty regarding the value of the target, and this is reflected in the form of 
negative returns. This effect is quite significant and robust in all of the regressions considered 
below (see Tables 5.18, 5.19, and 5.20). Additionally, the level of economic activity (GDP 
per capita) of the bidder country has a positive and statistically significant impact on acquirer 
returns while that of the target country is negative but not always statistically significant.  
With regard to payment method, two dummy variables are introduced to distinguish between 
the impact of cash-only and stock-only transactions. The results are consistent with the 
univariate analysis (see Tables 5.7 and 5.8) in that after controlling for target status, stock 
payment transactions demonstrate a positive impact on acquirer returns, while the effect of 
cash payment transactions is negative. However, in order to investigate the relation between 
method of payment and target status more thoroughly, Table 5.15 presents the results of 
regressions analysis with the sample split into public, private, and subsidiary targets. These 
results confirm that acquirers receive lower returns when the bidder pledges cash to acquire a 
non-public target or stock to acquire a public target. On the other hand, acquirers receive 




Table ‎5.15: Regressions Analysis for Public, Private, and Subsidiary Targets. 
The dependent variable is acquirers‘ three-day CARs (-1,+1). The independent variables are: (1) logarithm of 
transaction values, (2) logarithm of the GDP per capita of the target country, (3) a cash-only dummy variable 
equal to ‗1‘ if the acquirer used cash-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (4) a stock-only dummy 
variable equal to ‗1‘ if the acquirer used stock-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise. The 
estimations in this table are for subsamples of deals distinguished according to target status: Models 1 to 3 
represent public targets, Models 4 to 6 represent private targets, and Models 7 to 9 represent subsidiary targets. 
Heteroskedasticity-corrected estimates are reported with p-values shown in parentheses. All estimations include 
year and industry effects as well as country effects. 
  Public Target  Private Target  Subsidiary Target  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
No. obs 14013 14013 13807 22022 22022 21468 10723 10723 10356 
R
2
 0.006 0.017 0.019 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.007 
Adjusted R
2
 0.006 0.017 0.018 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 
F-test 17.452 40.413 37.375 29.852 24.666 23.752 13.562 10.985 10.608 
P-value(F) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 
-0.005 0.016 0.049 0.033 0.035 0.000 0.031 0.031 0.010 
(0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.955) (0.000) (0.000) (0.164) 

























0.008 0.007 0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) 
Stock-Only 
-0.005 -0.008 -0.008 0.017 0.017 0.014 0.018 0.018 0.018 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Country Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The positive impact of cash transactions in public target acquisitions can be explained by the 
theory that cash payments help to resolve the overvaluation problem (Myers and Majluf 
1984). Overpayment or underpayment issues also explain the negative returns on acquirer 
stock when public targets are involved (Eckbo 2009). Regarding private firms, the positive 
impact of using stock as payment could be related to the degree of information asymmetry 
surrounding private targets, which is generally much greater than that of public targets. In 
addition, the impact on stock returns is also explained by the overvaluation theory, which 
holds that when a public bidder announces a stock offer for a public target, this may signal to 
the market that the acquirer‘s stock is overvalued, which is then reflected in the form of 
negative returns.  
In general, the finding involving greater positive acquirer returns whenever the target is 
private and negative returns whenever the target is public is very robust. It is thus not only the 
mechanism of transfer which is critical but also the status of the target. The results for 
subsidiary targets demonstrate similar effects as those for private targets. In other words, the 
main difference within these results seems to reside in the comparison between public and 
non-public targets. These results are consistent with the univariate analysis and confirm 
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significant differences in acquirer returns between cash and stock payment transactions, 
depending on the status of the target.  
5.4.2. Diversification 
Table ‎5.16: Regressions Analysis for Diversification (Cross-Border and Cross-Industry): 
The dependent variable is acquirers‘ three-day CAR (-1,+1). The independent variables are: (1) logarithm of 
transaction values, (2) logarithm of the GDP per capita of the target country, (3) domestic and focused deals 
(DAF), (4) domestic and cross-industry deals (DCI), (5) cross-border and focused deals (CBF), and (6) cross-
border and cross-industry deals (CBCI), (7) a stock-only dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the acquirer used stock-
only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (8) ‗public‘ as a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deal 
involves a public target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (9) Common Law (Target) dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the target is 
located in a common law country (proxy for investor protection), and ‗0‘otherwise, (10) Legal Ins Quality 
(Target) as a proxy for institutional environment (Source: Kuncic 2014). All estimations are for the entire 
sample (subject to data availability). All estimations include year and industry effects as well as country effects. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
No. obs 45631 45631 45631 45631 39393 39393 39393 39393 
R
2
 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
Adjusted R
2
 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011 
F-test 74.928 73.430 73.364 73.156 47.878 46.694 47.207 46.257 
P-value(F) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 
0.016 0.017 0.014 0.015 0.021 0.023 0.019 0.021 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Value of Trans. 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP (Target) 
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.037) (0.010) (0.020) 
DAF 
-0.003 
   
-0.004 
   
(0.000) 
   
(0.001) 
   
DCI  
0.001 





   
(0.621) 
  
CBF    
0.003 





   
(0.004) 
 
CBCI     
0.003 
   
0.002 
   
(0.043) 
   
(0.248) 
Stock-Only 
0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Public 
-0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Legal Ins 
Quality (Target) 
    
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
(0.776) (0.820) (0.773) (0.766) 
Common Law 
(Target) 
    
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
    
(0.614) (0.935) (0.448) (0.728) 
Country Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
There is robust evidence in the literature relating to the positive impact of portfolio 
diversification on asset price returns, which suggests that if diversification has the expected 
impact of reducing risk, this should be reflected in lower risk premiums being required by 
rational investors and higher expected asset prices. Following the univariate analysis on 
diversification, this section extends the enquiry by conducting regressions to test the impact 
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of activity and geographical diversification on acquirer returns. As before, diversification is 
classified into the four categories explained earlier (i.e. DAF, DCI, CBF, and CBCI), which 
are introduced as dummy variables in the cross-sectional CAR regressions.  
Table 5.16 above presents the results of the regressions in which the dependent variable is 
acquirers‘ three-day CARs (-1,+1). The control variables include transaction value, GDP per 
capita of bidder and target countries, and additionally (in later regressions), proxies to 
account for investor protection and institutional quality. The additional explanatory variables 
include selective dummies to control for method of payment and target status. Only the 
results involving the stock payment and public target dummies are reported here, though the 
findings are consistent when cash and other target dummies are also included (these findings 
are not shown for reasons of space). As before, the regressions are conducted using the 
maximum number of observations (deals) available, subject to the availability of data 
involving the relevant control variables. The results are consistent across all regressions. 
As with the univariate analysis, domestic and focussed (DAF) deals have a consistently 
significant negative impact on acquirers‘ CARs, while diversified deals (DCI, CBF, CBCI) 
have a significant positive impact in most cases. These results suggest that diversification 
improves acquiring companies‘ shareholder wealth, which is consistent with several previous 
empirical studies (Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Salleo 2008, Raj and Uddin 2013, Danbolt and 
Maciver 2012, Selcuk and Kiymaz 2015). 
In particular, it can be argued that the positive and consistent impact of cross-border and 
focussed deals (CBF) is supported by international diversification theory, where the CAPM 
or arbitrage pricing theory is extended to a multi-country context. In theory, there are always 
arbitrage gains from cross-border investments, and this extends to cross-border mergers. A 
similar reasoning can be applied to cross-border and cross-industry (CBCI) M&As by 
appealing to the international CAPM or arbitrage pricing theory perspective. Additionally, 
portfolio diversification theory suggests that cross-border diversification will drive down the 
cost of capital, especially if certain macroeconomic factors, like bilateral trade and regulation, 
are favourable. 
On the other hand, the negative impact of domestic and focussed (DAF) deals could be 
attributed to a number of possible factors, including agency costs, over-optimism, or hubris. 
Several hypotheses have been studied previously which attempt to explain the sub-optimal 
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acquisitions sometimes made by CEOs which actually destroy shareholder value. Irrational 
exuberance is susceptible to the idea of personal wealth creation by managers at the expense 
of shareholders. Focussed acquisitions, in this sense, are value-destroying and might be 
driven by irrational decision-making. Additionally, focussed deals may imply lower 
efficiency in economies of scale or scope, so the expected marginal benefit might be less than 
the initial cost of acquisition as a possible overpayment.  
To conclude, the empirical results reported here emphasise that activity and geographic 
diversification (CBCI) will generally improve acquiring companies‘ shareholder wealth. In 
contrast, the results show that focussed and domestic (DAF) deals reduce shareholder wealth. 
Importantly, these empirical results are consistent with several empirical studies. For 
example, Raj and Uddin (2013) and Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Salleo (2008) argue that focussed 
deals generally tend to involve underperforming targets. In the same vein, diversification 
tends to improve bidding companies‘ shareholder wealth as a result of significant 




5.4.3. Acquirer Bidding Experience (Frequent Bidders) 
Table ‎5.17: Regressions Analysis for Acquirer Bidding Experience. 
The dependent variable is acquirers‘ three-day CARs (-1,+1). The independent variables are: (1) logarithm of transaction values, (2) 
logarithm of the GDP per capita of the target country, (3) cross-border and focused deals (CBF), (4) cross-border and cross-industry 
deals (CBCI), (5) a stock-only dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the acquirer used stock-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ 
otherwise, (6) ‗public‘ as a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deal involves a public target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (7) Exp. 3-Y: the 
cumulative number of completed takeovers by the same acquirer during the preceding three years, (8) Exp. 5-Y: the cumulative 
number of completed takeovers by the same acquirer during the preceding five years, (9) Dum. Exp. 3-Y: a dummy variable equal to 
‗1‘ if the same bidder has two or more completed deals over the three preceding years, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (10) Dum. Exp. 5-Y: a 
dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the same bidder has two or more completed deals over the five preceding years (a frequent bidder), 
and ‗0‘ otherwise. P-values are shown in parentheses. Models 1-6 are estimated using the entire sample (45,631 deals), and Models 
7-12 are estimated using the sample of completed deals only (35,749 deals). Heteroskedasticity-corrected estimates are reported 
with p-values shown in parentheses. All estimations include year and industry effects, as well as country effects where possible. 
 
  All Deals Completed Deals Only 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
No. obs 45631 45631 45631 45631 45631 45631 35749 35749 35749 35749 35749 35749 
R
2
 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014 
Adjusted R
2
 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013 
F-test 77.28 74.69 79.51 81.24 63.06 60.73 64.01 61.38 64.31 66.30 51.47 49.21 
P-value(F) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 
0.020 0.018 0.020 0.020 0.017 0.015 0.025 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.023 0.021 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Value of Trans. 
-0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP (Target) 
0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.107) (0.081) (0.075) (0.046) (0.060) (0.047) 
CBF      
0.004 0.004 
    
0.003 0.003 
    
(0.003) (0.005) 
    
(0.033) (0.050) 
CBCI      
0.004 0.004 
    
0.002 0.001 
    
(0.006) (0.010) 
    
(0.313) (0.433) 
Stock-Only 
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 
(0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.001) (0.008) 
Public 
-0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exp. 3-Y 
-0.001 
   
-0.001   -0.001 




   
(0.000)   (0.000) 
   
(0.000) 
 
Exp. 5-Y  
-0.001 












   
(0.000) 













   




   
-0.007 
  




   
(0.000) 
  
Country Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Another important factor that may affect acquirers‘ shareholder returns is the bidder‘s prior 
experience of engaging in M&As. Some theoretical models highlight the ‗learning by doing‘ 
hypothesis, which suggests that experience enhances the ability to identify and engage in 
more synergy-adding M&As, which will, in turn, lead to more significant long-term gains. 
However, when acquirers have hidden private information about synergy value (asymmetric 
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information), then the market may react negatively, even to synergy-creating deals (Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz 2007, Officer, Poulsen, and Stegemoller 2009).  
Following the univariate analyses, this section extends the investigation by conducting 
regressions to test the impact of acquirer bidding experience on CARs. Table 5.17 above 
presents the results of these regressions, in which the dependent variable is acquirers‘ three-
day CARs (-1,+1). Experience is represented by prior acquisitions using the cumulative 
number of completed takeovers by the same acquirer during the preceding three or five years 
(Exp. 3-Y, Exp. 5-Y) and by the corresponding dummy variables defined earlier (Dum. Exp. 
3-Y, Dum. Exp. 5-Y). These are each considered individually in the regressions. The control 
variables include transaction value and GDP per capita of bidder and target countries. 
Additional explanatory variables include selective dummies to control for payment method, 
target status, and diversification—in this case using stock only, CBF, CBCI, and the public 
target dummy, although the other results involving cash payments and additional target 
dummies (not included here for reasons of space) are also consistent. As before, the 
regressions are conducted using the maximum number of observations (deals) available, 
subject to the availability of data involving the relevant control variables.  
The results shown in Table 5.17 above are consistent across all regressions, and these 
findings reveal a significant negative impact of acquirer bidding experience on CARs, which 
is consistent with the univariate analyses. In addition, these findings hint at the possibility of 
irrational decision-making by acquirers, consistent with various hypotheses discussed in 
Chapter 2, where managers are driven by hubris or over-optimism rather than synergy gains. 
For example, Roll (1986) indicates that a lack of concern is often given to subsequent 
acquisitions after the first because over-confident managers, driven by the success of prior 
takeovers (hubris), tend to pay a higher price for subsequent targets, which can have a 
counterproductive impact on abnormal returns. Furthermore, the ‗merger programme 
announcement‘ hypothesis suggests that a series of acquisitions will produce a negative 





5.5. Robustness Checks  
This section conducts a further robustness analysis to assess the consistency of the above 
findings by introducing additional firm and deal-specific factors into the regressions. In total, 
the results of 37 regressions are reported below in three tables (Tables 5.18, 5.19 and 5.20). 
These are more or less distinguished by adding successively increasing layers of deal-specific 
factors in an attempt to investigate the combined impact of (i) target status and method of 
payment, (ii) diversification, and (iii) acquirer bidding experience on acquirers‘ CARs. At the 
same time, the regressions are reported to assess the consistency of the subsamples, which 
include all deals, completed deals only, deals involving acquirers from the U.S. only (as these 
make up a large part of the sample), and deals involving non-U.S. acquirers only. The latter 
two cases yield some particularly interesting results. Throughout all regressions, two 
additional control variables are included: acquirers‘ market-to-book ratio (M/B ratio) and 
acquirers‘ size. In addition, all year/industry/country fixed effects are included where 
possible. The dependent variable is acquirers‘ three-day CARs (-1,+1) in all regressions. 
Table 5.18 reports the regression results assessing the combined impact of target status 
(public and private) and payment method (cash and stock only), estimated successively 
(every three columns), using samples covering (i) all deals, (ii) completed deals only, and (iii) 
deals involving U.S. acquirers only (however, in the final column, the estimation is 
conducted for the sample of non-U.S. acquirers only). For ease of analysis, the comparison is 
restricted to deals involving public vs. private targets
14
 and cash vs. stock payment only
15
.  
Focussing on the first six columns, the results show that the impact of acquiring a public 
target is consistently negative while that of acquiring a private target is consistently positive, 
while the effects of cash and stock payments are negative and positive, respectively, in (a) the 
global sample and (b) the sample of completed deals. However, for deals involving U.S. 
acquirers only, the impact of cash vs. stock payments is no longer consistent with earlier 
results, since cash payments in this case confer a positive impact while stock payments have a 
negative impact on acquirers‘ returns. However, the latter effect is more consistent with that 
observed in U.S. studies (Ismail 2008) but does not hold for non-U.S. acquirers, as the results 
of estimation in Column 13 confirm. 
                                                          
14
 Including the dummy for public targets can also determine (by default) the effect of non-public targets (as 
being the opposite effect). 
15
 Excluding the third category (i.e. subsidiary or mixed payment deals) avoids multicollinearity,  
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Columns 7-9 in Table 5.18 include all these factors (public, private, cash, and stock 
dummies), and the results are broadly consistent in terms of signs and magnitude, except that 
the impact of the private dummy is not statistically significant even though deals with public 
targets continue to have a negative and statistically significant effect.
16
  
The next set of three columns adds the interaction effects associated with cash, stock, and 
public dummies, along with all the constituent terms included, and the main set of results 
remains unaffected. Thus, the results are consistent with earlier findings. In particular, the 
effect of acquiring public targets is negative, though cash payments for these deals 
(CHS×PUB) has an offsetting positive effect while the factor of stock payments seems to 
exacerbate the negative impact. Correspondingly, the opposite applies for non-public targets. 
Table 5.19 reports a similarly estimated set of regression results assessing the combined 
effect of public target status, method of payment, and diversification. Again, most of the 
results confirm earlier findings, in particular, the impact of both activity and geographical 
(DCI, CBF, CBCI) diversified deals, which is consistently positive, while that of domestic 
and focussed deals (DAF) is negative. While adding these factors in the regressions, the 
impacts of cash payments and public target status remain consistent. An additional set of 
regression results (not reported here) also confirms that private (or non-public) targets and 
stock payments continue to have a broadly positive impact on acquirers‘ CARs.  
Table 5.20 reports another similar set of results but considers the additional influence of 
acquirer bidding experience along with all other effects (i.e. diversification, public targets, 
cash, stock, and interaction terms [CSH×PUB and STC×PUB]). These results confirm that 
the impact of acquirer bidding experience is negative and, as found earlier, the rest of the 
results are also broadly consistent. 
Importantly, the above results show that deals involving acquisition of public targets, acquirer 
bidding experience, and non-diversification (i.e. domestic and focussed) have a robustly 
negative impact, while diversification and the acquisition of non-public targets contribute to a 
positive impact on acquirer returns. Furthermore, cash payment deals generally have a 
negative impact while stock deals have a positive impact on acquirer returns, though this does 
                                                          
16
 This implies that non-public targets (both private and subsidiary) have a positive impact, but distinguishing 
deals with only private targets among these appears to cause an ambiguous effect and makes this case rather 
uninteresting. Hence, in the analysis that follows, only the public target dummy is included in the robustness 
regressions, implying a distinction between public and non-public cases. 
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not necessarily hold for U.S. acquirers. However, the results also confirm that the negative 
impact of acquiring public targets is offset in cash deals, and correspondingly, the positive 
impact of acquiring non-public targets is reduced by the factor of cash payment.  
Table ‎5.18: Regressions Analysis for Robustness Checks (1). 
The dependent variable is acquirers‘ three-day CARs (-1,+1). The independent variables are: (1) logarithm of 
transaction values, (2) logarithm of the GDP per capita of the target country, (3) a cash-only dummy variable 
equal to ‗1‘ if the acquirer used cash-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (4) a stock-only dummy 
variable equal to ‗1‘ if the acquirer used stock-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (5) ‗public‘ as 
a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deal involves a public target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (6) ‗private‘ as a dummy 
variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deal involves a private target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (7) STC×PUB is an interaction variable 
equal to ‗1‘ for public targets paid for with stock-only, (8) CSH×PUB equal to ‗1‘ for public targets paid for 
with cash-only, (9) market-to-book ratio for acquiring firms on announcement day (M/B Ratio), and (10) Bidder 
size, proxied by market value of the acquiring firm four weeks prior to announcement. Models 1, 4, 7 and 10, 
are estimated using the largest available sample (28,800 deals). Models 2, 5, 8 and 11 are estimated using the 
sample of completed deals only (22,414 deals). Models 3, 6, 9 and 12 are estimated using the sample of deals 
involving U.S. acquirers only (11,403 deals). A model 13 is estimated using the sample of deals involving non-
U.S. acquirers only (17,397 deals). Heteroskedasticity-corrected estimates are reported with p-values shown in 
parentheses. All estimations include year, industry, and country fixed effects where possible (subject to 











  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
  All Comp. US All Comp. US All Comp. US All Comp. US Non-USA 
No. obs 28800 22414 11403 28800 22414 11403 28800 22414 11403 28800 22414 11403 17397 
R
2
 0.012 0.014 0.024 0.009 0.010 0.024 0.012 0.013 0.024 0.017 0.019 0.029 0.012 
Adjusted R
2
 0.012 0.014 0.023 0.009 0.009 0.023 0.011 0.013 0.023 0.016 0.019 0.028 0.011 
F-test 40.20 35.97 35.16 29.70 24.14 34.88 30.64 27.43 28.38 37.21 33.65 28.76 16.42 
P-value(F) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 
0.019 0.028 0.020 0.022 0.030 0.043 0.016 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.031 0.026 0.014 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.307) (0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.001) (0.000) (0.241) (0.000) (0.000) (0.173) (0.007) 
Value of Trans. 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.055) 
GDP (Target) 
0.003 0.001 0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.002 
(0.020) (0.577) (0.414) (0.361) (0.635) (0.660) (0.008) (0.364) (0.464) (0.042) (0.619) (0.352) (0.037) 
Cash-Only 
-0.004 -0.003 0.007 
   
-0.003 -0.002 0.005 -0.010 -0.011 -0.014 -0.007 
(0.000) (0.011) (0.001) 
   
(0.014) (0.171) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock-Only    
0.002 0.001 -0.009 0.001 0.001 -0.007 0.015 0.015 -0.001 0.024 
   
(0.332) (0.547) (0.000) (0.483) (0.441) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.708) (0.000) 
Public 
-0.015 -0.016 -0.018 
   
-0.015 -0.017 -0.018 -0.021 -0.024 -0.032 -0.012 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private    
0.007 0.008 0.014 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.323) (0.205) (0.742) (0.061) (0.023) (0.174) (0.491) 
STC×PUB          
-0.022 -0.021 -0.007 -0.025 
         
(0.000) (0.000) (0.186) (0.000) 
CSH×PUB          
0.019 0.021 0.032 0.004 
         
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.177) 
M/B Ratio 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.025) (0.057) (0.064) (0.019) (0.050) (0.055) (0.025) (0.055) (0.046) (0.038) (0.000) 
Bidder Size 
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
(0.095) (0.899) (0.000) (0.080) (0.997) (0.000) (0.091) (0.900) (0.000) (0.088) (0.865) (0.000) (0.115) 
Country Dumm. Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Industry Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table ‎5.19: Regressions Analysis for Robustness Checks (2). 
The dependent variable is acquirers‘ three-day CARs (-1,+1). The independent variables are: (1) logarithm of transaction values, 
(2) logarithm of the GDP per capita of the target country, (3) domestic and focused deals (DAF), (4) domestic and cross-industry 
deals (DCI), (5) cross-border and focused deals (CBF), and (6) cross-border and cross-industry deals (CBCI), (7) a cash-only 
dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the acquirer used cash-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (8) ‗public‘ as a dummy 
variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deal involves a public target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (9) market-to-book ratio for acquiring firms on 
announcement day (M/B Ratio), and (10) Bidder size, proxied by market value of the acquiring firm four weeks prior to 
announcement. Models 1, 4, 7, and 10 are estimated using the largest available sample (28,800 deals). Models 2, 5, 8, and 11 are 
estimated using the sample of completed deals only (22,414 deals). Models 3, 6, 9, and 12 are estimated using the sample of 
deals involving U.S. acquirers only (11,403 deals). Heteroskedasticity-corrected estimates are reported with p-values shown in 
parentheses. All estimations include year and industry effects, as well as country effects where possible (subject to avoidance of 
multicollinearity). 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  All Comp. US All Comp. US All Comp. US All Comp. US 
No. obs 28800 22414 11403 28800 22414 11403 28800 22414 11403 28800 22414 11403 
R2 0.013 0.015 0.025 0.013 0.014 0.025 0.013 0.014 0.024 0.013 0.014 0.025 
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.014 0.024 0.012 0.014 0.024 0.012 0.014 0.023 0.012 0.014 0.024 
F-test 37.65 33.46 32.36 36.46 32.84 32.36 36.57 32.72 31.49 36.78 32.59 31.79 
P-value(F) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 
0.019 0.028 0.007 0.019 0.029 0.026 0.018 0.026 0.031 0.017 0.028 0.014 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.700) (0.000) (0.000) (0.197) (0.001) (0.000) (0.173) (0.001) (0.000) (0.472) 
Value of Trans. 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP (Target) 
0.003 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.005 
(0.011) (0.464) (0.112) (0.027) (0.770) (0.687) (0.013) (0.447) (0.805) (0.012) (0.592) (0.269) 
DAF 
-0.004 -0.004 -0.005 
         
(0.001) (0.006) (0.010) 
         
DCI    
0.000 0.001 0.005 
      
   
(0.952) (0.410) (0.025) 
      
CBF        
0.003 0.004 -0.002 
   
      
(0.049) (0.052) (0.637) 
   
CBCI           
0.006 0.003 0.005 
         
(0.004) (0.222) (0.197) 
Cash-Only 
-0.004 -0.004 0.007 -0.004 -0.003 0.007 -0.004 -0.003 0.007 -0.004 -0.003 0.007 
(0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.001) (0.000) (0.010) (0.001) 
Public 
-0.015 -0.016 -0.018 -0.015 -0.016 -0.018 -0.015 -0.016 -0.018 -0.015 -0.016 -0.018 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
M/B Ratio 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.031) (0.030) (0.008) (0.029) (0.030) (0.007) (0.028) (0.029) (0.023) (0.032) (0.029) (0.020) 
Bidder Size 
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.100) (0.886) (0.000) (0.093) (0.897) (0.000) (0.095) (0.900) (0.000) (0.104) (0.891) (0.000) 
Country Dumm. Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Industry Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table ‎5.20: Regressions Analysis for Robustness Checks (3). 
The dependent variable is acquirers‘ three-day CARs (-1,+1). The independent variables are: (1) logarithm of transaction 
values, (2) logarithm of the GDP per capita of the target country, (3) domestic and focused deals (DAF), (4) domestic and 
cross-industry deals (DCI), (5) cross-border and focused deals (CBF), and (6) cross-border and cross-industry deals (CBCI), (7) 
a cash-only dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the acquirer used cash-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (8) 
‗public‘ as a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deal involves a public target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (9) Exp. 5-Y is the cumulative 
number of completed takeovers by the same acquirer during the preceding five years, (10) STC×PUB is an interaction variable 
equal to ‗1‘ for public targets paid for with stock-only, (11) STC×PRV is an interaction variable equal to ‗1‘ for private targets 
paid for with stock-only, (12) market-to-book ratio for acquiring firms on announcement day (M/B Ratio), and (13) Bidder size, 
proxied by market value of the acquiring firm four weeks prior to announcement. Models 1, 4, 7, and 10 are estimated using the 
largest available sample (28,800 deals). Models 2, 5, 8, and 11 are estimated using the sample of completed deals only (22,414 
deals). Models 3, 6, 9, and 12 are estimated using the sample of deals involving U.S. acquirers only (11,403 deals). 
Heteroskedasticity-corrected estimates are reported with p-values shown in parentheses. All estimations include year and 
industry effects, as well as country effects where possible (subject to avoidance of multicollinearity). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  All Comp. US All Comp. US All Comp. US All Comp. US 
No. obs 28800 22414 11403 28800 22414 11403 28800 22414 11403 28800 22414 11403 
R2 0.016 0.018 0.025 0.016 0.018 0.025 0.016 0.018 0.025 0.016 0.018 0.025 
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.018 0.024 0.016 0.018 0.024 0.015 0.018 0.024 0.016 0.018 0.024 
F-test 36.57 32.19 24.66 36.07 32.27 24.73 35.82 32.08 24.32 36.02 32.03 24.35 
P-value(F) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 
0.023 0.031 0.008 0.023 0.031 0.022 0.022 0.029 0.030 0.021 0.030 0.013 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.649) (0.000) (0.000) (0.215) (0.000) (0.000) (0.152) (0.000) (0.000) (0.479) 
Value of Trans. 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP (Target) 
0.002 0.000 0.006 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.004 
(0.124) (0.923) (0.158) (0.198) (0.652) (0.639) (0.123) (0.977) (0.879) (0.122) (0.817) (0.329) 
DAF 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
         
(0.009) (0.035) (0.040) 
         
DCI    
0.000 0.000 0.003 
      
   
(0.790) (0.697) (0.074) 
      
CBF        
0.003 0.003 -0.003 
   
      
(0.099) (0.130) (0.458) 
   
CBCI           
0.005 0.002 0.005 
         
(0.006) (0.279) (0.182) 
Cash-Only 
-0.005 -0.004 0.004 -0.005 -0.003 0.004 -0.005 -0.004 0.004 -0.005 -0.004 0.004 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.074) (0.000) (0.008) (0.064) (0.000) (0.005) (0.061) (0.000) (0.007) (0.070) 
Public 
-0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exp. 5-Y 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
STC×PUB 
-0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STC×PRV 
0.014 0.015 0.005 0.014 0.015 0.005 0.014 0.015 0.006 0.014 0.016 0.006 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.136) (0.000) (0.000) (0.136) (0.000) (0.000) (0.112) (0.000) (0.000) (0.093) 
M/B Ratio 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.075) (0.057) (0.014) (0.075) (0.063) (0.012) (0.068) (0.049) (0.033) (0.077) (0.057) (0.029) 
Bidder Size 
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.085) (0.893) (0.000) (0.080) (0.900) (0.000) (0.082) (0.905) (0.000) (0.091) (0.895) (0.000) 
Country Dumm. Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Industry Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






5.6. Conclusion  
This chapter has considered the impact of M&As on acquirers‘ returns using evidence based 
on the event study and CAR regressions methods in order to test four main hypotheses 
relating to target status, method of payment, diversification, and acquirer bidding experience. 
In testing these hypotheses, both parametric and non-parametric tests have been employed on 
a global sample of 46,758 M&As deals that occurred during the period 1977-2012, with 
robustness analyses carried out on sub-samples of data to assess the consistency of results. 
In line with the hypotheses investigated, the empirical results have consistently shown that: 
 Acquiring company shareholder returns are negatively correlated to acquisitions of public 
target firms but positively related to acquisitions of non-public target firms, which include 
private and subsidiary targets.  
 Cash payments for acquisitions confer a negative impact on acquirer returns while stock 
payments have a positive impact. This effect is not robust across all samples and does not 
specifically hold for U.S. acquirers. However, cash payments for acquisitions serve to 
reduce the negative impact of acquiring public targets while stock payments enhance the 
positive impact of acquiring non-public targets in all cases.  
 Diversification benefits acquiring company shareholder wealth in that deals involving 
both cross-industry (activity) and cross-border acquisitions are associated with improved 
acquirer returns. On the other hand, domestic and focussed deals appear to destroy 
shareholder value.  
 Acquirer bidding experience has a robustly negative impact on shareholder wealth in that 
frequent acquisition (or bidding) contributes to the destruction of shareholder wealth 
more than single acquisitions, which is consistent with the hubris hypothesis.  
 
The next chapter investigates the impact of the above factors on acquirers‘ market risk and 
the probability of deal failure.  
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 Further Empirical Analysis: Acquirers’ Market Risk and the Probability of Chapter 6:
Deal Failure 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter extends the empirical analysis to evaluate the impact of M&As on acquirers‘ 
market risk and, additionally, on the probability of deal failure after announcement. In both 
cases, the analysis focusses on testing the four main hypotheses relating to (i) target status, 
(ii) method of payment, (iii) diversification, and (iv) acquirer bidding experience. However, 
differences in methodological approaches and the need to account for prior empirical work 
require that additional considerations be introduced in each part of the analysis in order to 
assess the importance and consistency of the results. 
The first part of this chapter (Section 6.2) evaluates the influence of M&A factors on 
acquirers‘ market risk, which is estimated by the change in the systematic risk (beta) 
component of an acquirer‘s total (portfolio) risk. In testing the aforementioned hypotheses, 
the empirical strategy, as outlined in Chapter 4, will focus initially on univariate analyses 
highlighting the results of both parametric (independent samples t-tests) and nonparametric 
(Mann-Whitney U tests) tests. This is followed by a multivariable analysis highlighting the 
results of risk regressions which assess the relative importance of various factors that can 
influence the change in acquirers‘ risk at the time of deal announcement.  
The second part of this chapter (Section 6.3) investigates whether the probability of deal 
failure is influenced by the range of factors that affect acquirers‘ characteristics as well as by 
the relevant deal categories that relate to the aforementioned four hypotheses. Here, the 
analysis follows a similar methodological approach using univariate analysis (Pearson‘s chi-
square tests for categorical variables) followed by probit/logit regressions to identify the 
specific factors which can influence the probability of deal failure.  
6.2. Acquirers’ Market Risk 
To analyse the impact of M&As on acquirers‘ market risk (and cost of capital), this section 
follows the approach of Amihud, Delong, and Saunders (2002), Focarelli, Pozzolo, and 
Salleo (2008), and Casu et al. (2015), among others, to measure acquirers‘ systematic risk as 
defined by the market risk (beta) of assets. As explained in Chapter 4, a two-step approach to 
testing the relevant hypotheses is followed. In the first step, an estimate of an acquirer‘s 
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market risk is obtained using the CAPM model. The use of CAPM is necessary in order to 
obtain an estimate of the change in acquirers‘ market risk (beta), which reflects its systematic 
volatility, brought about by the deal announcement. The second step involves conducting 
both univariate and multivariate analyses in order to test the main hypotheses relating to the 
impact of method of payment, target status, diversification, and acquirer bidding experience 
on acquirers‘ market risk.  
As illustrated in Chapter 4, systematic or market risk, as represented by beta, is the 
covariance between an acquirer‘s return on asset i and the market (index) return divided by 
the variance in the market return:  
       
       
  
        (6.1) 
To calculate the above measure of beta, daily data on acquirer share price and the home 
market index were obtained for 260 working days before and after the announcement of each 
M&A deal in the sample. Daily market returns were calculated using the benchmark local 
price index (available in Datastream, code LI). Using these daily returns, an average beta 
value before and after the announcement date of the deal was then calculated based on the 
formula above (using a MATLAB program) 
A measure of the change in market risk (∆Beta) is thus the difference between an acquirer‘s 
average beta in the post- and pre-merger periods (i.e. ∆Beta = beta after deal – beta before 
deal). Pre-merger beta was calculated for the period –260 to –20 days before the 
announcement date, and post-merger beta was calculated for the period +20 to +260 days 
after the announcement date. These windows allow the change in acquirers‘ market risk to be 
captured for the period surrounding an M&A deal. The change in beta before and after the 
event represents an estimate of the systematic volatility brought about by deal announcements 
on the share prices of acquirers‘ stock, and therefore on their cost of capital (Focarelli, 
Pozzolo, and Salleo 2008, Evripidou 2012). 
The period of study for this analysis is 1977-2012, which allows for a sample of 34,221 
completed deals covering 180 countries and 88 industries. For the analysis of market risk, 
only completed deals are considered in order to avoid distortions caused by deals that were 
terminated in the post-event period over which the change in beta is calculated. For example, 
according to the sample, 3,064 deals were terminated during the 364 days after the 
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announcement date, and therefore it is not appropriate to include such deals in the evaluation 
of acquirers‘ market risk. 
6.2.1. Univariate Analysis 
The main hypothesis tested here is that there is no significant difference in acquirers‘ market 
risk before and after the announcement of an M&A deal. This requires testing the statistical 
significance of the change in acquirers‘ market risk (∆Beta) for the overall sample of 
completed deals. However, the analysis in this section is extended to test acquirers‘ market 
risk for the relevant categories of deals, distinguishing between (i) cash and stock payments, 
(ii) public and non-public targets, (iii) focussed vs. diversified deals, and (iv) single vs. 
multiple acquirers. In principle, these are similar to the four main sub-hypotheses investigated 
in the case of acquirers‘ returns, but here the analysis requires that a distinction be drawn 
between the pre- and post-event market risk of the acquirer in addition to the criteria that 
distinguish the relevant sub-samples. More precisely, apart from testing the statistical 
significance of the change in acquirers‘ beta for each category pertaining to the four criteria 
above, the analysis requires that the mean differences in the change in beta be tested in 
accordance with the following hypotheses: 
 There are no significant differences in the change in acquirers‘ market risk between M&A 
deals based on the use of cash and stock payments. 
 There are no significant differences in the change in acquirers‘ market risk between M&A 
deals based on the involvement of public and non-public (private and subsidiary) targets. 
 There are no significant differences in the change in acquirers‘ market risk between 
focussed and diversified deals.  
 There are no significant differences in the change in acquirers‘ market risk between single 
and multiple acquirers. 
Table 6.1 below presents the main results on acquirers‘ beta statistics for the entire sample of 
34,221 completed deals as well as for the relevant sub-samples identified in accordance with 
the need to test the above sub-hypotheses. As before, both parametric (independent samples t-
test) and non-parametric (Mann-Whitney U test) tests are employed to test for mean 
differences in ∆Beta between the relevant categories, while the statistical significance of the 
change in average beta pre- and post-deals is determined using a simple t-test. Only the main 
results for the sub-categories of the sample are presented in the table. However, more detailed 
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test results were also performed for further evaluation of the above hypotheses, and these are 
presented in the Appendix to this chapter. 
Table ‎6.1: Acquirers’ Market Risk. 
‗Beta before deal‘ and ‗Beta after deal‘ refer to acquirers‘ pre-merger and post-merger market risk, respectively, 
calculated for the periods –260 to –20 before and +20 to +260 after announcement day, using a standard CAPM 
model. ∆Beta = Beta after deal – Beta before deal. Beta is the covariance between an acquirer‘s returns and the 
benchmark local price index returns (DataStream Code: LI) divided by the variance in the benchmark local price 
index returns. The relevant sub-categories are determined using the dummy variables including: (1) ‗public‘ as a 
dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deal involves a public target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (2) ‗private‘ as a dummy variable 
equal to ‗1‘ if the deal involves a private target, ‗0‘ otherwise, and (3) ‗subsidiary‘ as a dummy variable equal to 
‗1‘ if the deals involves a subsidiary target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (4) a cash-only dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the 
acquirer used cash-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (5) a stock-only dummy variable equal to 
‗1‘ if the acquirer used stock-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (6) domestic and focused deals 
(DAF), (7) domestic and cross-industry deals (DCI), (8) cross-border and focused deals (CBF), and (9) cross-
border and cross-industry deals (CBCI), (10) Dum. Exp. 3-Y: a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the same bidder 
has two or more completed deals over the three preceding years, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (11) Dum. Exp. 5-Y: a 
dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the same bidder has two or more completed deals over the five preceding years 
(a frequent bidder), and ‗0‘ otherwise.  The univariate tests of mean differences in ∆Beta test the null hypothesis 
that the deals belong to that category (e.g. Public) or not. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
One-Sample Statistics 
    N Mean Median Std. Dev. Std. Error Sig. 
Beta before deal 34221 0.730 0.691 0.595 0.0032 0.000*** 
Beta after deal 34221 0.751 0.715 0.596 0.0032 0.000*** 
∆ Beta 34221 0.021 0.015 0.56 0.003 0.000*** 
Subsample Statistics 
for deals with 
        Independent Samples t-Test Mann-Whitney U-test 
  N ∆ Beta Mean Diff. p-value Mean Rank Z p-value 
Public  10869 0.0179*** -0.005 0.406 17098 -0.169 0.865 
Private  16145 0.0218*** 0.001 0.872 17124 -0.169 0.865 
Subsidiary  7207 0.0252*** 0.005 0.478 17102 -0.092 0.927 
Cash-Only  10167 0.0092** -0.0173 .003*** 16843 -3.267 .001*** 
Stock-Only  8594 0.0329*** 0.0155 .049** 17274 -1.765 .078* 
DAF  13791 0.0281*** 0.0113 .063* 17220 -1.671 .095* 
DCI  12208 0.0152*** -0.0095 0.134 17039 -0.999 0.318 
CBF  4669 0.016** -0.0061 0.485 17004 -0.798 0.425 
CBCI  3553 0.023*** 0.0019 0.847 17076 -0.22 0.825 
Dum Exp. 3-Y  16382 0.0297*** 0.008 .0161** 17324 -3.829 .000*** 
Dum Exp. 5-Y  19181 0.0301*** 0.001 .0200** 17327 -4.573 .000*** 
 
The overall results indicate that acquirers‘ market risk increases after M&As for the overall 
sample as well as for all the sub-categories considered. For the overall sample, the average 
‗Beta before deal‘ is 0.730, and the average ‗Beta after deal‘ is 0.751. Thus, the increase in 
beta is 0.021, which is statistically significant. This result is consistent with other empirical 
studies. For example, Amihud, Delong, and Saunders (2002) and Focarelli, Pozzolo, and 
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Salleo (2008) report slight increases in average betas of 0.0234 and 0.023 respectively. In the 
above results, as in Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Salleo (2008), ∆Beta is statistically significant, 
suggesting that acquirers‘ cost of capital increases after M&As. Furthermore, the results 
confirm that acquirers‘ market risk increases with deal announcements irrespective of the 
nature of the deal, given that all categories of deals have a positive and statistically significant 
∆Beta. However, the mean differences in ∆Beta within each category are not always 
statistically significant. More specifically, in line with the above hypotheses, the findings 
indicate that: 
 Cash payment deals incur lower risk for acquirers than stock payment deals, and the mean 
differences between cash vs. non-cash and stock vs. non-stock deals are statistically 
significant. Thus, method of payment affects acquirers‘ market risk. 
 Deals with non-public (i.e. private and subsidiary) targets incur higher market risk for 
acquirers than deals with public targets, although the mean differences between public vs. 
non-public targets are not statistically significant. 
 Focussed deals yield slightly higher market risk for acquirers than diversified deals, 
although the mean differences are not statistically significant (except in the case of 
focussed vs. non-focussed deals, which are significant at the 10% level).  
 Acquirers‘ market risk increases with multiple prior M&As, and the mean difference in 
risk between multiple acquirers and single acquirers is statistically significant. 
An explanation for the increase in post-merger market risk is that an acquirer‘s beta may be 
lower than the beta of the target, so that during the takeover process, there is likely to be an 
increase in the acquirer‘s beta in light of the expectation that the beta value of the combined 
entity will reflect the betas of both the acquirer and the target. This is a basic theoretical 
argument drawn from a portfolio investment viewpoint, and such an increase is more likely in 
the case of greater information asymmetry between managers and investors. Furthermore, as 
noted in Chapter 2, there are specific market risks associated with M&As, particularly in the 
case of cross-border or cross-industry expansion, which may offset any risk reduction 
associated with diversification. For instance, increased risk could be associated with greater 
monitoring costs in diversified deals if the target firm‘s customer base is high. 
The above findings on domestic and focussed deals contrast with those of some prior studies 
investigating vertical vs. horizontal mergers. Chatterjee et al. (1992) observe that for mergers 
which are related, greater synergy may be generated, since it is assumed that there is a market 
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expectation that if the merger is related, then the streams of cash flow will be significantly 
influenced, which will further impact the beta values of both firms. There is, however, 
conflicting evidence regarding the impact of activity and geographic diversification on 
acquirers‘ market risk, as reviewed in Chapter 3. Amihud, Delong, and Saunders (2002) 
found that, on average, there is neither an increase nor a decrease in acquirer systematic risk 
via cross-border takeovers in banking.  
With regard to the impact of acquirer bidding experience, the results support the hubris 
hypothesis, which is consistent with the results obtained for acquirers‘ returns in that higher 
market risk for multiple acquirers could be associated with lower acquirer returns. However, 
M&As are shown to increase market risk for both single and multiple acquirers.  
6.2.2. Acquirers’ Market Risk According to Pre-Beta  
The above analysis does not explicitly take into account the impact of M&As on acquirers‘ 
market risk while controlling for their ex-ante risk. Based on insights drawn from studies 
which control for acquirers‘ ‗pre-beta‘ values in risk regressions (e.g. Focarelli, Pozzolo, and 
Salleo, 2008), this section attempts to re-analyse the results by examining whether M&As 
reduce the market risk of acquirers with high ex-ante market risk, and correspondingly 
increase the risk of acquirers with lower ex-ante market risk (relative to the beta of the home 
market portfolio). Specifically, the main hypothesis relating to the overall impact of M&As 
can be broken down into the following sub-hypotheses: 
 M&As increase acquirers‘ market risk if their ex-ante market risk is lower than the 
risk of the market portfolio (i.e. beta before deal <1). 
 M&As decrease acquirers‘ market risk if their ex-ante market risk is higher than the 
risk of the market portfolio (i.e. beta before deal >1). 
The above propositions can be tested by splitting the overall sample of M&A deals into two 
groups according to whether acquirers‘ ‗pre-beta‘ values (i.e. beta before the deal) are less 
than or greater than the beta of the market portfolio. Table 6.2 below presents the results for 
acquirers‘ beta statistics for the two sub-samples, comprising 24,058 successful deals with 
acquirers‘ pre-beta <1 and 10,163 successful deals with pre-beta >1. The table also shows the 
statistics for the relevant sub-categories, as in Table 6.1, but in this case, it is not essential to 
test for mean differences. 
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Table ‎6.2: Acquirers’ Market Risk According to Pre-Beta Values. 
The sample of deals is divided according to whether acquirers‘ ex-ante beta values are less than or greater than 1. 
The relevant sub-categories are determined using the dummy variables including: (1) ‗public‘ as a dummy 
variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deal involves a public target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (2) ‗private‘ as a dummy variable equal to 
‗1‘ if the deal involves a private target, ‗0‘ otherwise, and (3) ‗subsidiary‘ as a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the 
deals involves a subsidiary target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (4) a cash-only dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the acquirer used 
cash-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (5) a stock-only dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the 
acquirer used stock-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (6) domestic and focused deals (DAF), (7) 
domestic and cross-industry deals (DCI), (8) cross-border and focused deals (CBF), and (9) cross-border and 
cross-industry deals (CBCI), (10) Dum. Exp. 3-Y: a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the same bidder has two or 
more completed deals over the three preceding years, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (11) Dum. Exp. 5-Y: a dummy variable 
equal to ‗1‘ if the same bidder has two or more completed deals over the five preceding years (a frequent bidder), 
and ‗0‘ otherwise.  The univariate tests of mean differences in ∆Beta test the null hypothesis that the deals belong 
to that category (e.g. Public) or not. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the levels of 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively. 
    N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean p-value 
Pre-
Beta<1 
Beta before deal. 
24058 
.4421 .3861 .0025 .000*** 
Beta after deal. .5664 .4948 .0032 .000*** 
∆ Beta .1243 .4930 .0032 .000*** 
Pre-
Beta>1 
Beta Before deal. 
10163 
1.4106 .4251 .0042 .000*** 
Beta After deal. 1.1882 .5858 .0058 .000*** 
∆ Beta -.2224 .6283 .0062 .000*** 
  Pre-Beta<1 Pre-Beta>1 










All Sample .1243*** .0721 .4930 .0032 -.2224*** -.1707 .6283 .0062 
Public .1133*** .0728 .4038 .0047 -.1802*** -.1524 .5293 .0089 
Private .1317*** .0720 .5504 .0051 -.2731*** -.2121 .7255 .0110 
Sub. .1229*** .0718 .4680 .0066 -.1899*** -.1430 .5564 .0117 
Cash-Only .0926*** .0569 .3830 .0046 -.1792*** -.1482 .4435 .0079 
Stock-Only .1669*** .0992 .5874 .0077 -.2482*** -.2143 .7149 .0136 
Dum Exp. 5-Y .1317*** .0828 .4487 .0039 -.1831*** -.1551 .5905 .0075 
Dum Exp. 3-Y .1295*** .0814 .4454 .0042 -.1763*** -.1520 .5926 .0081 
DAF  .1287*** .0741 .4792 .0048 -.2199*** -.1773 .5905 .0094 
DCI  .1238*** .0738 .5267 .0057 -.2488*** -.1820 .7022 .0118 
CBF  .1203*** .0695 .4420 .0079 -.1979*** -.1525 .5659 .0145 
CBCI  .1131*** .0649 .4864 .0098 -.1798*** -.1295 .5852 .0177 
Interestingly, the results show that, in the overall sample, ∆Beta is positive (0.1243) for 
acquirers with pre-beta <1 and negative (–0.2224) for acquirers with pre-beta >1. This result 
suggests that M&As increased acquirers‘ market risk in cases involving relatively low ex-
ante market risk (in relation to the beta of the market portfolio) and reduced their risk in cases 
involving relatively high ex-ante market risk. These results are similar for all sub-categories 
of the sample, implying that the above finding holds irrespective of the nature of a deal.  
There may be several reasons why acquirers benefit from risk-reduction through M&As if 
their ex-ante risk is high compared to that of the home index. Diversification and synergy 
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motives are obvious examples of risk reduction where efficiency gains are possible. 
However, this logic does not explain the opposite effect, i.e. where acquirers with lower 
systematic risk have their risk increased after M&As. In general, the findings indicate that 
low-risk acquirers increase their systematic risk by engaging in M&As while high-risk 
acquirers reduce their systematic risk by doing so. 
This section has provided a new perspective regarding the impact of M&As on acquirers‘ 
market risk in that no previous study has examined this impact by taking into account 
companies‘ pre-existing market risk. However, it should be borne in mind that the above 
results are considered in relation to the relevant categories of the dichotomous independent 
variables (i.e. cash or stock payment deals, target status, diversification, and prior acquisition 
experience) as well as for the overall sample and does not account for the influence of other 
conditioning factors which might affect acquirers‘ risk. Regression-based studies have 
confirmed that the impact of acquirers‘ pre-beta on market risk is generally negative, which 
in a sense confirms the above finding.  
6.2.3. Risk Regressions  
The purpose of this section is to supplement the above findings using cross-sectional risk 
regressions with heteroskedasticity-corrected estimates in order to allow for further 
investigation of the aforementioned hypotheses through the addition of relevant conditioning 
variables to assess the impact of M&As on change in acquirers‘ market risk (as measured by 
∆Beta). Consistent with the analysis of acquirers‘ shareholder returns, the regressions below 
attempt to account for the impact of the following specific factors: 
1. Target Status  
2. Method of payment  
3. Activity and geographical diversification 
4. Acquirer bidding experience 
Given the consistency of the results obtained in the case of CAR regressions, it is convenient 
to include all these factors together in the risk regressions rather than assess them 
individually. Following previous studies, several control variables are also included in the 
risk regressions to account for firm- and country-level heterogeneity. In all regressions, the 
minimum set of control variables includes acquirers‘ pre-beta (to control for their prior risk), 
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target size (proxied by deal value), bidder size (proxied by acquirers‘ market capitalisation), 
and the GDP per capita of both bidder and target countries. Additionally, in some regressions, 
acquirers‘ market-to-book ratio, interaction effects, and proxies are included to control for 
legal origin and institutional quality in bidder and target countries, noting that the inclusion of 





Table ‎6.3: Acquirers’ Market Risk Regressions. 
The dependent variable is the change in acquirers‘ market risk (∆Beta). The independent variables are: (1) logarithm of 
transaction values, (2) logarithm of the GDP per capita of the target country, (3) domestic and focused deals (DAF), (4) 
domestic and cross-industry deals (DCI), (5) cross-border and focused deals (CBF), and (6) cross-border and cross-industry 
deals (CBCI), (7) a cash-only dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the acquirer used cash-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ 
otherwise, (8) a stock-only dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the acquirer used stock-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ 
otherwise, (9) ‗public‘ as a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deal involves a public target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (10) ‗private‘ as 
a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deal involves a private target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (11) Exp. 3-Y: the cumulative number of 
completed takeovers by the same acquirer during the preceding three years, (12) legal and institutional quality in target 
countries, (13) STC×PUB is an interaction variable equal to ‗1‘ for public targets paid for with stock-only, (14) CSH×PUB 
equal to ‗1‘ for public targets paid for with cash-only, (15) market-to-book ratio for acquiring firms on announcement day 
(M/B Ratio), (16) legal origin (represented by a common law dummy) for target countries,  (17) acquirers‘ pre-beta (beta 
before deal), measured over the period –260 to –20 before announcement day), (18) bidder size, measured by the logarithm 
of acquirers‘ market capitalisation four weeks prior to announcement day.  Models 1-9 are estimated using the entire 
sample (33,488 deals), while Models 10-11 are estimated for U.S. acquirers and non-U.S. acquirers respectively. 
Heteroskedasticity-corrected estimates are reported with p-values shown in parentheses. All estimations include year and 
industry effects, as well as country effects where possible (subject to avoidance of multicollinearity). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
No. obs 33488 33488 33488 33488 33488 33488 33488 33488 25468 10225 15243 
R2 0.170 0.172 0.173 0.174 0.174 0.174 0.174 0.175 0.181 0.228 0.258 
Adjusted R2 0.169 0.172 0.173 0.173 0.174 0.174 0.174 0.174 0.180 0.227 0.257 
F-test 854.34 867.53 701.58 703.88 544.14 543.88 544.29 544.93 281.04 158.73 265.14 
P-value(F) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 
0.227 0.232 0.222 0.229 0.224 0.222 0.227 0.224 0.228 0.014 0.316 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.923) (0.000) 
Value of Trans. 
0.009 0.008 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 -0.008 0.011 
(0.007) (0.013) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.280) (0.012) 
GDP (Target) 
-0.007 -0.012 -0.010 -0.013 -0.010 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.006 0.040 -0.025 
(0.194) (0.030) (0.096) (0.022) (0.077) (0.043) (0.047) (0.053) (0.335) (0.194) (0.000) 
DAF     
-0.007 
      
    
(0.140) 
      
DCI      
0.010 
  
0.011 0.006 0.016 
     
(0.028) 
  
(0.063) (0.540) (0.028) 
CBF        
-0.001 
 
0.003 0.074 -0.006 
      
(0.885) 
 
(0.706) (0.001) (0.532) 
CBCI         
-0.007 0.005 0.049 0.008 
       




-0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.014 -0.014 -0.012 
(0.000) 
 
(0.064) (0.058) (0.069) (0.074) (0.087) (0.089) (0.054) (0.328) (0.126) 
Stock-Only  
0.043 0.041 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.052 0.037 0.031 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.013) 
Public   
-0.024 
 




(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.087) (0.021) 
Private    
0.017 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.031 -0.011 
   
(0.000) (0.208) (0.222) (0.234) (0.236) (0.187) (0.045) (0.131) 
Exp. 3-Y     
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.009 
    
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Legal Ins Quality 
(Target) 
        
-0.003 -0.006 -0.005 
        
(0.381) (0.443) (0.269) 
STC×PUB         
-0.007 0.009 0.018 
        
(0.630) (0.676) (0.325) 
CSH×PUB         
0.007 -0.014 0.020 
        
(0.540) (0.508) (0.167) 
M/B Ratio         
0.000 0.002 0.000 
        
(0.290) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common Law (Target)         
0.023 0.043 -0.003 
        
(0.000) (0.081) (0.692) 
Pre-Beta 
-0.395 -0.399 -0.400 -0.399 -0.400 -0.401 -0.400 -0.401 -0.397 -0.438 -0.371 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bidder Size 
0.067 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.067 0.068 0.067 0.068 0.061 0.084 0.052 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Country Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Industry Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6.3 presents the results of 11 models aiming to analyse the impact of the above M&A 
factors on acquirers‘ market risk. The first eight models are estimated using the entire sample 
of completed deals (reduced to 33,474 deals owing to the need to include additional control 
variables) by selectively including the relevant explanatory variables associated with method 
of payment, target status, diversification, and acquirer bidding experience. Model 9 includes 
all the variables where possible, and Models 10-11 are estimated for deals involving only 
U.S. and non-U.S. acquirers respectively. All regressions are statistically significant, as 





 is generally low, but they are consistent with most prior empirical research 
using cross-sectional market data.  
The results show that the impact of acquiring a public target on acquirers‘ market risk is 
negative and statistically significant across all models, while that of acquiring non-public 
(private or subsidiary) targets is consistently positive but not always statistically significant 
(especially when public and private dummies are included together). However, the results are 
consistent with the univariate results in that deals with non-public targets incur higher market 
risk for acquirers than deals with public targets. In fact, the regression results suggest that 
public targets reduce acquirers‘ market risk. This observation is consistent with standard 
portfolio theory, which suggests that lower risk is associated with lower returns for acquirers 
in such deals, as observed in Chapter 5. Conversely, there is greater information asymmetry 
associated with the acquisition of private or subsidiary targets (compared to that associated 
with public targets), which may increase acquirers‘ market risk but also yield higher returns.  
With regard to method of payment (cash vs. stock), the results confirm a negative effect of 
cash payment deals but a positive effect of stock payment deals, both being statistically 
significant. Hence, cash payment deals incur lower risk for acquirers while stock payment 
deals increase their risk. Again, this result is consistent with standard portfolio theory as 
higher returns were observed for acquirers engaging in stock deals than for those engaging in 
cash deals in the overall sample. However, as observed in Chapter 5, lower acquirer returns 
were associated with the acquisition of public targets in stock payment deals due to the 
market‘s perception of overvaluation as a result of asymmetric information. It is therefore 
interesting to consider whether this may have the effect of reducing acquirers‘ risk. Hence, 
the interaction terms STC×PUB and CHS×PUB are added in Model 9, and the results seem to 
confirm a negative effect of STC×PUB, although it is not statistically significant. 
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Considering the impact of diversification, all the results are statistically insignificant at the 
1% level (Columns 5-11) except for the sample of U.S. acquirers, for whom cross-border 
deals appear to slightly increase risk. On the whole, diversification has little or no impact on 
acquirers‘ risk, a result which stands in contrast to the standard international diversification 
theory (which suggests that diversification or integration of markets may reduce systematic 
risk). However, as observed in Chapter 2, there can be several factors which may also 
increase risk with international diversification, and the association between the two is thus 
not clear cut. The univariate results showed that focussed deals yielded slightly higher market 
risk for acquirers than diversified deals, although the mean differences were not statistically 
significant. Controlling for other factors in the risk regressions, the results confirm no 
significant impact of diversification on acquirers‘ risk. 
In contrast, acquirers‘ prior experience has a positive and statistically significant impact on 
acquirers‘ market risk. As observed in the univariate results, acquirers‘ market risk is higher 
for multiple than for single bidders. Lower shareholder returns were also associated with 
multiple acquirers, as observed in Chapter 5. These results, therefore, cannot be easily 
explained by standard portfolio theory, which assumes rational decision-making. However, 
the results seem consistent with the explanations offered by hubris theory, which suggests 
that multiple acquirers may destroy value as well as incur higher risk for shareholders. 
As for the control variables, the results clearly show that acquirers‘ pre-beta is significantly 
and negatively associated with change in acquirers‘ market risk, and this is consistent with 
the findings of the univariate analysis. Hackberth and Morallec (2008) argue that a pre-
merger run-down on the acquirer‘s stock may occur if the acquirer‘s core asset beta values 
are lower than the target‘s core asset beta values, and the opposite is true when bidder beta 
values are significantly larger than those of the target. Hence, this market response could 
explain the change in the systematic risk factors.  
In addition, the results show a positive impact of target size (proxied by deal values) and 
acquirer size on acquirers‘ market risk. An acquirer‘s size may also reflect the systematic risk 
of the firm, since it captures a firm‘s leverage capacity. The results also show a significant 
negative impact of target country GDP and an insignificant impact of acquirer country GDP. 
This is consistent with standard diversification theory, since GDP can be considered a proxy 
for economic development, suggesting that bidders aiming for larger targets may benefit 
more from geographical diversification, which is also reflected in the significant negative 
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impact on the beta values of acquirers. The results also confirm that a strong legal and 
institutional environment in the bidder country also reduces acquirers‘ risk. 
6.2.4. Robustness Check 
As a robustness check, the estimations in Table 6.4 below report the results by splitting the 
global sample of M&A deals into two groups according to whether acquirers‘ ‗pre-beta‘ 
values (i.e. beta before deal) are less than or greater than the beta of market portfolio, as with 
the univariate analysis above. This sample-split reveals a higher proportion of acquirers with 
pre-beta <1 in the entire sample of completed deals. In this set of results, the diversification 
variables are excluded as they are largely insignificant. The main results hold, in particular 
the negative impact of cash payment and public target deals, and the positive impact of deals 
involving stock payment, private targets, and multiple acquirers. Additionally, acquirers‘ pre-
beta has a negative impact on risk in both samples, which is consistent with that found in the 
univariate results, and this confirms that acquirers‘ ex-ante market risk has a negative 




Table ‎6.4: Risk Regressions According to Acquirers’ Pre-Beta Values. 
The dependent variable is the change in acquirers‘ market risk (∆Beta). The independent variables are: (1) logarithm of 
transaction values, (2) logarithm of the GDP per capita of the target country, (3) a cash-only dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the 
acquirer used cash-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (4) a stock-only dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the 
acquirer used stock-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (5) ‗public‘ as a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deal 
involves a public target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (6) ‗private‘ as a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deal involves a private target, ‗0‘ 
otherwise, (7) Exp. 3-Y: the cumulative number of completed takeovers by the same acquirer during the preceding three years, 
(8) legal and institutional quality in target countries, (9) market-to-book ratio for acquiring firms on announcement day (M/B 
Ratio), (10) legal origin (represented by a common law dummy) for target countries,  (11) acquirers‘ pre-beta (beta before 
deal), measured over the period –260 to –20 before announcement day), (12) bidder size, measured by the logarithm of 
acquirers‘ market capitalisation four weeks prior to announcement day. The diversification variables, which are insignificant 
and have therefore been excluded from the regressions. Models 1-6 are estimated for the sample of deals with acquirers having 
pre-beta >1, and Models 7-12 are estimated for deals with acquirers having pre-beta <1. Heteroskedasticity-corrected estimates 
are reported with p-values shown in parentheses. All estimations include year and industry effects, as well as country effects 
where possible (subject to avoidance of multicollinearity). 
  Pre-Beta>1 Pre-Beta<1 
6.4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
No. obs 9870 9870 9870 9870 8649 7749 23618 23618 23618 23618 19541 17719 
R2 0.132 0.133 0.133 0.135 0.128 0.131 0.083 0.083 0.084 0.084 0.082 0.085 
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.132 0.132 0.134 0.127 0.130 0.082 0.083 0.083 0.084 0.081 0.084 
F-test 187.39 189.38 168.25 140.39 97.80 78.03 265.80 267.46 239.21 197.17 134.22 109.43 
P-value(F) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 
0.223 0.228 0.231 0.223 0.252 0.256 0.233 0.232 0.234 0.229 0.201 0.214 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Value of Trans. 
0.003 0.001 0.000 0.012 0.014 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.009 
(0.661) (0.835) (0.969) (0.056) (0.032) (0.483) (0.021) (0.034) (0.041) (0.010) (0.011) (0.033) 
GDP (Target) 
-0.007 -0.011 -0.011 -0.009 -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 0.000 0.002 




-0.005 -0.001 -0.007 0.002 -0.022 
 
-0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 
(0.059) 
 
(0.592) (0.886) (0.474) (0.853) (0.000) 
 
(0.023) (0.038) (0.034) (0.044) 
Stock-Only  
0.043 0.040 0.044 0.042 0.056 
 
0.035 0.030 0.031 0.029 0.037 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public    
-0.032 -0.029 -0.031 
   
-0.010 -0.013 -0.019 
   
(0.009) (0.019) (0.023) 
   
(0.188) (0.090) (0.027) 
Private    
0.021 0.021 0.013 
   
0.002 0.006 0.006 
   
(0.074) (0.085) (0.313) 
   
(0.827) (0.393) (0.482) 
Exp. 3-Y     
0.000 0.001 
    
0.005 0.006 
    
(0.993) (0.634) 
    
(0.000) (0.000) 
Legal Ins Quality (Target)      
-0.010 
     
-0.001 
     
(0.159) 
     
(0.757) 
M/B Ratio     
0.008 0.006 
    
0.000 0.000 
    
(0.044) (0.130) 
    
(0.259) (0.466) 
Common Law (Target)      
0.040 
     
0.014 
     
(0.000) 
     
(0.043) 
Pre-Beta 
-0.454 -0.457 -0.457 -0.463 -0.447 -0.465 -0.388 -0.389 -0.389 -0.389 -0.374 -0.379 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bidder Size 
0.109 0.111 0.111 0.108 0.090 0.092 0.049 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.048 0.048 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Country Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





6.3. Estimating the Probability of Deal Failure  
As noted in Chapter 4, given the uncertainty about whether a deal, once announced, will be 
successful or not, it is useful to investigate whether there are specific deal-, firm-, or country-
specific characteristics that can influence the probability of deal failure (or success). As no 
previous study has undertaken this kind of analysis, the investigation here is exploratory and 
should be considered supplementary to the main research objectives, which focus on 
acquirers‘ shareholder wealth and risk. However, as mentioned earlier, it seems appropriate 
to examine whether the market reaction at the time of deal announcement reflects an 
expectation regarding deal completion or failure, which may itself be associated with the 
specific deal in question or other characteristics which may influence shareholder returns. 
Hence, it seems sensible to extend the analysis by investigating whether the probability of 
deal failure is influenced by acquirers‘ returns (at the time of deal announcement), their pre-
merger risk, and the relevant deal categories that distinguish between (i) cash and stock 
payments, (ii) public and non-public targets, (iii) focussed vs. diversified deals, and (iv) 
single vs. multiple acquirers. The analysis here follows the same methodological approach as 
above, using univariate analysis as well as regressions to identify specific factors which may 
influence the probability of deal failure. As such, the analysis aims to investigate the 
following hypotheses: 
 There are no significant differences in the probability of deal failure between cash and 
stock-funded M&As. 
 There are no significant differences in the probability of deal failure between focussed 
and diversified deals. 
 There are no significant differences in the probability of deal failure between deals 
involving public and non-public targets. 
 There are no significant differences in the probability of deal failure between multiple 
acquirers and single acquirers. 
 Acquirers‘ shareholder returns or ex ante market risk at the time of deal announcement 





6.3.1. Univariate Analysis  
The dependent variable is dichotomous, and the appropriate test for independence from a 
statistical association when the explanatory variable is also dichotomous is Pearson‘s chi-
squared test. Hence, this test is employed to examine the independence of association 
between the two groups of successful and failed deals, as distinguished by the relevant 
dichotomous categories (i.e. cash or stock method of payment, public or private targets, 
focussed or diversified deals, and multiple or single acquirers).  
Table ‎6.5: Pearson’s Chi-Squared Test for Category Variables. 
This table presents the results of Pearson‘s chi-squared test and the phi and Cramer‘s V statistics which have been used 
to analyse the independence of association between two groups of categorical variables (hence 2x2). The first 
categorical (dependent) variable distinguishes between failed (unsuccessful) and completed (successful) deals in the 
overall sample. The second categorical variable is any one of the independent dichotomous variables listed in the table. 
These variables are  (1) ‗public‘ as a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deal involves a public target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (2) 
‗private‘ as a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deal involves a private target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (3) ‗sub.‘ as a dummy 
variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deals involves a subsidiary target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (4) a cash-only dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ 
if the acquirer used cash-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (5) a stock-only dummy variable equal to 
‗1‘ if the acquirer used stock-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (6) domestic and focused deals (DAF), 
(7) domestic and cross-industry deals (DCI), (8) cross-border and focused deals (CBF), (9) cross-border and cross-
industry deals (CBCI), (10) Dum. Exp. 3-Y: a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the same bidder has two or more 
completed deals over the three preceding years, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (11) Dum. Exp. 5-Y: a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ 
if the same bidder has two or more completed deals over the five preceding years (a frequent bidder), and ‗0‘ otherwise. 
The table lists the actual and expected counts and frequencies under each category. The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 





% within X 
(Actual) 






Failure Deal Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Public 2698 11315 3078 10935 19.3% 80.7% 22% 78% 85.65 .000*** -.043 .000*** 
Private 5413 16609 4836 17186 24.6% 75.4% 22% 78% 52.41 .000*** .033 .000*** 
Sub. 3058 7665 2355 8368 28.5% 71.5% 22% 78% 348.95 .000*** .086 .000*** 
Cash-Only 2591 10668 2912 10347 19.5% 80.5% 22% 78% 63.27 .000*** -.037 .000*** 
Stock-Only 2371 9310 2565 9116 20.3% 79.7% 22% 78% 25.16 .000*** -.023 .000*** 
DAF 3708 14762 4056 14414 20.1% 79.9% 22% 78% 63.38 .000*** -.037 .000*** 
DCI  4041 13024 3748 13317 23.7% 76.3% 22% 78% 46.28 .000*** .031 .000*** 
CBF  1297 4924 1366 4855 20.8% 79.2% 22% 78% 5.19 .023** -.011 .023** 
CBCI  1223 3779 1099 3903 24.5% 75.5% 22% 78% 20.23 .000*** .021 .000*** 
Dum Exp. 5-Y 5058 20005 5504 19559 20.2% 79.8% 22% 78% 99.96 .000*** -.046 .000*** 
Dum Exp. 3-Y 4398 17111 4724 16785 20.4% 79.6% 22% 78% 53.33 .000*** -.034 .000*** 
 
Table 6.5 shows the results of the chi-squared tests, confirming statistically significant 
differences between observed and expected frequencies when testing for the independence of 
association between the dichotomous categories of the dependent variables and the relevant 
independent variables in turn (hence, 2x2). It is important to bear in mind that the chi-squared 
test is meant to assess the significance of the association between the categories rather than 
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uncover causal relationships. Pearson‘s chi-squared test measures how well the observed 
distribution of data fits with the distribution of data that would be otherwise expected (by 
chance), as if the variables were independent. The statistical significance of Pearson‘s chi-
squared and the phi and Cramer‘s V tests determines the association between the two relevant 
categories of variables, i.e. whether the categories of explanatory variables are associated 
with the likelihood of a deal being a success or a failure. In particular, the positive values of 
the phi and Cramer‘s V tests reveal that the respective categories have a positive association 
with the likelihood of deal failure while the negative values indicate the opposite.  
The results clearly indicate the statistical significance of the association between the 2x2 
categories of independent and dependent variables, although in most cases these differences, 
as revealed by the values of the phi and Cramer‘s V tests, are small. Most notable are the 
differences in the outcomes that distinguish between target status and diversification. For 
instance, from the computed figures in Table 6.5, the overall sample reveals a lower 
percentage of failed public target deals (19.3%) while the corresponding figures for private or 
subsidiary targets are slightly higher (24.6% and 28.5% respectively). As the expected 
percentage of failed deals is 22% under the independence of association assumption, there is 
greater likelihood (relative to chance) of non-public target deals ultimately failing. In 
contrast, deals involving public targets are less likely to be terminated, and these differences 
in the outcomes between the two categories of deals are reflected in the negative and positive 
values of the phi and Cramer‘s V tests. Based on similar reasoning and according to the 
sample, there is a greater likelihood of cross-industry and cross-border deal termination but a 
relatively low chance of domestic and focussed deal failure. It remains to be seen whether 
these results are confirmed by the probit/logit regressions presented below. 
Interestingly, the results in Table 6.5 also indicate a negative association between method of 
payment (cash or stock) and unsuccessful deals. Similarly, the association between multiple 
acquirers and completed deals is also negative; indicating that acquirer bidding experience (as 




6.3.2. Probit Estimation 
As explained in the section on the methodology for probit estimation reviewed in Chapter 4, 
the dependent variable is dichotomous, characterising the probability of deal failure or 
success (coded as ‗0‘ for successful deals and ‗1‘ for unsuccessful deals). The explanatory 
variables in probit regressions include the set of categorical variables to facilitate the testing 
of the above hypotheses as well as a set of control variables characterising firm- and country-
level differences in cross-sectional data. As with the previous regressions, the minimum set 
of control variables includes transaction value (target size), GDP per capita of bidder and 
target countries, and acquirers‘ ex-ante market risk (pre-beta).
17
 Additionally, it seems 
appropriate to include a proxy for an expectation of deal completion at the time of 
announcement, represented here by acquirers‘ three-day CARs (–1,+1). Furthermore, in some 
regressions, additional controls account for acquirers‘ market-to-book ratio, bidder size, legal 
origin, and institutional quality in bidder and target countries. It should be noted, however, 
that the inclusion of these variables reduces the sample size, and it is therefore used mainly to 
assess the consistency of the results. 
Table 6.6 presents the results of 11 models estimating the impact of the above M&A factors 
on the probability of deal failure. The first eight models are estimated based on the entire 
sample of successful and unsuccessful deals (45,869 in total) and selectively including the 
explanatory factors associated with method of payment, target status, diversification, and 
acquirer bidding experience. Model 8 includes all of these factors together, Model 9 includes 
additional control factors (thus reducing the sample size), and Models 10 and 11 are 
estimated for deals involving only U.S. acquirers and only non-U.S. acquirers, respectively. 
The explanatory power of the estimated model increases as more regressions are added, as 
confirmed by the values of McFadden‘s R
2




                                                          
17
 As the sample includes both successful and unsuccessful deals, the pre-beta values have been recalculated 
over the period –110 to –10 days before the event, this being the same as that used for the calculation of 
abnormal returns in the event study.   
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Table ‎6.6: Probit Estimates for Probability of Deal Failure. 
The dependent variable is binary, representing the probability of deal failure/success (coded as ‗0‘ for successful deals and 
‗1‘ for unsuccessful deals). The independent variables are: (1) logarithm of transaction values, (2) logarithm of the GDP per 
capita of the target country, (3) domestic and focused deals (DAF), (4) cross-border and cross-industry deals (CBCI), (5) a 
cash-only dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the acquirer used cash-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (6) a 
stock-only dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the acquirer used stock-only as the method of payment, and ‗0‘ otherwise, (7) 
‗public‘ as a dummy variable equal to ‗1‘ if the deal involves a public target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (8) ‗private‘ as a dummy variable 
equal to ‗1‘ if the deal involves a private target, ‗0‘ otherwise, (9) Exp. 3-Y: the cumulative number of completed takeovers 
by the same acquirer during the preceding three years, (10) legal institutional quality in target countries, (11) legal origin 
(represented by a common law dummy) for target countries,  (12) acquirers‘ three-day CARs (–1,+1), (13) acquirers‘ pre-
beta (beta before deal), measured over the period –260 to –20 before announcement day), (14) market-to-book ratio for 
acquiring firms on announcement day (M/B Ratio), (15) bidder size, measured by the logarithm of acquirers‘ market 
capitalisation four weeks prior to announcement day. Models 1-8 are estimated using the entire sample of successful and 
unsuccessful deals (45,631 deals) while Models 9-11, respectively, are estimated using additional control variables for (i) the 
entire sample of deals, (ii) a sub-sample including deals with U.S. acquirers only, and (iii) a sub-sample of deals involving 
non-U.S. acquirers only. Estimation is by maximum likelihood with p-values shown in parentheses. All estimations include 
year and industry effects, as well as country effects where possible (subject to avoidance of multicollinearity).  
Probit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
No. obs 45631 45631 45631 45631 45631 45631 45631 39393 25938 10816 15122 
McFadden R2 0.062 0.060 0.062 0.065 0.067 0.068 0.074 0.103 0.127 0.078 0.117 
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.060 0.062 0.065 0.067 0.068 0.073 0.102 0.125 0.073 0.115 
Constant 
2.128 2.106 2.128 2.246 2.247 2.305 2.102 2.037 2.572 1.437 2.073 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Value of Trans. 
-0.048 -0.048 -0.047 -0.068 -0.067 -0.071 -0.071 -0.080 -0.025 0.048 -0.040 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP (Target) 
-0.559 -0.567 -0.556 -0.576 -0.545 -0.557 -0.559 -0.502 -0.578 -0.362 -0.483 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DAF   
-0.031 -0.046 -0.040 -0.044 -0.063 -0.053 -0.051 -0.091 -0.011 
  
(0.035) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.012) (0.010) (0.670) 
CBCI    
0.002 0.011 0.008 0.012 0.026 0.050 0.066 0.038 0.070 
  




-0.149 -0.166 -0.166 -0.168 -0.158 -0.174 -0.104 -0.031 -0.119 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.473) (0.000) 
Stock-Only  
0.055 0.005 -0.018 0.004 -0.002 -0.006 0.037 -0.072 -0.024 -0.053 
 
(0.001) (0.756) (0.295) (0.802) (0.919) (0.736) (0.047) (0.003) (0.535) (0.102) 
Public    
0.219 
 
0.103 0.082 0.218 0.180 0.441 0.038 
   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.302) 
Private     
-0.224 -0.173 -0.182 -0.098 -0.159 -0.085 -0.102 
    
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.145) (0.000) 
Exp. 3-Y      
-0.018 -0.018 -0.016 0.012 0.021 0.003 
     
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.001) (0.715) 
Legal Ins Quality (Target)        
-0.293 -0.284 -0.257 -0.283 
       
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common Law (Target)       
0.284 0.292 0.268 -0.068 0.366 
      
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.416) (0.000) 
CARs(-1,+1) 
-0.047 -0.037 -0.050 -0.011 -0.023 -0.017 -0.023 -0.043 -0.303 -0.308 -0.260 
(0.363) (0.468) (0.327) (0.835) (0.652) (0.748) (0.649) (0.439) (0.000) (0.009) (0.015) 
Pre-Beta 
-0.032 -0.034 -0.032 -0.030 -0.033 -0.029 -0.028 -0.022 0.012 -0.020 0.063 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) (0.336) (0.291) (0.000) 
M/B Ratio         
0.000 0.001 0.000 
        
(0.659) (0.662) (0.596) 
Bidder Size         
-0.091 -0.158 -0.063 
        
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Country Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Industry Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Consistent with the univariate analysis, the probit results confirm that domestic and focussed 
deals (DAF) negatively influence the likelihood of deal failure, while diversified deals, here 
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represented by cross-border and cross-industry (CBCI) deals, positively influence this 
likelihood
18
. This implies that once announced, DAF deals are less likely to fail than CBCI 
deals, which seems reasonable. However, it raises an interesting question in light of the fact 
that acquirer shareholder returns were positive for diversified deals (CBCI) and negative for 
DAF deals
19
. This could, however, be due to the greater degree of information asymmetry 
and uncertainty associated with diversified deals, which may reflect higher adverse selection 
premiums demanded by rational investors in such cases. Hence, greater positive acquirer 
returns are achieved from such deals relative to domestic and focussed transactions, which 
may also mean that the former deals are riskier and therefore that their probability of failure 
is high. Furthermore, transaction and monitoring costs are another barrier to integration into 
markets, and such barriers may impact the probability of success, even though greater 
synergy gains may be possible through diversification.  
The results also indicate that using cash as payment reduces the likelihood of deal failure, 
while using stock as payment has a mixed or insignificant impact. This observation may be 
due to information asymmetry surrounding bidder/target valuations. Standard theory suggests 
that cash payment deals are more favourable for targets as a way of distinguishing high-value 
bidders from low-value bidders. Thus, as Branch and Yang (2003) argue, cash deals are more 
likely to be accepted by targets than stock payment deals. However, it should be noted that 
for U.S. acquirers, neither of these factors (included together) is statistically significant. 
With regard to the impact of target status, the results show that the acquisition of public 
targets increases the probability of deal failure while that of private targets has the opposite 
effect. This stands in contrast to the findings of the univariate analysis in which the chi-
squared tests indicated a relatively high likelihood of deal completion for public targets. 
However, as noted earlier, the latter reflects the strength of association based on sample 
proportions and not causal effects. The probit results are more sensible in light of theoretical 
arguments which suggest that public target shareholders are more likely to ‗free-ride‘ on 
bidder offers while private targets, which tend to have concentrated shareholders, have better 
negotiating power to ensure deal completion. 
                                                          
18
 Other diversification variables (e.g. DCI) are not included in the regression, but the results are similar. 
  
19
 For example, the seven-day window CAR for DAF is 0.982% compared with 2.191% for CBCI (see Section 
5.3.3 for more detail) 
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The results also confirm that acquirer bidding experience affects the likelihood of deal 
completion, although the findings are mixed in that the impact is positive in some cases and 
negative in others. In general, acquirers with prior experience of bidding ought to have 
greater expertise in ensuring deal completion, although this does not automatically mean that 
they make efficient decisions.  
The results also suggest that acquiring company shareholder returns at the time of deal 
announcement have, in most cases, a negative and insignificant impact on the probability of 
deal failure, though this effect is only significant in the reduced sample with added control 
variables (i.e. the final three columns). In contrast, the significance of acquirers‘ pre-beta, 
whose effect is generally negative, disappears in the reduced sample. On the whole, it is 
difficult to assess the impact of these two factors, but the significant negative influence of 
acquirer shareholder returns (albeit in the reduced sample) appears to reflect an expectation 
of deal completion, though this effect is not generally robust.  
With regard to the influence of the control variables, the results suggest that larger target size 
(or higher deal values) increases the probability of deal completion, this effect being 
consistent with the higher synergy gains typically expected from larger deals. Similarly, 
acquirer size also negatively influences the probability of deal failure. Larger deals are likely 
to incur higher costs and require specialist resources (e.g. financial advisors) to which large 
acquirers are able to commit, and this may increase the chances of deal completion. 
Among the country-level factors, higher GDP per capita for both bidder and target countries 
decreases the probability of deal failure, as more advanced economies have larger markets for 
corporate control with greater financial development than less advanced economies. 
Furthermore, stronger legal and institutional quality in both bidder and target countries has a 
negative and significant impact on deal failure due to the existence of better provisions for 
property rights protection. On the other hand, the stronger investor (creditor and shareholder) 
protection associated with common law countries increases the likelihood of deal failure. 
Anderson, Marshall and Wales (2009) argue that strong investor protection in a target country 
affords higher bargaining power to targets, and Hagendorff, Collins and Keasey (2008) argue 
that investors in relatively unprotected environments may require compensation for these 
lower governance standards and face a higher risk of expropriation by insiders. These 
considerations are more likely to adversely affect the chances of deal completion and may be 
one of the reasons for a similarly positive effect of diversified deals.  
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6.3.3. Logit Estimation 
As a consistency check, Table 6.7 below reports the results of the logit estimations carried 
out using the same set of independent variables, and the results, as expected, are very similar. 
The main difference between the logit and probit models, as noted in Chapter 4, lies in the 
transformation of the categorical dependent variable. According to Long and Freese (2006), 
logit and probit models generally have similar outcomes. 
Table ‎6.7: Logit Estimates for Probability of Deal Failure. 
Logit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
No. obs 45631 45631 45631 45631 45631 45631 45631 39393 25938 10816 15122 
McFadden R2 0.063 0.061 0.063 0.066 0.067 0.068 0.074 0.103 0.126 0.078 0.118 
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.061 0.062 0.065 0.067 0.068 0.074 0.102 0.125 0.073 0.116 
Constant 
3.604 3.572 3.606 3.789 3.798 3.894 3.531 3.456 4.375 2.700 3.463 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Value of Trans. 
-0.092 -0.093 -0.092 -0.124 -0.124 -0.129 -0.130 -0.148 -0.053 0.093 -0.074 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP (Target) 
-0.921 -0.937 -0.918 -0.950 -0.899 -0.918 -0.920 -0.833 -0.964 -0.647 -0.799 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DAF   
-0.051 -0.075 -0.066 -0.072 -0.107 -0.094 -0.086 -0.185 -0.012 
  
(0.049) (0.004) (0.011) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.017) (0.005) (0.775) 
CBCI    
0.002 0.017 0.013 0.018 0.042 0.081 0.109 0.049 0.122 
  




-0.255 -0.281 -0.283 -0.284 -0.269 -0.296 -0.178 -0.049 -0.196 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.554) (0.000) 
Stock-Only  
0.106 0.021 -0.018 0.019 0.008 0.001 0.078 -0.118 -0.050 -0.079 
 
(0.000) (0.475) (0.539) (0.532) (0.787) (0.973) (0.018) (0.006) (0.487) (0.155) 
Public    
0.352 
 
0.155 0.118 0.352 0.300 0.844 0.042 
   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.510) 
Private     
-0.373 -0.300 -0.318 -0.176 -0.275 -0.150 -0.174 
    
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.175) (0.000) 
Exp. 3-Y      
-0.033 -0.032 -0.031 0.020 0.037 0.005 
     
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.002) (0.682) 
Legal Ins Quality (Target)        
-0.503 -0.490 -0.470 -0.478 
       
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common Law (Target)       
0.495 0.515 0.470 -0.128 0.625 
      
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.403) (0.000) 
CARs(-1,+1) 
-0.086 -0.070 -0.093 -0.030 -0.051 -0.042 -0.049 -0.081 -0.527 -0.563 -0.441 
(0.338) (0.435) (0.300) (0.739) (0.575) (0.641) (0.584) (0.395) (0.000) (0.009) (0.017) 
Pre-Beta 
-0.052 -0.056 -0.052 -0.050 -0.055 -0.048 -0.046 -0.035 0.021 -0.038 0.110 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.030) (0.308) (0.269) (0.000) 
M/B Ratio         
0.000 0.001 0.001 
        
(0.626) (0.593) (0.563) 
Bidder Size         
-0.156 -0.297 -0.108 
        
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Country Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Industry Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





6.4. Conclusion  
This chapter has analysed the impact of M&A deals on acquirers‘ market risk using evidence 
based on risk regressions in order to test the four main hypotheses relating to target status, 
method of payment, diversification, and acquirer bidding experience. Additionally, the 
chapter has investigated the influence of deal characteristics pertaining to these hypotheses as 
well as acquirers‘ risk-return attributes on the probability of deal failure using probit/logit 
estimations. The latter analysis is unique in that no previous study has explicitly investigated 
the influence of deal and acquirer characteristics on the probability of deals being terminated 
following announcement. 
Summarising the combined results of both sets of analysis, the main conclusions of this 
chapter are as follows: 
 Acquirers‘ market risk is negatively correlated to acquisitions of public target firms and 
positively correlated to acquisitions of non-public target firms, including private and 
subsidiary targets. On the other hand, there is greater likelihood that M&A deals will be 
successful with non-public targets than with public targets. 
 
 Cash payment deals reduce acquirers‘ market risk while stock payment deals increase it. 
On the other hand, cash payment deals increase the likelihood of deals ultimately being 
successful, while stock payment deals appear to have a mixed or insignificant impact on 
the probability of deal completion. 
 
 Diversification has an insignificant impact on acquirers‘ market risk. On the other hand, 
diversification turns out to be an important attribute affecting the probability of deal 
failure. In particular, domestic and focussed deals are generally more likely to be 
successful than cross-industry and cross-border deals. 
 
 Multiple acquirers tend to experience increased risk compared to single acquirers, which 
is consistent with the hubris hypothesis. On the other hand, multiple acquirers with prior 
experience of bidding influences the likelihood of deal completion, although the impact 




 Change in an acquirer‘s market risk is negatively correlated to its ex ante risk (pre-beta) 
in that M&A deals will reduce (increase) the risk of high-risk (low-risk) acquirers. 
Additionally, the influence of acquirers‘ pre-beta on the probability of deal failure is 
negative. 
 
 Acquirers‘ shareholder returns upon deal announcements influence the probability of deal 
completion, which suggests that the market reaction reflects an expectation of deal 
completion following an announcement, although this effect is not generally robust. 
 
Finally, both risk and the probability of deal failure are influenced by firm-level attributes 
such as target and bidder size as well as country-level attributes such as economic 












 Conclusion Chapter 7:
7.1. Introduction 
This thesis has investigated the impact of M&As on acquiring company shareholder returns 
and risk using a global sample of 45,758 M&A announcements covering 180 countries and 
88 industries between the years 1977 and 2012. Using event study methodology and cross-
sectional regressions, the empirical analysis has taken into account factors related to the 
method of payment, target status, diversification, and acquirer bidding experience. In 
addition, the study has analysed the impact of these factors on the probability of deal failure 
using probit and logit estimations. This chapter summarises the empirical results and 
discusses the limitations and implications of the study as well as some potential areas for 
further research. 
7.2. Summary the Empirical Findings 
Acquirers’ Shareholder Results  
In investigating the impact of M&A transactions on acquirers‘ shareholder returns, four main 
hypotheses were tested relating to target status, payment method, diversification, and acquirer 
experience using evidence based on the event study methods and CAR regressions. The 
findings revealed no significant differences in market reaction based on the consideration of 
successful versus unsuccessful deals. This indicates that the reaction of market participants is 
based solely on deal announcements, a finding which is consistent with the efficient market 
hypothesis since abnormal returns are not impacted by uncertainty regarding the eventual 
completion or termination of a deal. Hence, both completed and unsuccessful deals were 
included in the empirical analysis to avoid any sample selection bias. Additionally, 
robustness checks were performed in the univariate analysis using parametric and non-
parametric tests with different event study windows, as well as in CAR regressions using 
different samples, variables, and heteroskedasticity-corrected estimates to ensure consistent 
results.  
The results indicated that acquirers experience negative abnormal returns when acquiring 
public targets and positive abnormal returns when acquiring private or subsidiary targets, 
which means that M&As tend to be value-adding with private/subsidiary targets and value-
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destroying with public targets. This finding is consistent with previous empirical studies and 
conforms with a growing trend in recent years involving public firms taking over non-public 
ones (e.g. Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller 2002, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2004, 
Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin 2006, Jaffe et al. 2015).  
Furthermore, the results showed that using cash as the method of payment is associated with 
a negative impact on acquirer returns while stock payments are associated with a positive 
impact. However, the latter effect is not robust across all sub-samples, and does not hold for 
U.S. acquirers. The findings also revealed that the highest acquirer returns were associated 
with stock deals involving non-public targets while the lowest returns were associated with 
stock deals involving public targets. Furthermore, cash deals for the acquisition of public 
targets improved shareholder returns. Hence, acquirers benefitted from using cash to fund the 
acquisition of public targets and stock to fund the acquisition of non-public targets, and this 
finding is also consistent with previous research (e.g. Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller 2002). 
There is a long-standing debate in the literature regarding whether cross-border M&As add 
value for the shareholders of bidding firms, and the evidence has been mixed. One relevant 
argument is for the existence of a ‗home country bias‘, which means that bidding companies 
may miss out on potentially profitable opportunities due to a preference for investing within 
their home country. However, this thesis has provided robust evidence indicating that 
significant gains can be made from cross-border and cross-industry M&As. The results of the 
univariate and regression analyses indicated that domestic and focussed deals (DAF) are 
associated with a significant negative impact on acquirer returns, while diversified deals 
(DCI, CBF, CBCI) tend to be associated with a significant positive impact. This suggests that 
diversification can have a positive effect on shareholder returns, and this finding is also 
consistent with a number of previous studies (e.g. Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Salleo 2008, Raj 
and Uddin 2013, Danbolt and Maciver 2012, Selcuk and Kiymaz 2015). 
In the same context, the findings have demonstrated that diversification between developed 
and emerging countries achieved the highest returns for acquiring firms. In other words, the 
combination of acquirers in developed (developing) and targets in developing (developed) 
countries yields more significant gains for acquirers than M&As within developed or 
developing regions. Again, this finding is consistent with some previous studies (e.g. Chari, 
Ouimet, and Tesar 2010, Du and Boateng 2012). 
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Furthermore, the findings revealed a significant negative impact of acquirer bidding 
experience on shareholder returns. This finding is specific to serial acquirers and supports the 
hubris or over-optimism motive, which stands in contrast to the rational, synergy-based 
theories of mergers, which suggest that with increased experience, acquirers ought to improve 
their shareholder wealth. 
Acquirers’ Market Risk 
The empirical analysis in this study was extended to include the impact of M&A activity on 
acquiring companies‘ market risk (and cost of capital). The main hypothesis tested was that 
acquirers‘ market risk does not change significantly from before the announcement of a deal 
to after the announcement. In order to accomplish this, the statistical significance of the 
change in acquirer market risk (∆ beta) for the overall sample of completed deals was tested. 
The analysis was then extended using risk regressions to assess the impact on the change in 
acquirer market risk for each of the relevant deal categories (i.e. cash vs. stock payments, 
public vs. non-public targets, focussed vs. diversified deals, and single vs. multiple 
acquirers). These, in principle, are similar to the four hypotheses related to acquirer returns, 
but in this case, a distinction was drawn between pre- and post-event market risk in addition 
to the other criteria. 
The method for analysing the impact of M&A activity on acquirers‘ market risk was based on 
a number of previous studies (e.g. Amihud, Delong, and Saunders 2002, Focarelli, Pozzolo, 
and Salleo 2008, Casu et al. 2015). This involved a two-step process, using the CAPM model 
to obtain an estimate of an acquirer‘s market risk and then conducting both univariate and 
multivariate analyses to test the hypotheses. Only completed deals were included in this 
analysis to measure post-event changes in beta. 
For the overall sample, the results indicated that acquirers‘ market risk (and hence their cost 
of capital) tends to increase after M&A activity. This finding is consistent with previous 
studies (e.g. Amihud, Delong, and Saunders 2002, Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Salleo 2008). In 
addition, the overall sample was divided into two groups based on whether an acquirer‘s pre- 
market risk values were less or greater than the beta of the market portfolio. Here, the 
findings indicated that M&A activity was associated with increased market risk only in cases 
where acquirers‘ ex ante market risk was relatively low in relation to the rest of the market, 
and decreased market risk was associated with cases of relatively high ex-ante market risk. 
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According to the results of the cross-sectional risk regressions, the impact of acquiring a 
public target on acquiring companies‘ market risk is negative and statistically significant. The 
impact of acquiring a non-public (private or subsidiary) target, on the other hand, while not 
always statistically significant, was shown to be consistently positive. In terms of the 
payment method, the results confirmed a negative impact of cash deals and a positive effect 
of stock deals, statistically significant in both cases. The impact of diversification, however, 
was statistically insignificant, implying that acquirers‘ market risk was unaffected by cross-
border or cross-industry deals. Acquirers‘ previous experience of bidding, however, had a 
significantly positive impact on acquirer market risk. The findings also indicated that 
acquirers‘ pre-beta is negatively associated with change in market risk, implying that high 
risk acquirers were able to reduce their risk through M&As. 
Probability of Deal Failure 
The analysis was extended further using probit regressions to investigate whether the relevant 
factors which influenced acquirer returns and risk could also influence the probability of 
deals failure. Earlier, the findings of this study revealed no significant differences in market 
reaction based on whether or not a deal was ultimately successful. Hence, it was also 
appropriate to investigate whether the market‘s expectation regarding deal completion at the 
time of announcement, as captured by abnormal returns, influenced the probability of deal 
completion, which could also be associated with the specific deal characteristics affecting 
acquirer returns or risk. The results, while significant in some cases, were not robust in this 
regard.  
According to the probit results, domestic focussed deals (DAF) were negatively associated 
with the likelihood of deal failure while the effect of diversified deals was positive. This 
implies that DAF deals were more likely to succeed than cross-border and cross-industry 
deals and can be explained by the higher levels of information asymmetry and uncertainty 
generally associated with diversified deals (since rational investors demand higher premiums 
from such deals). For this reason, such deals lead to greater positive returns for acquirers 
compared to domestic focussed deals, which could also mean that diversified deals involve 
more risk, and their probably of failure is therefore high. 
The results of the probit estimations also revealed that financing a deal with cash decreased 
the likelihood of deal failure. This finding may also be due to information asymmetry 
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surrounding bidder/target valuation, since cash deals tend to be more favourable for target 
companies as a way of distinguishing high-value bidders from low-value bidders. The results 
regarding the impact of target status indicate that deals involving public targets have an 
increased probability of failure compared to deals involving private targets. These results also 
make sense in light of the theory suggesting that shareholders of public targets tend to free-
ride on offers from bidders, while private targets, which tend to have concentrated 
shareholders, have more negotiating power to aid in eventual deal completion. 
The results also confirmed that acquirer experience affects the likelihood of deal failure. 
However, the findings here were found to be mixed insofar as the impact was shown to be 
positive in some cases but negative in others. In general, experienced acquirers should have 
greater expertise in ensuring deal completion, though this may not necessarily mean that they 




Table ‎7.1: Summary of the main findings relating to the four hypotheses. 
 1) CAR 2) Market risk 
(Beta) 
3) Probability of deal 
completion 
Explanation  
(a) Method of 
payment 
Acquirers receive the highest 
returns on stock only deals 
and the lowest returns on cash 
only deals. 
More specifically, acquirers 
receive the highest returns on 
stock deals involving non-
public targets and the lowest 
returns on stock deals 
involving public targets.  
The results reveal a 
significant negative 
effect of cash 
payment deals but a 
significant positive 
effect of stock 




There is generally 
less likelihood of 
cash deal failure and 
greater likelihood of 
stock deal failure.  
Acquirers‘ gains are most significant in stock payment deals involving 
private or subsidiary targets, while stock payment deals involving 
publicly-listed targets yield lower returns. In general, cash payment for 
acquisitions serves to reduce the negative impact of acquiring public 
targets, while stock payment enhances the positive impact of acquiring 
private or subsidiary targets. 
Moreover, cash payment deals incur lower risk for acquirers while stock 
payment deals increase their risk. This result is consistent with standard 
portfolio theory as higher returns were observed for acquirers engaging 
in stock deals than for those engaging in cash deals in the overall sample. 
However, cash as payment reduces the likelihood of deal failure, while 
using stock as payment has a mixed or insignificant impact. This 
observation may be due to information asymmetry surrounding 
bidder/target valuations. Standard theory suggests that cash payment 
deals are more favourable for targets as a way of distinguishing high-
value bidders from low-value bidders, hence cash deals are more likely 
to be accepted by targets than stock payment deals. 
(b) Target status Acquirers receive the highest 
(positive) returns on deals 
involving non-public targets 
and the lowest (negative) 
returns on deals involving 
public targets. 
 
The results show 
that the impact of 
acquiring a public 
target on acquirers‘ 
market risk is 
consistently 
negative, while that 
of acquiring non-
public targets is 
consistently 
positive. 
There is generally 
greater likelihood that 
deals involving non-
public targets will be 
more successful and 
that those involving 
public targets will be 
less successful.  
 
 
M&A destroy acquiring shareholder wealth when the target is a public 
firm but improve it when the target is a private or subsidiary company. In 
the same line, deals with non-public (i.e. private and subsidiary) targets 
incur higher market risk for acquirers than deals with public targets. This 
is consistent with standard portfolio theory, which suggests that lower 
risk is associated with lower returns for acquirers in such deals. 
Moreover, there is greater information asymmetry associated with the 
acquisition of private or subsidiary targets (compared to that associated 
with public targets), which may increase acquirers‘ market risk but also 
yield higher returns. 
However, the acquisition of public targets increases the probability of 
deal failure while that of private targets has the opposite effect, which is 
consistent with the theoretical arguments which suggest that public target 
shareholders are more likely to ‗free-ride‘ on bidder offers while private 
targets, which tend to have concentrated shareholders, have better 






Domestic and focussed (DAF) 
deals consistently have a 
significant negative impact on 
acquirer returns, while 
diversified deals have a 
significant positive impact in 
most cases. These results 










There is generally 
greater likelihood that 
domestic and 
focussed deals will be 
successful and less 
likelihood that cross-
industry and cross-
border deals will be 
successful. 
In line with portfolio diversification theory, diversified deals yield 
significant announcement gains for acquirers, although in comparison 
with domestic and focussed deals, such deals carry a greater risk of 
failure. This could be due to the greater degree of information 
asymmetry and uncertainty associated with diversified deals, which may 
reflect higher adverse selection premiums demanded by rational 
investors in such cases. Diversification, however, has no significant 
impact on acquirers‘ market or systematic risk. 
(d) Acquirer 
experience 
Acquirers‘ prior bidding 
experience has a significant 




has a positive and 
statistically 
significant impact 
on their market risk. 
There is generally 
greater likelihood that 
deals involving 
experienced bidders 
will be completed 
than deals with single 
bidders. 
Acquirers‘ prior experience of bidding in M&A deals is associated with 
significantly lower shareholder returns for acquirers, and this also 
increases their risk. The results seem consistent with the explanations 
offered by hubris theory, which suggests that multiple acquirers may 
destroy value as well as incur higher risk for shareholders. In addition, 
acquirers with prior experience of bidding ought to have greater 




7.3. Research Contributions  
This thesis has contributed to the existing literature in the following ways: 
1. The first contribution is that it has provided a robust set of results based on a global 
data set. The majority of M&A research has involved small or medium-sized samples. 
This thesis presents new evidence based on a sample of 46,758 M&A deals covering 
180 countries and involving 88 industries over the period 1977-2012. This broad 
sample covering both developed and developing countries has allowed a more 
systematic cross-country investigation of the postulated hypotheses for different 
geographical regions while controlling for specific deal-, firm-, and country-level 
characteristics. 
 
2. Previous empirical studies on M&As have reported mixed findings, with conflicting 
results regarding the impact of method of payment for public vs. non-public targets 
and cross-border vs. domestic mergers. Additionally, most prior empirical studies on 
shareholder wealth have investigated evidence based on publicly-listed targets. This 
thesis provides a novel contribution from the perspective of a global sample 
distinguishing between public, private, and subsidiary targets. This has allowed for 
the generation of evidence based on cross-country differences associated with the 
characteristics of public and non-public takeovers. For example, in the case of public 
firms announcing M&A deals with private targets, the stock payment mechanism was 
commonly observed to provide a positive signal to investors which is rewarded with 
positive abnormal returns. This contrasts strongly with the negative market reaction to 
similar bids in the case of public targets. Although some earlier studies have revealed 
such anomalies, the empirical evidence presents robust findings based on a global 
sample. 
3. A limited number of empirical studies have investigated the impact of bidder 
experience on acquirers‘ shareholder wealth. The results, on one hand, are mixed, and 
on another, are inconsistent with several theoretical hypotheses (i.e. learning by 
doing, overvaluation, hubris, and merger programme announcement). This study has 
contributed to the literature by providing comprehensive empirical evidence on the 
impact of acquirer bidding experience on shareholder wealth and risk, and the results 
have confirmed that single acquirers tend to experience higher returns, while returns 
decrease for serial acquirers. On the other hand, this evidence contrasts with the view 
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that more M&A experience will lead to greater knowledge of target valuation and 
thus more profitable deals. Instead, evidence suggests that serial acquirers actually 
destroy shareholder wealth, demonstrating that M&As are not always purely 
economically motivated (i.e. maximising firm value). Indeed, such observations can 
only be explained by hubris theory or over-optimism rather than synergy gains. 
According to hubris theory, managers may believe they have economic motives for an 
acquisition, but due to excessive confidence or pride, they overvalue target firms and 
pay too high a price. In other words, an acquirer‘s ex post performance not only 
relates to returns on its investment but can also point to the true motives behind 
certain investments. 
4. There has been a limited number of studies assessing the implications of M&As on 
the systematic/market risk (beta) of acquiring firms. Although a few studies have 
analysed the impact of M&As on acquirers‘ market risk, they have focussed mostly 
on the diversification aspect and have come to mixed conclusions. This study has 
contributed to the existing literature by providing a more comprehensive analysis 
regarding the implications of diversification, drawing on the debate between focussed 
and diversified M&As. The findings suggest that diversification does not affect 
acquirers‘ market risk. However, other interesting results from this study include a 
strong and very consistent increase in acquirers‘ market risk if the ex-ante (i.e. prior to 
the acquisition) beta is lower than the market portfolio beta and exactly the opposite if 
the ex-ante beta is higher. These results confirm that other factors which have not 
been considered before in assessing the impact of M&As on acquirers‘ risk, such as 
method of payment, target status, and acquirer experience, influence acquirers‘ risk 




7.4. Limitations and Implications 
As with any empirical research, the results of this study are subject to a number of caveats or 
limitations: 
 While analysing the impact of M&As on acquirer returns, the findings are based on the 
use of the market model only, and alternative models such as CAPM were not considered. 
However, given the consistency of the event study results over different event windows, it 
is unlikely that CAPM or other models would have made much difference. 
 Owing to the limited availability of data on private and subsidiary targets, the empirical 
analysis could not consider the influence of target characteristics other than size (proxied 
by deal values) in a global sample.  
 Another limitation of this study is not using the actual ratios of stock to cash in 
combination payments instead of a simple cash/stock combination dummy variable. This 
ratio was excluded from the analysis due to data limitations, although the analysis could 
be extended to incorporate mixed payment deals (using the precise cash/stock percentages 
used in deals).  
 A further limitation of the current study is not controlling for inflation and currency 
exchange rate, as the value of merger transactions could be affected by these variables. 
Historically, according to Black (2000), M&As have thrived in a low inflation 
environment. Uddin and Boateng (2011) argue that if the inflation rate in the acquirer 
country is very high, then acquirers would try to bid for acquisition of firms outside their 
home countries where the inflation rate is low. Other adverse impacts of inflation include 
value degradation of capital, misallocation of resources, and depression of markets. In 
cross border mergers, exchange rate fluctuations may also influence the relative strength 
of the acquirers‘ home currency with respect to that of the targets‘ which will impact the 
premium paid for the merger. Several studies (e.g. Harris and Ravenscraft 1991; Kiymaz 
and Mukherjee 2000) have shown that, when the acquirer country‘s currency is strong, 
the target shareholders benefit by receiving higher returns.  Kiymaz (2004) suggests that 
acquirers will benefit from a strong home currency during the transaction and from a 
weak home currency at the time of distributing dividends and cash flows. In general, 
inflation and exchange rates are more likely to influence expected cash flows from cross-
border mergers, and bidder shareholder return may also be influenced indirectly though 
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the impact of inflation and relative strength of currently in the bidder and target countries 
on the value of transactions. 
The results of the thesis may have some practical or strategic implications for managers and 
regulators. In terms of payment methods, strong implications were found regarding stock-
based deals, specifically those involving private target firms. Stock-based deals were shown 
to systematically generate higher returns for public bidders in cases of private acquisitions, 
something which could be strategically exploited by managers based on the potential 
signalling implications (i.e. revealing to market participants the true value of synergies in 
such mergers). However, for strategic purposes, public bidders may prefer to pay cash for 
public targets in order to ensure deal completion, since a robust analysis emphasises that 
cash-based deals are more likely to be successful.  
Additionally, some interesting inferences can be drawn from the diversification perspective. 
Even though domestic and focussed deals were shown to generate consistent negative returns, 
there is always a higher likelihood of such deals being completed, while the opposite was 
observed for cross-border and cross-industry deals. This anomaly could be related to the 
‗home country bias‘, which may suggest further policy implications for regulators, such as 
removing barriers to cross-country and cross-industry consolidation which could lead to 
improved welfare for all stakeholders.   
7.5. Further Research 
One of the many findings of this study concerns the factors influencing the probability of deal 
failure. Although the results indicated that cross-border and cross-industry diversification, 
acquisition of public targets, the stock method of payment, and single acquirers contributed to 
the likelihood of deal failure, the analysis is rather exploratory and suggests that there are 
potentially other more important factors that can explain M&A failure or success, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Further investigation is certainly needed to understand not only the 
factors influencing deal completion/failure but also the analysis of returns associated with 
failed deals. For example, liquidity problems of acquirers or targets may lead to inadequate 
funding to close the deal. 
There are four players in any M&A transaction: the acquirer, the target, the market, and the 
government, and the results of this study indicate that there tends to be no market expectation 
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surrounding the event in terms of whether a deal will ultimately succeed or fail, which 
supports the EMH. Therefore, further research is necessary to analyse the influence of market 
expectations which may be affected by market participants. For instance, are market 
participants, including shareholders, blockholders, and investors/institutional investors, able 
to influence the likelihood of deal failure? These influences could be reflected in earnings or 
analyst forecasts which might be considered in further research.  
Further research could also analyse the impact of regulations and corporate governance on 
shareholder returns and risk. For example, cross-country differences in regulations might be 
an important source of influence on acquirers‘ risk.  
This study has focussed primarily on the specific M&A factors affecting acquirers‘ market 
risk, but further research could analyse the influence of risk shifting between acquirer and 
target firms. Risk shifting also has an important influence in the theory of dividend payouts 
(Kanas 2013, Onali 2014), but risk shifting via mergers and acquisitions has not been 
previously studied, so future work might consider ways of incorporating the influence of risk 
shifting by acquirers in M&As. 
Moreover, prior studies have utilised a relatively unclear definition of acquirers‘ bidding 
experience; it is generally described as the number of completed deals by a single bidder 
within a specific time period. Further research could use other proxies to reflect acquirer 
experience from another perspective—for example, managerial board experience could 
improve the ability of the board of directors regarding accurate target valuation in order to 
avoid paying high target premiums. Managerial board experience could also be measured 
from various angles, such as the board of directors‘ years of experience, interlocks between 
bidder and target boards, education level of bidder board members, or the presence of 
investment bankers on the board. Therefore, further research could analyse whether acquirer 
experience combined with corporate governance influences contribute to the generation of 





To conclude, the author would like to emphasise that the current thesis has constituted an 
attempt to thoroughly analyse various hypotheses which have been discussed in the literature 
over several decades. Many earlier studies have used relatively small samples focussing on 
specific countries. As explained earlier, this thesis has aimed to fill an important gap by 
providing a robust study on a global sample of M&A data which, it is hoped, will provide 
new insight into various aspects of acquirers‘ risk and returns. The researcher has drawn on 
numerous papers covering different aspects of M&As, and the author would like to end by 
noting that research is an endless process. It is hoped that some of the critical results which 
have been generated from this thesis can be used to develop better theoretical understanding 
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Appendix 1: Acquirers’ Market Risk and Diversification 
Table ‎0.1: Acquirers’ Market Risk and Diversification 
      
 
Independent Samples t-Test Mann-Whitney U 
      N Mean Mean Diff. p-value Mean Rank Z p-value 
DAF 
Beta Before Ann. 




No 20430 .7388 17362 
Beta After Ann.  




No 20430 .7555 17317 
∆ Beta 




No 20430 .0168 17038 
DCI 
Beta Before Ann. 




No 22013 .7368 17209 
Beta After Ann. 




No 22013 .7615 17229 
∆ Beta (a) 




No 22013 .0247 17151 
CBF 
Beta Before Ann. 




No 29552 .7203 16932 
Beta After Ann. 




No 29552 .7425 16941 
∆ Beta (a) 




No 29552 .0222 17128 
CBCI 
Beta Before Ann. 
(a) 




No 30668 .7277 17046 
Beta After Ann. 




No 30668 .7488 17053 
∆ Beta (a) 




No 30668 .0211 17115 




      
Appendix 2: Acquirers’ Market Risk and Method of Payment 
Table ‎0.2: Acquirers’ Market Risk and Method of Payment 
        Independent Samples t-Test Mann-Whitney U 





Beta Before Ann. 




No 24054 .7158 16815 
Beta After Ann. 




No 24054 .7423 16898 
∆ Beta 




No 24054 .0265 17224 
Stock-Only 
Beta Before Ann. 




No 25627 .7244 17063 
Beta After Ann. 




No 25627 .7419 17047 
∆ Beta 




No 25627 .0174 17056 
Cash & Stock 
Combination 
Beta Before Ann. 




No 29120 .7372 17293 
Beta After Ann. 




No 29120 .7553 17242 
∆ Beta 




No 29120 .0181 17053 
    
Appendix 3: Acquirers’ Market Risk and Bidder Experience 
Table ‎0.3: Acquirers’ Market Risk and Bidder Experience 
        Independent Samples t-Test Mann-Whitney U 










No 17839 .6813 16277 
Beta After Ann. 




No 17839 .6949 16176 
∆ Beta 














No 15040 .6701 16101 
Beta After Ann. 




No 15040 .6803 15936 
∆ Beta 




No 15040 .0101 16835 
Correlations 
  Beta Before Ann. Beta After Ann. ∆ Beta 
Exp. 5-Y 
Pearson Correlation .105*** .117*** .013** 
Sig. .000 .000 .019 
Exp. 3-Y 
Pearson Correlation .085*** .097*** .014** 
Sig. .000 .000 .012 
Exp. 5-Y 
Spearman's rho Correlation .110*** .125*** .029*** 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 
Exp. 3-Y 
Spearman's rho Correlation .098*** .112*** .026*** 




Appendix 4: Acquirers’ Market Risk & Public Target Status (Public, Private, 
Subsidiary) 
Table 8.4: Acquirers’ Market Risk and Public Target Status (Public, Private, Subsidiary) 
        Independent Samples t-Test Mann-Whitney U 
      N Mean Mean Dif. p-value Rank Z p-value 
Public 
Beta Before Ann. 




Non-Pub. 23352 .7028 16606 
Beta After Ann. 




Non-Pub. 23352 .7257 16616 
∆ Beta 




Non-Pub. 23352 .0229 17117 
Private 
Beta Before Ann. 




Non- Private 18076 .7710 17978 
Beta After Ann. 




Non- Private 18076 .7918 17992 
∆ Beta 




Non- Private 18076 .0208 17099 
Sub. 
Beta Before Ann. 




Non-Sub. 27014 .7254 16967 
Beta After Ann. 




Non-Sub. 27014 .7457 16949 
∆ Beta 




Non-Sub. 27014 .0203 17114 
 
  





Appendix 5: M&A Deals According to Country of Target 
Target Country 
Country No % Country No % Country No % 
Albania 5 .011 Greenland 1 .002 Panama 18 0.038 




Antigua 5 .011 Guatemala 10 .021 Paraguay 4 0.009 
Argentina 137 .293 Guernsey 16 .034 Peru 91 0.195 
Armenia 5 .011 Guyana 10 .021 Philippines 179 0.383 
Aruba 1 .002 Haiti 1 .002 Poland 261 0.558 
Australia 2089 4.468 Honduras 1 .002 Portugal 89 0.190 
Austria 65 .139 Hong Kong 914 1.955 Puerto Rico 18 0.038 
Bahamas 8 .017 Hungary 33 .071 Qatar 7 0.015 
Bahrain 1 .002 Iceland 15 .032 Rep of Congo 7 0.015 
Bangladesh 6 .013 India 455 .973 Reunion 1 0.002 
Barbados 7 .015 Indonesia 287 .614 Romania 52 0.111 
Belarus 5 .011 Iran 1 .002 Russian Fed 239 0.511 
Belgium 160 .342 Iraq 7 .015 Rwanda 1 0.002 
Belize 4 .009 IrelandRep 154 .329 Saudi Arabia 20 0.043 
Bermuda 46 .098 Isle of Man 14 .030 Senegal 1 0.002 
Bolivia 10 .021 Israel 192 .411 Serbia 9 0.019 




Botswana 3 .006 Jamaica 4 .009 Seychelles 4 0.009 
Brazil 547 1.170 Japan 2968 6.348 Sierra Leone 2 0.004 
British Virgin 84 .180 Jersey 11 .024 Singapore 489 1.046 
Brunei 3 .006 Jordan 12 .026 Slovak Rep 15 0.032 
Bulgaria 31 .066 Kazakhstan 24 .051 Slovenia 20 0.043 
Burkina Faso 5 .011 Kenya 3 .006 Solomon Is 1 0.002 
Burundi 1 .002 Kuwait 27 .058 South Africa 445 0.952 
Cambodia 6 .013 Kyrgyzstan 17 .036 South Korea 1222 2.613 
Cameroon 2 .004 Laos 6 .013 Spain 383 0.819 
Canada 3127 6.688 Latvia 7 .015 Sri Lanka 10 0.021 
Cape Verde 1 .002 Lebanon 5 .011 Sudan 3 0.006 
Cayman 
Islands 
14 .030 Liberia 2 .004 Surinam 1 0.002 
Chile 135 .289 Lithuania 21 .045 Swaziland 2 0.004 
China 3087 6.602 Luxembourg 34 .073 Sweden 477 1.020 
Colombia 86 .184 Macau 4 .009 Switzerland 194 0.415 
Costa Rica 6 .013 Macedonia 6 .013 Syria 1 0.002 
Croatia 23 .049 Madagascar 2 .004 Taiwan 269 0.575 
Cuba 1 .002 Malaysia 1190 2.545 Tajikistan 3 0.006 
Cyprus 40 .086 Mali 6 .013 Tanzania 9 0.019 
Czech 
Republic 
73 .156 Malta 7 .015 Thailand 287 0.614 
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Czechoslovakia 3 .006 Marshall Is 2 .004 Togo 1 0.002 
Dem Rep 
Congo 
3 .006 Mauritania 3 .006 Trinidad&Tob 8 0.017 
Denmark 166 .355 Mauritius 10 .021 Tunisia 4 0.009 
Dominican Rep 9 .019 Mexico 168 .359 Turkey 125 0.267 
Ecuador 14 .030 Moldova 3 .006 Turkmenistan 2 0.004 
Egypt 42 .090 Monaco 9 .019 Turks/Caicos 1 0.002 
El Salvador 3 .006 Mongolia 16 .034 Uganda 3 0.006 
Eritrea 1 .002 Montenegro 2 .004 Ukraine 52 0.111 




Ethiopia 3 .006 Mozambique 7 .015 United States 17376 37.162 
Falkland Is 2 .004 Namibia 19 .041 Uruguay 12 0.026 
Faroe Islands 1 .002 Nepal 1 .002 Utd Arab Em 27 0.058 
Fiji 6 .013 
Neth 
Antilles 
4 .009 Uzbekistan 3 0.006 
Finland 227 .485 Netherlands 327 .699 Vanuatu 1 0.002 
Fr Polynesia 1 .002 
New 
Zealand 
148 .317 Venezuela 25 0.053 
France 737 1.576 Nicaragua 11 .024 Vietnam 39 0.083 




Georgia 5 .011 Niue 2 .004 Yemen 1 0.002 
Germany 606 1.296 North Korea 2 .004 Yugoslavia 5 0.011 
Ghana 11 .024 Norway 341 .729 Zambia 9 0.019 
Gibraltar 2 .004 Oman 6 .013 Zimbabwe 5 0.011 





Appendix 6: M&A Deals According to Country of Acquirer  
Acquirer Country 
Country No % Country No % Country No % 
Argentina 51 .109 Hong Kong 1089 2.329 Papua N Guinea 5 .011 
Australia 2168 4.637 Hungary 28 0.060 Peru 32 .068 
Austria 73 .156 Iceland 35 0.075 Philippines 159 .340 
Bahamas 7 .015 India 504 1.078 Poland 201 .430 
Bahrain 3 .006 Indonesia 167 0.357 Portugal 73 .156 
Belgium 159 .340 IrelandRep 197 0.421 Puerto Rico 10 .021 
Belize 6 .013 Isle of Man 17 0.036 Qatar 12 .026 
Bermuda 72 .154 Israel 205 0.438 Romania 4 .009 
Brazil 373 .798 Italy 323 0.691 Russian Fed 159 .340 
British Virgin 6 .013 Japan 3314 7.088 Saudi Arabia 15 .032 
Bulgaria 9 .019 Jersey 11 0.024 Singapore 579 1.238 
Cambodia 1 .002 Jordan 6 0.013 Slovak Rep 2 .004 
Canada 3813 8.155 Kenya 1 0.002 Slovenia 15 .032 
Cayman Islands 9 .019 Kuwait 38 0.081 South Africa 417 .892 
Chile 72 .154 Latvia 1 0.002 South Korea 1282 2.742 
China 2483 5.310 Lebanon 4 0.009 Spain 395 .845 
Colombia 35 .075 Liechtenstein 1 0.002 Sri Lanka 5 .011 
Croatia 8 .017 Luxembourg 29 0.062 Sweden 555 1.187 
Cyprus 31 .066 Malaysia 1279 2.735 Switzerland 248 .530 
Czech Republic 13 .028 Malta 4 0.009 Taiwan 279 .597 
Denmark 141 .302 Mexico 94 0.201 Tanzania 1 .002 
Egypt 28 .060 Morocco 5 0.011 Thailand 249 .533 
Estonia 9 .019 Namibia 1 0.002 Togo 1 .002 
Faroe Islands 1 .002 Neth Antilles 5 0.011 Turkey 77 .165 
Finland 279 .597 Netherlands 311 0.665 Ukraine 6 .013 
France 713 1.525 New Zealand 80 0.171 United Kingdom 5157 11.029 
Germany 483 1.033 Nigeria 2 0.004 United States 17434 37.286 
Ghana 4 .009 Norway 321 0.687 Uruguay 1 .002 
Gibraltar 4 .009 Oman 5 0.011 Utd Arab Em 19 .041 
Greece 169 .361 Pakistan 4 0.009 Venezuela 7 .015 
Guernsey 33 .071 Panama 2 0.004 Vietnam 20 .043 




Appendix 7: M&A Deals According to Years of Study 
 
Year No % Year No % 
1977 1 0.002 1995 1331 2.847 
1978 18 0.038 1996 1651 3.531 
1979 10 0.021 1997 1937 4.143 
1980 46 0.098 1998 2021 4.322 
1981 242 0.518 1999 2214 4.735 
1982 273 0.584 2000 2633 5.631 
1983 356 0.761 2001 1942 4.153 
1984 401 0.858 2002 1571 3.360 
1985 203 0.434 2003 1743 3.728 
1986 304 0.650 2004 2274 4.863 
1987 358 0.766 2005 2589 5.537 
1988 425 0.909 2006 3071 6.568 
1989 520 1.112 2007 3512 7.511 
1990 371 0.793 2008 2898 6.198 
1991 471 1.007 2009 2376 5.081 
1992 634 1.356 2010 2628 5.620 
1993 866 1.852 2011 2708 5.792 
1994 1134 2.425 2012 1026 2.194 
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Appendix 8: No of M&As based on Acquirer Industry  
Acquirer Mid Industry 
Mid Industry No. % Mid Industry No. % 
Advertising & Marketing 535 1.14 IT Consulting & Services 1469 3.14 
Aerospace & Defense 349 0.75 Legal Services 5 0.01 
Agriculture & Livestock 262 0.56 Machinery 1118 2.39 
Alternative Energy Sources 82 0.18 Metals & Mining 3530 7.55 
Alternative Financial Investments 371 0.79 Motion Pictures / Audio Visual 389 0.83 
Apparel Retailing 115 0.25 National Agency 1 0.00 
Asset Management 578 1.24 Non Residential 106 0.23 
Automobiles & Components 778 1.66 Oil & Gas 2362 5.05 
Automotive Retailing 150 0.32 Other Consumer Products 910 1.95 
Banks 3895 8.33 Other Energy & Power 223 0.48 
Biotechnology 382 0.82 Other Financials 1574 3.37 
Broadcasting 286 0.61 Other Healthcare 6 0.01 
Brokerage 449 0.96 Other High Technology 69 0.15 
Building/Construction & Engineering 1371 2.93 Other Industrials 945 2.02 
Cable 167 0.36 Other Materials 130 0.28 
Casinos & Gaming 145 0.31 Other Media & Entertainment 5 0.01 
Chemicals 854 1.83 Other Real Estate 794 1.70 
Computers & Electronics Retailing 122 0.26 Other Retailing 341 0.73 
Computers & Peripherals 931 1.99 Other Telecom 91 0.19 
Construction Materials 597 1.28 Paper & Forest Products 443 0.95 
Containers & Packaging 288 0.62 Petrochemicals 152 0.33 
Credit Institutions 152 0.33 Pharmaceuticals 1012 2.16 
Discount and Department Store Retailing 256 0.55 Pipelines 67 0.14 
Diversified Financials 16 0.03 Power 623 1.33 
Ecommerce / B2B 135 0.29 Professional Services 1293 2.77 
Educational Services 146 0.31 Public Administration 6 0.01 
Electronics 1004 2.15 Publishing 583 1.25 
Employment Services 249 0.53 Real Estate Management 229 0.49 
Food & Beverage Retailing 576 1.23 Recreation & Leisure 154 0.33 
Food and Beverage 1360 2.91 REITs 699 1.49 
Government Sponsored Enterprises 2 0.00 Residential 27 0.06 
Healthcare Equipment & Supplies 1016 2.17 Semiconductors 765 1.64 
Healthcare Providers & Services (HMOs) 610 1.30 Software 1810 3.87 
Home Furnishings 172 0.37 Space and Satellites 26 0.06 
Home Improvement Retailing 40 0.09 Supranational 2 0.00 
Hospitals 142 0.30 Telecommunications Equipment 602 1.29 
Hotels and Lodging 230 0.49 Telecommunications Services 750 1.60 
Household & Personal Products 235 0.50 Textiles & Apparel 666 1.42 
Industrial Conglomerates 47 0.10 Tobacco 48 0.10 
Insurance 789 1.69 Transportation & Infrastructure 897 1.92 
Internet and Catalog Retailing 138 0.30 Travel Services 105 0.22 
Internet Infrastructure 1 0.00 Water and Waste Management 349 0.75 
Internet Software & Services 1008 2.16 Wireless 351 0.75 





Appendix 9: Number of M&As based on Target Industry  
Target Mid Industry 
Mid Industry No. % Mid Industry No. % 
Advertising & Marketing 546 1.17 IT Consulting & Services 1474 3.15 
Aerospace & Defense 227 0.49 Legal Services 9 0.02 
Agriculture & Livestock 302 0.65 Machinery 1091 2.33 
Alternative Energy Sources 85 0.18 Metals & Mining 3504 7.49 
Alternative Financial Investments 90 0.19 Motion Pictures / Audio Visual 373 0.80 
Apparel Retailing 139 0.30 National Agency 1 0.00 
Asset Management 552 1.18 Non Residential 352 0.75 
Automobiles & Components 691 1.48 Oil & Gas 2372 5.07 
Automotive Retailing 158 0.34 Other Consumer Products 986 2.11 
Banks 3498 7.48 Other Energy & Power 196 0.42 
Biotechnology 366 0.78 Other Financials 1989 4.25 
Broadcasting 277 0.59 Other Healthcare 1 0.00 
Brokerage 514 1.10 Other High Technology 26 0.06 
Building/Construction & Engineering 1381 2.95 Other Industrials 886 1.89 
Cable 152 0.33 Other Materials 217 0.46 
Casinos & Gaming 91 0.19 Other Media & Entertainment 9 0.02 
Chemicals 781 1.67 Other Real Estate 936 2.00 
City Agency 1 0.00 Other Retailing 433 0.93 
Computers & Electronics Retailing 141 0.30 Other Telecom 73 0.16 
Computers & Peripherals 812 1.74 Paper & Forest Products 394 0.84 
Construction Materials 521 1.11 Petrochemicals 138 0.30 
Containers & Packaging 299 0.64 Pharmaceuticals 856 1.83 
Credit Institutions 257 0.55 Pipelines 100 0.21 
Discount and Department Store 
Retailing 
134 0.29 Power 567 1.21 
Diversified Financials 42 0.09 Professional Services 1893 4.05 
Ecommerce / B2B 146 0.31 Public Administration 4 0.01 
Educational Services 201 0.43 Publishing 501 1.07 
Electronics 845 1.81 
Real Estate Management & 
Development 
243 0.52 
Employment Services 235 0.50 Recreation & Leisure 263 0.56 
Food & Beverage Retailing 604 1.29 REITs 398 0.85 
Food and Beverage 1287 2.75 Residential 53 0.11 
Government Sponsored Enterprises 8 0.02 Semiconductors 702 1.50 
Healthcare Equipment & Supplies 1134 2.43 Software 2207 4.72 
Healthcare Providers & Services 
(HMOs) 
575 1.23 Space and Satellites 19 0.04 




Home Improvement Retailing 76 0.16 Telecommunications Services 660 1.41 
Hospitals 164 0.35 Textiles & Apparel 577 1.23 
Hotels and Lodging 298 0.64 Tobacco 31 0.07 
Household & Personal Products 164 0.35 Transportation & Infrastructure 971 2.08 
Insurance 831 1.78 Travel Services 133 0.28 
Internet and Catalog Retailing 112 0.24 Water and Waste Management 346 0.74 
Internet Infrastructure 1 0.00 Wireless 324 0.69 




Appendix 10: Number of M&As for Acquirer and Target Industries 
Macro Industry 
                               Target        
Acquirer 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) Total % 
(1) Consumer Products & 
Services 
1265 107 69 170 2 163 379 263 130 133 62 106 31 2880 6.16 
(2) Consumer Staples 142 1600 43 124 0 75 53 137 163 41 58 125 10 2571 5.50 
(3) Energy and Power 95 25 2822 180 0 15 96 301 196 29 27 36 36 3858 8.25 
(4) Financials 264 103 139 6047 3 87 268 229 227 136 192 78 53 7826 16.74 
(5) Government & Agencies 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 9 0.02 
(6) Healthcare 300 38 16 86 0 2339 104 97 67 16 29 62 14 3168 6.78 
(7) High Technology 516 38 99 263 0 127 4769 387 149 290 48 111 395 7192 15.38 
(8) Industrials 360 106 268 249 1 107 463 3050 446 76 199 88 92 5505 11.77 
(9) Materials 147 164 268 199 0 80 152 461 4170 54 90 31 26 5842 12.49 
(10) Media & Entertainment 254 26 10 88 0 15 314 58 41 1488 52 80 68 2494 5.33 
(11) Real Estate 60 21 24 213 0 40 39 111 54 91 1153 40 9 1855 3.97 
(12) Retail 136 124 21 94 0 31 89 66 36 58 61 1012 10 1738 3.72 
(13) Telecommunications 78 9 25 67 0 15 505 86 34 98 10 28 865 1820 3.89 
Total 3618 2361 3804 7781 6 3096 7231 5247 5716 2510 1982 1797 1609 46758 100 






Abnormal Return and Cumulative Abnormal Return  
 
Upload Data and Convert Price to Return 
 
yyb = xlsread(filename,BidderP); %reads the specified worksheet (bidder share price). 
xbidder = xlsread(filename,MarketP); %reads the specified worksheet (market index price). 
a = xlsread(filename,sheet); %reads the specified worksheet. 
ryb= price2ret(yyb); %convert price to return for bidder  
rmbidder= price2ret(xbidder); %convert price to return (market index) 
  




Yousef = 1:z; % z is the number of deals 
  
l1=100;  % number of days on the estimation period  
l2=61;  % number of days on the event period 
  
%for event (-30,+30); 61 days  
m1 = rmbidder(1:(l1),:); % return on market for estimation period 
y1 = ryb(1:(l1),:); % return on bidder for estimation period 
a1 = a(1:(l1),:);  
x2 = rmbidder((l1+1):(l1+l2),:);   % return on market for event period 
a2 = a((l1+1):(l1+l2),:);   
for i=Yousef; % i refers to columns of the matrix (number of deals) 
    Beta(:,i) = [a1,m1(:,(i))]\y1(:,(i)); 
    AR_est(:,i) = (y1(:,i)-([a1,m1(:,(i))]*Beta(:,i)))'; 
    yhat(:,i) = Beta(:,i)'*[a2,x2(:,(i))]'; 
end 
y2 = ryb((l1+1):(l1+l2),:);   % return on bidder for event period 
AR = y2 - yhat;        % abnormal return for event period 
CAR30f = sum (AR,1); % cumulative abnormal return for event period 
CAR_30 = sum(AR(1:31,:)); 
CAR = [CAR30f]; 
  
  
%for event (-20,+20); 41 days 
m11 = rmbidder(11:(l1+10),:); % return on market for estimation period  
y11 = ryb(11:(l1+10),:); % return on bidder for estimation period 
a11 = a(11:(l1+10),:);  
x220 = rmbidder((l1+1+10):(l1+10+41),:);   % return on market for event period 
a220 = a((l1+1+10):(l1+10+41),:); 
for i=Yousef; i refers to columns of the matrix (number of deals) 
    Beta20(:,i) = [a11,m11(:,(i))]\y11(:,(i)); 
    AR_est20(:,i) = (y11(:,i)-([a11,m11(:,(i))]*Beta20(:,i)))'; 
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    yhat20(:,i) = Beta20(:,i)'*[a220,x220(:,(i))]'; 
end 
y2220 = ryb((l1+1+10):(l1+10+41),:);   % return on bidder for event period 
AR20 = y2220 - yhat20;        % abnormal return for event period 
CAR20f = sum (AR20,1); 
CAR_20 = sum(AR20(1:21,:)); 
CAR20 = [CAR20f]; 
  
  
%for event (-10,+10); 21 days 
m110 = rmbidder(21:(l1+20),:); % return on market for estimation period  
y110 = ryb(21:(l1+20),:); % return on bidder for estimation period 
a110 = a(21:(l1+20),:);  
x220 = rmbidder((l1+1+20):(l1+20+21),:);   % return on market for event period 
a220 = a((l1+1+20):(l1+20+21),:); 
for i=Yousef; i refers to columns of the matrix (number of deals) 
    Beta10(:,i) = [a110,m110(:,(i))]\y110(:,(i)); 
    AR_est10(:,i) = (y110(:,i)-([a110,m110(:,(i))]*Beta20(:,i)))'; 
    yhat10(:,i) = Beta10(:,i)'*[a220,x220(:,(i))]'; 
end 
yR2220 = ryb((l1+1+20):(l1+20+21),:);   % return on bidder for event period 
AR10 = yR2220 - yhat10;        % abnormal return for event period 
CAR10f = sum (AR10,1); 
CAR_10 = sum(AR10(1:11,:)); 




%for event (-5,+5); 11 days 
m5 = rmbidder(26:(l1+25),:); % return on market for estimation period  
y5 = ryb(26:(l1+25),:); % return on bidder for estimation period 
a5 = a(26:(l1+25),:);  
x25 = rmbidder((l1+1+25):(l1+25+11),:);   % return on market for event period 
a25 = a((l1+1+25):(l1+25+11),:); 
for i=Yousef; i refers to columns of the matrix (number of deals) 
    Beta5(:,i) = [a5,m5(:,(i))]\y5(:,(i)); 
    AR_est5(:,i) = (y5(:,i)-([a5,m5(:,(i))]*Beta5(:,i)))'; 
    yhat5(:,i) = Beta5(:,i)'*[a25,x25(:,(i))]'; 
end 
y225 = ryb((l1+1+25):(l1+25+11),:);   % return on bidder for event period 
AR5 = y225 - yhat5;        % abnormal return for event period 
CAR5f = sum (AR5,1); 
CAR_5 = sum(AR5(1:6,:)); 
CAR5 = [CAR5f]; 
  
  
%for event (-3,+3); 7 days 
m3 = rmbidder(28:(l1+27),:); % return on market for estimation period  
y3 = ryb(28:(l1+27),:); % return on bidder for estimation period 
a3 = a(28:(l1+27),:);  
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x32 = rmbidder((l1+1+27):(l1+27+7),:);   % return on market for event period 
a32 = a((l1+1+27):(l1+27+7),:); 
for i=Yousef; i refers to columns of the matrix (number of deals) 
    Beta3(:,i) = [a3,m3(:,(i))]\y3(:,(i)); 
    AR_est3(:,i) = (y3(:,i)-([a3,m3(:,(i))]*Beta3(:,i)))'; 
    yhat3(:,i) = Beta3(:,i)'*[a32,x32(:,(i))]'; 
end 
y32 = ryb((l1+1+27):(l1+27+7),:);   % return on bidder for event period 
AR3 = y32 - yhat3;        % abnormal return for event period 
CAR3f = sum (AR3,1); 
CAR_3 = sum(AR3(1:4,:)); 
CAR3 = [CAR3f]; 
  
%for event (-2,+2); 5 days 
mS2 = rmbidder(29:(l1+28),:); % return on market for estimation period  
yS2 = ryb(29:(l1+28),:); % return on bidder for estimation period 
aS2 = a(29:(l1+28),:);  
xS2 = rmbidder((l1+1+28):(l1+28+5),:);   % return on market for event period 
aS22 = a((l1+1+28):(l1+28+5),:); 
for i=Yousef; i refers to columns of the matrix (number of deals) 
    BetaS2(:,i) = [aS2,mS2(:,(i))]\yS2(:,(i)); 
    AR_estS2(:,i) = (yS2(:,i)-([aS2,mS2(:,(i))]*BetaS2(:,i)))'; 
    yhatS2(:,i) = BetaS2(:,i)'*[aS22,xS2(:,(i))]'; 
end 
yS22 = ryb((l1+1+28):(l1+28+5),:);   % return on bidder for event period 
ARS2 = yS22 - yhatS2;        % abnormal return for event period 
CARS2 = sum (ARS2,1); 
  
  
%for event (-1,+1); 3 days 
mS1 = rmbidder(30:(l1+29),:); % return on market for estimation period  
yS1 = ryb(30:(l1+29),:); % return on bidder for estimation period 
aS1 = a(30:(l1+29),:);  
xS1 = rmbidder((l1+1+29):(l1+29+3),:);   % return on market for event period 
aS11 = a((l1+1+29):(l1+29+3),:); 
for i=Yousef; i refers to columns of the matrix (number of deals) 
    BetaS1(:,i) = [aS1,mS1(:,(i))]\yS1(:,(i)); 
    AR_estS1(:,i) = (yS1(:,i)-([aS1,mS1(:,(i))]*BetaS1(:,i)))'; 
    yhatS1(:,i) = BetaS1(:,i)'*[aS11,xS1(:,(i))]'; 
end 
yS11 = ryb((l1+1+29):(l1+29+3),:);   % return on bidder for event period 
ARS1 = yS11 - yhatS1;        % abnormal return for event period 





























% Write Microsoft Excel spreadsheet file 
 







Market Risk (Beta) 
Upload Data and Convert Price to Return 
 
yyb = xlsread(filename,BidderP); %reads the specified worksheet (bidder share price). 
xbidder = xlsread(filename,MarketP); %reads the specified worksheet (market index price). 
a = xlsread(filename,sheet); %reads the specified worksheet. 
ryb= price2ret(yyb); %convert price to return for bidder  
rmbidder= price2ret(xbidder); %convert price to return (market index) 
 
  




Yousef = 1:z; % z is the number of deals   
   
prd_0=260; % the number of days before announcement  














for i=Yousef;  
    Betab100(:,i) = [a100,mb100(:,(i))]\yb100(:,(i)); % beta before  
    Betab200(:,i) = [a200,mb200(:,(i))]\yb200(:,(i)); % beta after 
         
end 
  
Beta_all =[Betab100 Betab200]; 
 
 
